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This thesis was undertaken as part of a larger inter-university project “What’s up, 
Switzerland? Language, Individuals, and Ideologies in Mobile Messaging”, which was funded 
by the Swiss National Foundation and took place between January 2016 and December 2018 
(CRSII1-160714). The principal investigator of this Sinergia research was Prof. Dr. Elisabeth 
Stark at the University of Zurich. [1] The project consisted of four sub-projects investigating 
different aspects of digital communication. My thesis was specifically aligned with sub-project 
D, “The Cultural Discourses and Social Meanings of Mobile Communication”, directed by 
Prof. Dr. Crispin Thurlow at the University of Bern. Sub-project D was designed to 
investigate language about mobile communication and shed light on deep-seated media and 
language ideologies. [2] A core feature of this sub-project was the creation of an online 
repository of news reports about digital language and communication (The Digital Discourse 
Database), to be used by researchers engaged in digital discourse studies [3].  
 








Digial discourse is frequently framed in a technologically deterministic way that leads to a 
discourse of “moral panic” where digital language and digital media are held responsible for a 
variety of societal ills (e.g. Thurlow 2006, 2007, 2014; Tagliamonte & Denis, 2008; Vickery, 
2017). Very often, these discourses of moral panic target young people, and girls in particular. 
As Thurlow et al. (2019, p.14) argue, digital discourse is often framed around assumptions 
related to gender and age, but also related to race and class. This can be seen for example in 
two recent news media examples taken from the BBC (UK) and 20 Minutes (France). [4] The 
first is a lead from a BBC news story and focuses on “young people”: A social-media "trend" is 
leaving young people with genuine mental health problems "facing unfair and distressing criticism", private-
school leaders say. The second is a headline from the French news website 20 Mintutes and 
targets “girls”: Les filles qui passent du temps sur les réseaux sociaux sont plus sujettes à la depression (girls 
who spend time on social media are more likely to be depressed). I situate the current thesis 
against the backdrop of such ideologically-charged news discourses. I am particularly 
concerned with metadiscursive comments related to media ideologies (Gershon, 2010c), or 
people’s beliefs about the different media they use, these media effects on users, as well as the 
ways in which users’ beliefs are shaped by deep-seated social and cultural ideologies such as 
those concerning gender. By examining the “cultural discourses” (i.e. public discourses) and 
“social meanings” (i.e. embedded practices) of digital media from a multimodal and a 
multilingual perspective, my research offers new perspectives into the field of digital discourse 
studies (e.g. Thurlow, 2018). In order to critically examine digital practices and the ideologies 
attached to them, I use a combination of approaches that fall into the broader framework of 
“multimodal critical discourse analysis” (cf. Machin, 2013). My thesis is organized around five 
chapters that investigate examples from the press (i.e. cultural discourses) and from actual 
	 vi	
users (i.e. social meanings) in order to reveal the interplay between language ideologies, media 
ideologies, and gender ideologies. In the end, I show the “affective” connection between the 
news media’s ideologies and the audience’s responses to the media’s ideologies. As Grossberg 
(1992, p.82-83) phrases it, “affect is the missing term in an adequate understanding of 
ideology”. Ultimately, I discuss the nuance in the moral panic discourses revealed in the press 
and among users, as users themselves also challenge what they hear and see in the news. 
Although many discourses are imbued with a sentiment of fear and anxiety, the “affective 
regimes” (cf. Wee, 2016) of digital discourse are more subtle.   
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“[M]oral panics have become the way in which daily events are brought to the attention of the public. 
They are a standard response, a familiar, sometimes weary, even ridiculous rhetoric rather than an 
exceptional emergency intervention. Used by politicians to orchestrate consent, by business to promote 
sales in certain niche markets, and by media to make home and social affairs newsworthy, moral panics 




“Depression in girls linked to higher use of social media” 
“Research suggests link between social media and depressive symptoms was stronger for girls compared 
with boys”  
(Headline and sub-head from the newspaper The Guardian, UK, 4 January 2019) 
 
 
A recent news story from the British newspaper The Guardian (quoted above in Extract 1.1) serves 
as the perfect example of how the news media problematically frames girls’ digital media practices. 
As Thurlow (2017, p.17) demonstrates, news media discourse often portrays women and girls’ 
digital media use and practices in a reductionist mannner that emphasizes women’s vulnerability, 
which is what the above headline from The Guardian and its sub-head illustrate. They serve to 
create a sense of “moral panic”, which McRobbie & Thornton (quoted above) define as “a 
standard response, a familiar, sometimes weary, even ridiculous rhetoric” which the media uses 
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“to make home and social affairs newsworthy” (p.560). McRobbie & Thornton emphasize the 
everydayness of moral panic discourses, which circulate across many different domains and among 
many different groups of people. It is specifically the “everyday” quality of moral panic discourse 
that draws my interest, as in this thesis I investigate how different kinds of moral panic discourses 
regarding digital communication circulate on a daily basis, through news media discourse and in 
everyday conversations. Another crucial point that McRobbie & Thornton’s quote highlights is the 
fact that moral panic discourses are “constructed”. This implies that they are socially and 
culturally shaped, and also that people themselves can challenge such discourses and (re)negotiate 
meaning, as recent “moral panic” research demonstrates (e.g. Critcher, 2008; McRobbie & 
Thornton, 1995). As I explain throughout this thesis, new perspectives on moral panic take into 
account the plurality of voices and the role of the audience in the constant (re)negotiation and 
(re)construction of fear-mongering discourses. 
 In the current thesis, I investigate the everyday circulation of moral panic discourses 
concerning new/digital media, and the language ideologies, media ideologies, and gender 
ideologies associated with them. More specifically, I explore different aspects of new media, or as 
Ilana Gershon (2017, p.15) suggests, how people (i.e. the news media and the audience in this case) 
understand the use and practices of specific communicative channels in the creation of new “social 
practices”. I thus focus on new media in Gershon’s sense, but I specifically investigate digital media 
and communication in digital environments. In fact, digital technologies are not seen as “new” 
anymore, which is why the focus should rather be on what is new about their context of use and 
their socio-cultural impact (Flew, 2014; Tannen & Trester, 2013). In the same vein, Lievrouw & 
Livingstone (2006) propose analyzing new media by taking into account three specific 
components: the material aspect of the technology itself, the use/activity of the technology, and the 
social shaping of the technology. Here, I use the terms new media and digital media interchangeably 
although they highlight different aspects of a technology. New media emphasizes the newness of 
what a certain technology allows, and digital media focuses on the way that information is 
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transmitted (see Deumert, 2014 for an overview of different terms used). I do not use the term 
CMC, which puts an emphasis on the medium used. As Thurlow (2018, p.136) suggests, 
terminology and labeling can sometimes be confusing in the field of digital discourse studies. 
Nevertheless, the terms one uses shed light on crucial theoretical concepts. In this thesis, I most 
often use the term “digital media” since I am referring to any digitally-mediated form of 
communication.  
 As I explore people’s “digital practices”, I investigate what Jones et al. (2015, p. 3) call 
“‘assemblages’ of actions involving tools associated with digital technologies, which have come to 
be recognized by specific groups of people as ways of attaining particular social goals, enacting 
particular social identities, and reproducing particular sets of social relationships”. In other words, 
I expand on previous work done in the field of digital discourse studies as I monitor how digital 
technologies continue to enable new forms of communication, new relationships, and new “social 
practices” (cf. Gershon, 2017). Burgess et al. (2018a, p.1) claim that we are living in a “social 
media paradigm” dominated by social media technologies that “facilitate communication and 
collaboration by users”. Although they favor the term “social media” over “new media” (outdated) 
and “digital media” (too broad), I aim to investigate the “newness” of digital media in Gershon’s 
sense. Digital media (and the “newness” of these media) are rapidly evolving and changing, and so 
are the social practices of which they are a part. In order to better understand digital media, it is 
essential to look at how they work and how people use and understand them at different moments 
in time. To do so, I take into account different theoretical perspectives within digital discourse 
studies. Although I do not investigate the language of/in digital media per se, or the “micro-level 
linguistic practices” (Thurlow et al., 2019, p.3), I rely on the latest digital discourse studies (e.g. 
Georgakopoulou & Spilioti, 2015; Seargeant & Tagg, 2014; Thurlow, 2018) in order to better 
understand how people talk about the language of/in digital media, or the “macro-level socio-
cultural processes” (Thurlow et al., 2019, p.3). Very often, discourses about digital media target 
young people, and girls in particular. As Thurlow et al. (2019, p.14) argue, discourses about 
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(young) people’s digital media use and practices are inherently gendered, raced, and classed. In 
this thesis, I mainly address the gendered aspect of digital media, and attempt to provide a better 
understanding of what people believe to be the relationship between women and digital media. 
While there certainly is a “feminist uptake of digital communication” that attempts to counter 
sexism and patriarchy (Mendes et al., 2018, p.237), the media’s portrayal of women’s relationship 
with digital media does not necessarily align with this new trend of resistance.  
 While investigating various discourses about digital media I try to keep in mind what Spilioti 
(2015, p.134) states: 
Investigating the ways in which digital media and language use are talked about, understood and valued 
is important because it opens up a window into the very ways in which symbolic meanings are assigned 
to language and digital communication at particular moments in history 
 
Discourses about digital media and digital communication are key evidence of our society’s 
concerns, fears, and beliefs, and as such, they reveal much about the ways in which people 
function, and how they value language, communication, and technologies at a certain time and 
place (Spilioti, 2015, p.134). Moreover, the “cultural discourses” (i.e. public discourses) and “social 
meanings” (i.e. embedded practices) surrounding digital communication reflect not only key 
concerns that people have within a specific socio-historical context, “they can impact upon the 
development and integration of digital technologies in people’s everyday lives” (Spilioti, 2015, 
p.134; see also Sturken & Thomas, 2004, p.3). In this thesis, I thus explore ideologies about digital 
media from a multilingual and multinational perspective, in order to gain a better understanding 
of digital media practices and their impact on users. In an age when digital media are used to 
regulate various domains of our daily lives (e.g. to break up, organize protests, condemn 
discrimination, spread political ideas, etc.), it is essential to attend to the sociocultural impact of 
such technologies, which is the goal of this thesis. 
 I now delineate the major theories and concepts that frame my research, from (digital) 
discourse studies in general to more specific language, media, and gender ideologies, and 
metadiscourse studies.  
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(Digital) discourse studies  
	
…discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned – it constitutes situations, objects of 
knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of people. It is 
constitutive both in the sense that it helps to sustain and reproduce the social status quo, and in the sense 
that it contributes to transforming it. Since discourse is so socially consequential, it gives rise to 
important issues of power. (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997, p.258) 
 
 
I closely follow Fairclough and Wodak’s definition of discourse as “social practice”. Although 
“discourse” can be defined as language beyond the level of the sentence, language in use, and 
language related to social order and social practice, contemporary discourse scholars favor a more 
social approach and thus focus on the third definition; they investigate processes beyond language 
in use (see Cameron & Panovic, 2014; Tannen et al, 2015; and Jaworski & Coupland, 2014 for 
thorough overviews of discourse studies). In other words, they examine the role that language and 
other semiotic modes play in the shaping of social life, thus considering discourse as a form of 
social practice. Consequently, discourse studies are not the sole concern of linguists; scholars who 
situate themselves within a social, cultural, philosophical, or psychological field – among others – 
also explore the interplay between language and society (Jaworski & Coupland, 2014, p.3). In this 
regard, discourse studies examine how people make sense of their environment and how they 
interpret their social and cultural world. Discourse analysts explore how people classify and 
interpret certain concepts since “the building of knowledge and interpretation is largely a process 
of defining boundaries between conceptual classes, and of labeling those classes and the 
relationships between them” (Jaworski & Coupland, 2014, p.3). Such an approach is critical in the 
sense that discourse scholars do not just describe language; indeed, they deconstruct people’s social 
practices in order to uncover power relationships and issues of inequality. As such, “[a]ny social 
phenomenon lends itself to critical investigation, to be challenged and not taken for granted” 
(Wodak & Meyer, 2001, p.2). [5] 
 Part of the field of discourse studies, digital discourse scholarship also attempts to shed light 
on broader socio-cultural processes and on the role of language in the shaping of social life. This is 
why, Thurlow (2018) argues, “discourse” is one of the core organizing principles of digital 
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discourse studies (see also Thurlow & Mroczek, 2011). Before taking into account the relevance of 
“discourse”, research in digital discourse started in the 1990s with studies that examined the 
linguistic and formal features related to computer-mediated communication (CMC). The so-called 
“first wave” of digital discourse research was more medium-related than user-related, and because 
of its focus on the medium, early research unintentionally implied a deterministic relationship 
between the digital medium and the language used, as Squires (2010, p.462) explains. Susan 
Herring (e.g. 1996) greatly influenced digital discourse research by giving the field its foundational 
concepts. Herring & Androutsopoulos’s (2015) overview of computer-mediated discourse (CMD) 
divided the field into six areas of research: the nature of CMD (e.g. modality, genres), discourse 
structure (e.g. typography, syntax), meaning (e.g. through words, emoticons, intertextuality), 
interaction (e.g. turn-taking norms), social practice (e.g. sociolinguistic variation, interaction and 
identity) and multimodal CMD (e.g. emojis, GIFs, videos). However, as Thurlow (2018) and 
Georgakopoulou & Spilioti (2015) argue, digital discourse scholars have tried to shift their concern 
towards a more socially (and sociolinguistic) oriented approach that focuses less on the digital 
medium and the linguistic forms of CMC. Digital discourse scholarship has thus moved towards a 
perspective “that no longer shies away from cross-fertilizations with social theory; that has 
embraced interactional approaches and is much less wary of ‘discourse’ [my emphasis]” 
(Georgakopoulou, 2006, p.548). Therefore, the latest digital discourse research acknowledges the 
fact that communication is always contextualized and dependent on a wide range of factors such 
as identity, relationships, groups/communities, and context. The most recent theoretical approach 
corresponds with the so-called “third wave” of digital communication research, where “critical 
approaches to discourses and ideologies of digital communication are rapidly becoming focal 
concerns” (Georgakopoulou & Spilioti 2015, p.5). Therefore, the latest research in digital discourse 
studies (e.g. Androutsopoulous, 2011; Burgess et al., 2018b; Georgakopoulou & Spilioti 2015; 
Sargent & Tagg, 2014; Thurlow, 2018; Thurlow and Mroczek, 2011) is more socially oriented and 
allows scholars to shed light on issues related to the “social meanings” or “embedded practices” of 
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digital communication and social media, and to better understand language and connected media 
ideologies.  
 The second ‘core principle’ of current digital discourse studies, as outlined by Thurlow 
(2018; see also Thurlow & Mroczek, 2011) is “multimodality”. [6] Multimodality draws on the 
tradition of “social semiotics”, which allows for the study of “the semiotic potential of a given 
semiotic resource” and for exploring “how that resource has been, is, and can be used for purposes 
of communication” (van Leeuwen, 2005, p.5). In the study of visual design, one explores visual 
resources that perform a particular sort of semiotic work, or metafunction (cf. Jewitt & Oyama, 
2001, p.140). Importantly, digital discourse studies are increasingly taking into account other 
modes of communication (e.g. visual, auditory, and embodied engagement) in addition to written 
and spoken language (e.g. Jewitt, 2015; Keating, 2015). Thurlow et al. (2019) suggest two ways in 
which scholars might address multimodality in the field of digital discourse. First, researchers 
might investigate the visual resources used in digitally mediated communication, such as emojis, 
GIFs, or videos (e.g. Androutsopoulos & Tereick, 2015; Dürscheid & Siever, 2017), and others 
might rather focus on the ways in which digital discourse is visually represented in different media 
(e.g. Thurlow, 2017; Thurlow et al., 2019); the latter is the perspective which I follow.  
 The third ‘core principle’ that Thurlow (2018) outlines is “ideology”, or the relationship 
between language and macro-level systems of beliefs. With regards to the ideological nature of 
digital media and digital communication, Spilioti (2016, p.133) states: 
The study of language use in digital communication cannot shy away from the wider social, cultural and 
historical discourses about digital media that interplay with the micro-level stylistic, textual and 
interactional practices of everyday users  
Spilioti reminds us that both micro-level linguistic issues and macro-level ideological matters are 
interconnected. Since I will delve into the concept of “ideology” in more detail in the following 
section, I now simply propose to consider Thurlow’s (2018) perspective in order to understand the 
relationship between both. Thurlow (2018) suggests two ways in which digital media scholars 
might investigate the relationship between language and ideology. The first approach centers on 
the ways in which our linguistic and communicative practices constitute our ideological system, 
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and the second approach explores the ways in which ideologies shape our communicative 
practices (Thurlow, 2018, p.138). Consequently, communicative practices are related to small-d-
discourse, and language ideologies are related to discursive practices known as big-D Discourses 
(Gee, 2011). D-discourses are representations of broader social and cultural communicative and 
representational practices reproduced within powerful organizations (Spilioti, 2015). According to 
Gee (2011, p.30), D Discourse “is a characteristic way of saying, doing, and being”. People speak, 
act, and create different identities in different contexts, and classify things in distinctive categories 
according to “norms”. In doing so, they create relations of power and inequality through their use 
of language, actions, and values, employing “discourse” as a form of social action. People act and 
create links between linguistic forms (small-d discourse) and social phenomena (big-D Discourse) 
within specific ideological frameworks. These links are rarely questioned and become naturalized 
in their performance. Indeed, ideological relationships do not just “exist” devoid of any context; 
they can only become “real” in practice. I would now like to turn to the next section where I 
explore the concept of “ideology” in greater detail by looking at three kinds of ideologies: language 
(and semiotic) ideologies, media ideologies, and gender ideologies (gender ideologies are part of 
broader cultural/social ideologies).  
Ideology 
Language (and semiotic) ideologies 
Ideologies are “any constellation of fundamental or commonsensical, and often normative, ideas 
and attitudes related to some aspect(s) of social ‘reality’” (Blommaert & Verschueren, 1998, p.25). 
Language ideologies – beliefs, attitudes, conceptualizations about language practices – are 
interconnected with broader moral, political, and cultural interests (Irvine, 1989; Kroskrity, 2004; 
Silverstein, 1979; Woolard, 1998). Although there is no set methodology for examining language 
ideologies (Coupland & Jaworski, 2004, p.37), Irvine and Gal (2000) propose a framework which is 
useful for understanding the interplay between linguistic features and broader socio-cultural 
processes, where certain linguistic forms index group identities. By interpreting relationships 
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between language and social identities, people create linguistic ideologies. Irvine and Gal (2000) 
suggest three semiotic processes that people use to explain linguistic differences: “fractal 
recursivity”, “iconization”, and “erasure”. “Fractal recursivity” involves the reproduction of 
opposition at different levels. For example, certain ideologies can be “applied to further groups or 
activities” (Androutsopoulos, 2010, p. 184). Androutsopoulos (2010) uses fractal recursivity to 
explain the meaning of linguistic difference between standard German and ethnolects. If there is 
opposition between linguistic varieties (i.e. standard German and ethnolect), the dichotomy will 
recur at another level (i.e. between people). If standard German is seen as the norm and an 
ethnolect as a deviant form, the same opposition will be applied to both social groups. As a result, 
the ethnolect is the language of “problem youth” and standard German is “normal German 
reality” (Androutsopoulos, 2010, p.198). The next step in constructing language ideologies is 
“iconization”, a process which involves associating a linguistic form with a particular social group, 
thus making the linguistic feature an essence of the group. Although Thurlow’s (2014) study 
examines all three ideological processes (i.e. erasure, iconization, and recursivity), here I only 
discuss Thurlow’s perspective on “iconization”. Thurlow (2014, p.489) discusses the case of “mock 
texting” which focuses on the supposed unintelligibility of young people’s digital language. The 
author argues that metadiscursive comments in the press related to young people’s texting habits 
are “simplified caricatures and bear little resemblance to the kinds of messages most young people 
send” (Thurlow, 2014, p.489); therefore, he claims that text message language is commonly seen 
as an icon of young people. Finally, “erasure” is an ideological practice which removes anything 
that does not align with a specific belief in order to maintain iconic distinctions. For example, 
Squires (2011) demonstrates how the media removes adult text message practices from their news 
reports because this does not fit with their “digital nativist” ideology. In his recent study of the 
news media’s representation of “sexting” (a particular type of digital discourse), Thurlow (2017) 
also applies Irvine and Gal’s (2000) framework and demonstrates how sexting is understood as a 
typical youth phenomenon (cf. iconization), how actual users’ relationships are not mentioned (cf. 
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erasure), and how individual practices are displaced to a whole generation of young people (cf. 
recursivity). Consequently, Irvine and Gal’s (2000) framework is an excellent analytical tool to 
determine to what extent the language we use – through the use of the three semiotic processes – 
feeds our beliefs and ideologies regarding digital discourse. Similarly, multiple studies (e.g. in 
Jaworski et al., 2004; Johnson & Ensslin, 2007; Milani & Johnson, 2010) explore the concept of 
language representation as part of language ideologies. They investigate the social and cultural 
processes that affect linguistic forms, and the links between forms of talk and broader categories 
such as people’s identity and relationships. In this regard, an ideology functions as a system of 
representation, “a structured pattern of semiotic resources, which misrecognizes what is merely 
arbitrary, and re-signifies it as intrinsically natural, logical and morally good” (Milani 2007, p.114). 
Therefore, ideologies about (digital) language also reflect deep-seated beliefs about how meaning is 
made and how communication functions; they are reflective of deeper “semiotic ideologies”. 
Semiotic ideologies are “basic assumptions about what signs are and how they function in the 
world” (Keane 2003, p.419; see also Thurlow, 2017, and Parmentier, 1994 for the first reference 
of semiotic ideology). Keane (2003) developed the concept of “semiotic ideology” while exploring 
the status of material things; more precisely, his essay is a call for the use of other modes (besides 
language) to approach materiality in the world. As such, Thurlow (2017, p.15) proposes to look at 
the connection between semiotic ideologies and broader questions of multimodality, since semiotic 
ideologies involve ways of thinking about different modes as being better/worse than others. In the 
same vein, Thurlow (2017, p.15) claims that “the way we talk about meaning-making says a lot 
about whose ways of making meaning are considered better and whose beliefs about meaning-
making are most powerful or influential”. These are, Thurlow (2017, p.15) suggests, matters 
related to wider questions of “symbolic authority”, or “representational economies” according to 
Keane (2003). Although both language ideologies and semiotic ideologies structure the social 
meanings of digital communication, Thurlow’s (2017) study demonstrates how “media ideologies” 
(cf. Gershon, 2010c) are also interrelated with both language and semiotic ideologies. This leads 
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me to the next theoretical concept that I would like to examine, that of “media ideology”.  
Media ideologies 
Within the field of digital discourse, a system of representation does not only reveal language and 
semiotic ideologies; indeed, when people discuss matters related to their digital communicative 
practices, they inevitably make allusions that are tied to their beliefs about different media, which 
are called “media ideologies” (Gershon, 2010c; see also Thurlow, 2017). Ilana Gershon (2010a) 
introduced the concept of “media ideologies” in her innovative study about young people’s talk 
about breakups. She argued that people do not always agree on the definition of a “good” breakup 
and on what is (in)appropriate use of digital media, because they have different media ideologies. 
As such, “media ideologies are what people believe about how the medium affects or should affect 
the message” (Gershon, 2010b, p.391). Gershon (2010c) also recognizes that media ideologies are 
connected to language ideologies since they work in the same way. However, the focus on the 
material aspect of the technology is what distinguishes media ideologies from language ideologies. 
Discussing media ideologies inevitably forces us to consider questions of “materiality” (i.e. the 
physical properties of a given technology), “referentiality” (i.e. contextualization), “address” (i.e. 
audience identity), “remediation” (i.e. how beliefs about older media shape beliefs about newer 
media), and “newness” (i.e. how people think about the “newness” of new media) (see Gershon, 
2010c for an introduction to these concepts, as well as Thurlow, 2017). [7] As I stated at the 
beginning of this introductory chapter, “newness” refers to the understanding of the use and 
practices of specific communicative channels in the creation of new “social practices”. An 
important element of these new “social practices” concerns cultural and social ideologies that are 
tightly connected to digital media. For example, Thurlow et al. (2019, p.14) argue that digital 
communication is often framed as a youth, middle-class, white and urban phenomenon, which is 
also gendered as a female practice. Similarly, Thurlow (2017) investigates the ways in which 
“sexting” (as a digital practice) is linguistically and visually represented in news media discourse, 
and how metadiscourse about sexting often concerns women and girls. News media discourse 
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tends to portray women/girls as well as their digital media use and practices in reductionist and 
degrading ways, similar to the way women/girls have been represented in the media for years. 
This brings me to the next section where I discuss gender ideologies with regards to (digital) media. 
Gender ideologies 
	
Gender as a social construction 
Before going any further, it is worth defining what I mean by “gender” and by other terms such as 
“sex” and “sexuality”. In recent years, various social science scholars have detailed their concerns 
regarding the problematic definitions of these terms as well as misunderstandings and 
misconceptions about their meaning, which have led to much ambiguity and confusion (e.g. 
Cameron, 2010; Marwick, 2014; Mcelhinny, 2003; Pinto-Coelho & Mota-Ribeiro, 2016; 
Richardson, 2007). However, as Mcelhinny (2003, p. 36) and Pinto-Coelho & Mota-Ribeiro 
(2016, p.53) argue, conceptions and definitions of these terms are ideological. As such, struggles 
over the meaning of “gender”, “sex” and “sexuality” “are also over language in the sense that 
having the power to determine which meanings are ‘correct’ is an important aspect of social and 
ideological power” (Pinto-Coelho & Mota-Ribeiro, 2016, p.53). Consequently, the perspective I 
offer concerning the terminology of such important concepts should also be viewed as ideological. 
Nevertheless, defining these terms allows for a better understanding of my thesis and what I 
attempt to demonstrate through my analyses.    
 As early as 1987, West and Zimmerman (1987) proposed looking at “sex” as a social 
construction, challenging the received ideas of the previous decades that viewed “sex” as a 
biological and fixed “given”, while “gender” was seen as a cultural construction. Since then, 
scholars have been challenging the overly simplistic dualism that characterizes “sex”, “gender”, 
and “sexuality”. The concept of “sexuality” has often been misunderstood in terms of a simplistic 
dichotomy between “heterosexual” and “homosexual”. As Marwick (2014) explains, sexuality “is 
an individual expression and understanding of desire” (p.62), and does not necessarily follow these 
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two commonly-accepted binary categories. Therefore, post-structuralist sociolinguists have been 
deconstructing such presuppositions and have been following the approach of the social 
construction of “sex” in order to address the problematic framing of sex and gender (Mcelhinny, 
2003). Importantly, as Mcelhinny (2003, p.24) claims, proponents of this approach do not merely 
investigate gender differences; rather, they “ask how and why gender differences are being 
constructed in that way, or what notion of gender is being normalized in such behavior”.  
 In popular (and sometimes “expert”) discourse, “gender” is often understood as being 
rooted in biological differences. For instance, Marwick (2014, p.61) explains that people tend to 
view both sex and gender differences based on biological differences; as a result, gender is a “social 
understanding of how sex should be experienced”. However, gender results from sociocultural 
expectations and norms. In the same vein, Cameron (2010) discusses the upsurge of the “new 
biologism”, a perspective that views differences between men and women as caused by biological 
differences – such a message can also be found in academic and scientific discourse. In her article, 
Cameron argues against the “new biologism” and what some scientific experts claim in order to 
prove that gender differences are not based on biological differences. Rather, Cameron favors a 
more social-constructionist approach to explain such differences.  
 Research in Media and Gender has been attempting to deconstruct gender representations 
and demonstrate how they function as “constructions” and how they do not always mirror reality 
(e.g. Carter, 2012; de Lauretis, 1987; Goffman, 1979; Hall, 1997; Ott & Mack, 2014). In this 
regard, gender is something we “do” or perform, but not something we “are” (cf. Butler, 1990). 
We can thus also construct our gender identities through our consumer behavior by seeing gender 
being performed around us (e.g. in the media) and by being taught how to perform the “right” 
gender (e.g. at school and at home). Children are socialized by their parents/caregivers, teachers, 
media institutions, and society at large to adopt the “correct” gender behavior: either a “female” 
or a “male” behavior. Consequently, there is pressure for children to conform to appropriate 
gender categories; and partly through the media’s perpetuation of fixed and normalized gendered 
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representations, gender socialization continues. In the same vein, de Lauretis (1987, p.4) suggests 
that gender is “the representation of a relation, that of belonging to a class, a group, a category”. 
These representations – products of the media or of “social technologies” (de Lauretis, 1987, p.2) – 
show media consumers how they should behave, perform, or act if they belong to a certain 
category. For instance, Mitra and Jones’s study (2012) investigates gender roles in TV ads aimed at 
children. They show that children are aware of gender dichotomies in the ads they are being 
presented and of the “appropriate” behavior to adopt if they are a boy or a girl. For example, 
liking pink is not acceptable for a boy since this goes against perceived gender-appropriate 
behavior. When blurring the distinctions between sex and gender, the media creates and attempts 
to fix hegemonic definitions of patriarchy and provides a guide to “appropriate” and “natural” 
behavior that people should follow. However, if one considers gender differences as cultural 
constructions – as opposed to “given” and “natural” – this allows for the possibility of change. In 
this regard, such differences depend on socio-historical elements that evolve over time. For 
instance, Dennis (2012) notes that during the era of King Louis XIV in France, wearing a wig and 
lipstick was considered masculine. Therefore, as scholars suggest (e.g. Carter, 2012; Dennis, 2012; 
Lazar, 2000), gender meanings are never fixed and can differ across time, culture, race, and class. 
Similarly, as Gauntlett (2002, p.6) claims, “what we learned in the 1960s, 1970s or 1980s about 
media and gender might not be so relevant today, because the media has changed, and people's 
attitudes have changed”. Meanings tend to change; yet certain gender representations have been 
remarkably resilient over time because of the role of the media in trying to fix hegemonic 
definitions of masculinity.  
 Similarly, Language and Gender research followed the same evolution to show that 
differences between men and women’s communication styles are not biological or natural. 
Research into language and gender exploded after the year 1975, when studies based on 
“difference” emerged, such as Robin Lakoff’s (1975) groundbreaking work “Language and 
woman’s place”, which describes “women’s language” and subsequent gender inequalities. 
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Linguistic research that focused on “difference” still dominated until the end of the twentieth 
century, and culminated with Deborah Tannen’s (1990) work “You just don’t understand”, which 
became popular within non-academic audiences as well. In this era, the idea that men and women 
were naturally different was still quite common, and was used to help explain common 
misunderstandings between men and women (Cameron, 2006, p.136-137). However, as Cameron 
(2010, p.532-533) suggests, more recent studies have attempted to show, through empirical 
evidence, just how difficult it is to characterize women’s language in uniform ways (e.g. the idea 
that women talk more than men or that women are more co-operative than men). Rather, recent 
scholarly work (e.g. Goodwin, 2006; Kotthoff, 2010; Wodak, 2015) shows that language is bound 
to historical and socio-cultural factors, and that it is thus subject to much variation. In other words, 
differences between men and women’s communication styles are “statistical tendencies” 
(Cameron, 2006, p.145) and are influenced by sociocultural factors; they are not necessarily 
biological or natural.  
 
Gender and/in media studies 
As I said above, gender and media scholars explore the idea that gendered messages are cultural 
constructions which revolve around relationships of power in a masculine-dominant society. 
Although the media directs audiences towards “preferred” (i.e. hegemonic) meanings (cf. Hall, 
1997), viewers and readers can still modify and reject the media’s perspective. The media certainly 
plays a powerful role in influencing its audience in certain ways; however, the media alone cannot 
create meaning by itself. Prior to the 1970s, communication scholars viewed the interpretation of a 
message as linear, “based on the idea of the closed message transmitted between sender and 
receiver” (Thornham et al., 2009, p.10). However, during the “cultural turn” of the 1970s, Stuart 
Hall (1997) introduced a major shift in our conception of culture; he offered a definition of culture 
as “shared meanings”, highlighting a social constructionist view of meaning produced and created 
in exchanges as opposed to the traditional belief that things have meaning in and of themselves 
	 16	
(see also Bell & Garrett, 1998; and Talbot, 2007). As such, Hall explores the ways in which 
meanings are exchanged in a “circuit of culture” while examining the relationship between a text’s 
production and reception. According to this approach, meaning is constantly reworked and 
shaped through different relationships, in a dialogic way. As a result, for the first time, scholars 
have started to take into consideration the fact that the audience “might shape the future media 
output” and that one can investigate the production process by exploring the text and its reception 
(Thorham et al., 2009, p.10). According to Hall (1997, p.1), language – composed of signs and 
symbols such as sounds, words, and images – constructs meaning through a system of 
representation. These signs “are vehicles or media which carry meaning because they operate as 
symbols, which stand for or represent (i.e. symbolize) the meanings we wish to communicate” (Hall, 
1997, p.5). Audiences resort to their own systems of representation to decode such texts. They 
make associations between people, objects, ideas etc. using a mental map and a specific language 
which enable them to make sense of the world (i.e. to represent the world) (Hall, 1997, p.17). 
Representation is at the heart of the “circuit of culture”; people interpret messages by creating 
links between certain concepts (e.g. between ‘woman’ and ‘home’), and then they use language 
(images, words, etc.) to represent the concepts in their thoughts. Consequently, the “circuit of 
culture” recognizes the complex relationship between a text, its production and its reception, and 
the fact that exchanges occur in different places and contexts. This shows that media producers do 
not have total power in creating the meaning of a text. 
 Although readers or viewers of media texts assign meaning to certain things using their 
systems of representation, “interpretation is not infinitely open” (Carter, 2012, p. 374). Media 
messages are shaped according to dominant and hegemonic ideologies in society. In this way, the 
media exercises power in privileging one meaning over other possible ones, and the audience 
decodes this “alongside the ideological lines cued up in the text (and often also found in their own 
lives)” (Thornham et al., 2009, p.10). Furthermore, according to Hall (1997, p.228), in directing 
the audience towards a preferred meaning, the media tries to “fix” it and naturalize it. Their role 
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in this process is one that focuses on “otherness” or “difference”. When talking about race and 
racial differences, Hall (1997) suggests that difference is necessary to meaning; more specifically, 
the author argues that “meaning depends on the difference between opposites” (p.234).  
Therefore, regarding sexual difference, men and women are often defined in contrast to one other. 
The definition of a man is based on what a woman is not, and the definition of a woman is based 
on what a man is not. With gender representations, the media tries to fix this biological difference 
with seemingly natural gender roles. Gender difference – which is based on but not synonymous 
with sexual difference – is thus naturalized. Very often, the media takes an essentialist view which 
enacts “an understanding of gender differences as innate and rooted in biological and 
psychological underpinnings” (Marwick, 2014, p.63). One of the processes that the media uses to 
fix hegemonic definitions of masculinity is stereotyping. Stereotypes are a means of reducing the 
complexity of the individual to a few simplistic characteristics, and in so doing, they fix and 
naturalize difference (Hall, 1997, p.258).  
 Gender representations in the media tend to be stereotypical. As Abel (2012) and Lazar 
(2014) suggest, society now assumes that gender inequality and sexism are issues of the past, which 
is a “post-feminist” perspective. There has been some progress regarding the media’s 
representation of gender; women are not necessarily as underrepresented in the media as they 
once were, but the way that they are represented today still sexualizes, objectifies, and 
dehumanizes them (e.g. Carter and Steiner, 2004; Döring & Poeschl, 2006; Jia et al., 2016; 
Landreth Grau & Zotos, 2016). For instance, Collins’s (2011, p.290) review of two issues of the 
journal Sex Roles in 2010 and 2011 emphasizes the fact that women are still underrepresented in 
certain media and are still portrayed in a negative manner. Indeed, women tend to be depicted in 
traditional feminine roles (as housewives, mothers, wives, nonprofessionals) and as sexualized 
(partially clothed or nude) and subordinated objects. Moreover, although there seems to be a 
feeling of equality, inclusivity, and emancipation in the representation of women in the media (e.g. 
women represented in powerful positions and work-related places), such images are mere “playful 
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fantasies”; in others words “[they are] only a game to play”, as Machin & Thornborrow (2003, p. 
468) notice.   
 As a result of the establishment of a binary opposition between male and female roles, 
media discourse creates hegemonic definitions of patriarchy. If gender differences appear natural – 
which is the goal of the media’s use of stereotypes – they become “beyond history, permanent and 
fixed” (Hall, 1997, p.245). Moreover, as Cameron (2006, p.144) states, “when difference is 
naturalized, inequality is institutionalized”. The marking of difference automatically brings with it 
inequality; in the case of gender differences, “masculine” carries more power than “feminine”. 
Indeed, as Derrida (1972) argues, binary oppositions such as feminine/masculine are rarely 
neutral; they emphasize relations of power with a dominant and a subordinated category. The 
media’s role in sustaining relations of power is undeniable; in the case of gender relations, they 
favor a masculine or patriarchal ideology.  In order to maintain power any ruling class must gain 
the public’s consent, and the media can be a powerful tool used to achieve such a goal since it can 
construct definitions of what is appropriate behavior in what appears to be a mirror of reality. As I 
explained above, the media subtly directs its audience towards a preferred meaning that aligns 
with its values, and this way of encoding a message reproduces hegemonic definitions of a 
patriarchal society (Carter and Steiner, 2004, p.21). Consequently, the media’s patriarchal 
ideology reflects dominant attitudes in society but does not actually mirror society, which aligns with 
Collins’ (2011) argument that recent studies portray “a media world closer to the working-world 
reality of 1950 than to 2010 society” (p.292). There have been many social changes concerning the 
role and position of women in society, which the media often seem to ignore since they still portray 
men and women in traditional gender roles. As Lazar suggests, discourse is a “socio-historically 
contingent ‘meaning-potential’” (2000, p.376).  Thus, gender discourse cannot be fixed; it has the 
potential to be changed. But as the above examples regarding gender representations demonstrate, 
this proves to be a difficult and slow-moving process.  
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Feminism in new media studies 
Although the press continues to frame the relationship between women/girls and digital media in 
unfavorable terms (see previous section), women have been taking an active “feminist” role with 
regards to new technologies – thus going against the traditional vision of technology as a 
“masculine” entity. [8] According to Wacjman (2010, p.144), technology is traditionally “thought 
of in terms of industrial machinery and military weapons, the tools of work and war, overlooking 
other technologies that affect most aspects of everyday life”. In Western society, the use of 
technology by women has often been considered a “corruption of nature” (Ganito, 2010, p.79). 
However, with the advent of digital media, feminist research has become more optimistic with 
regard to the relationship between technology and women. As Wacjamn (2010, p.147) claims, 
“feminist approaches of the 1990s and today are positive about the possibilities of information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) to empower women and transform gender relations”. In this 
view, Donna Haraway’s (1985) Cyborg Manifesto is a pioneering (and provocative) literary work in 
which she describes how technology can empower women and change gender relations. Following 
her lead, other scholars have investigated the power of (digital) technologies in empowering 
women. Digital media are challenging and changing representations of gender in today’s digital 
society. One characteristic of digital media that is particularly relevant for the challenging of 
gender norms is the fact that audiences can be both producers and consumers of digital media 
content. Participants still consume content, but they can also create it (e.g. social platforms such as 
YouTube, comment sections of online newspapers, blogs, etc.). Such a characteristic challenges 
the processes of message encoding and decoding as well as the notion of audience (Durham and 
Kellner, 2012, p.20). With the internet, the interactivity between producers and audiences has 
grown in significant ways (Talbot, 2007; Willett, 2008). As with the MeToo movement in 2017, 
there is now a trend of using digital media in order to challenge gender oppression (and other 
forms of oppression). Through digital feminism (e.g. the use of hashtags), women may raise their 
voices so as to produce change in society, which is in itself a form of empowerment (e.g. Chen et 
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al., 2018; Dixon, 2014; Keller et al., 2018; Mendes et al., 2018; Thrift, 2014). Research (e.g. Baym 
& boyd, 2012; Willet, 2008) has also explored the role of online spaces in the construction of 
people’s digital identity. In this regard, women can use social media as sites for conveying and 
contesting gender identities, as Halonen & Leppänen (2017) argue in their study of “pissis girls” in 
Finland. In their study, the authors show how young women “construct the category of so-called 
pissis girls – girls who are taken to embody a particular version of ‘bad’ young femininity in 
contemporary Finland” (Halonen & Leppänen, 2017, p.39). Although research investigates how 
digital spaces can play an important role in the negotiation and challenging of (gendered) 
identities, women and girls still face the pressure of having to present feminine and sexualized 
identities online (e.g. Barbovschi et al., 2017; Livingstone & Mason, 2015; Ringrose, 2011; 
Ringrose & Barajas, 2011). Nevertheless, as the above studies illustrate, digital/social media 
discourse is an arena under much scrutiny in the field of feminist media research, especially 
because of the political dimension of such research (e.g. the activist dimension of new media). 
While feminist activism is indeed a recent subject in feminist media scholarship, I now outline 
other important approaches to gender and new/digital media research.   
 While “first-wave” feminism mainly focused on issues prior to the 1950s, such as women’s 
suffrage, “second-wave” feminism started in the 1960s and with it “began the systematic analysis 
of the media as sites of gender construction” (Ganito, 2010, p.78). Published in 1963, The Feminine 
Mystique by Betty Friedan marked the start of this “second-wave” feminist movement since it was 
the first to question the power of the media in defining gender roles (women’s roles in particular). 
Another major milestone in feminist media research was Gaye Tuchman’s (1978) description of 
women’s exclusion in media contexts as “symbolic annihilation”. With these publications followed 
many “representation” studies that investigated the role of the media in shaping gendered 
meanings and what it meant to be a woman. As Bachmann et al. (2018, p.2) emphasize, 
“Exploring, understanding, and challenging the implications of gender have been at the core of 
feminist media studies”. However, the role of feminist media research goes further than 
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investigating patriarchal and hegemonic media messages and/or granting women certain rights. 
“Third-wave” feminist studies take into consideration the plurality and heterogeneous nature of 
women as opposed to a universal vision of women as victims of patriarchal oppression (e.g. Baxter, 
2003; Mills, 2002; Wajcman, 2010). More recent research has started to focus on issues of 
differences between women. This view of intersectionality (Crenshaw, 1989) is particularly 
important in feminist studies and “explains how people’s subjectivities and experiences are defined 
through a set of complex interwoven identities based on gender, race, class, ethnicity, disability, 
sexuality, among other markers” (Bachmann et al., p.3). Furthermore, as van Zoonen (1994, p.27) 
highlights, in this new perspective from the 1990s, “meaning is no longer conceptualized as a more 
or less consistent entity, but is seen as contradictory, divided and plural, in other words as 
polysemic”. As such, within “third-wave” research where meaning is viewed as plural, scholars 
take into account the social shaping of gender and technology. Thus, de Lauretis (1987, p.2) 
proposes looking at “technologies of gender”, where gender can be shaped by various “social 
technologies” and “institutionalized discourses”. In this view, gender should not be understood as 
strictly attached to sexual differences. In sum, what is particularly important in “third-wave” 
feminist perspectives is the desire to go beyond simplistic investigations of the media’s distorted 
and stereotypical representations of women, and to consider the mutual shaping of gender and 
technology. In other words, gender should indeed be seen as being shaped by technology, but the 
effect of gender on technology should also be considered (Wajcman, 2010).  
 In “third-wave” feminist media studies, research investigates how “society is co-produced 
with technology” (Ganito, 2010, p. 79). For instance, Faulkner’s study (2001) rejects the view of 
technology as being deterministically patriarchal (p.80). From a deterministic point of view, 
technology is seen as an extension of men’s desire to control things which thus determines its 
masculine use. Rather, as in other feminist technology studies (Selwyn, 2007; van Doorn and van 
Zoonen, 2009), Faulkner sees technology as socially constructed: gender and technology mutually 
influence and shape each other (Faulkner, 2001, p.80). In this regard, the masculine characteristic 
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of technology should not be seen as given or unchanging, but rather as socially constructed 
(Faulkner, 2001, p.82). New technologies are not created in predetermined ways; there is flexibility 
in the meanings that a new technology can carry. Also, new creations can have unintended 
consequences. For example, although the telephone was not created for social purposes, it came to 
carry a feminine connotation because women used it as a social tool to communicate with at home 
(Lemish, 2007, p.512). Indeed, the telephone was first used for business purposes, and it was 
introduced in the domestic sphere because it was thought that “businessmen would find it useful to 
call other colleagues from the home” (Faulkner, 2001, p.84). However, the wives of these 
businessmen appropriated the phone by using it for their own social purposes. The telephone is 
thus a good illustration of technology as a social construct. Technology is not gendered by nature; 
it acquires a masculine or feminine connotation through the interaction between the actual use of 
the medium and other social processes (Lemish & Cohen, 2007, p.512). As a result, representations 
of technologies as masculine or feminine can change over time and carry different meanings.  
 I am particularly informed by studies that focus on the relationship between gender and 
digital media, such as smartphones. In the media (e.g. advertisements), women tend to be 
portrayed as the primary users of phones, and as such mobile phones are often gendered and seen 
as feminine objects (cf. Vickery, 2014). Furthermore, the gendered shaping of technology can also 
be seen in the design of mobile communication technologies; indeed, mobile phone companies 
often advertise their products to attract female users, and thus resort to gendered stereotypes (e.g. 
in mobile phones’ features and accessories) (cf. Shade, 2007). Although mobile phones are not 
intrinsically gendered, they are gendered as feminine objects in order to match gender scripts. As 
such, Faulkner (2001, p.83) proposes two ways of understanding gendered technologies. The first 
one concerns “gendering by association”; for example, home appliances tend to be used by 
women; hence, they are considered “feminine”. The second one concerns “gender in technology”, 
where masculine or feminine features are embodied in the design of the technology. The author 
claims that most relationships are gendered by association (Faulkner, 2001, p.83). If most cultural 
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images of technology are considered masculine (Cotten and Tufekci, 2009; Faulkner, 2001; 
Lemish & Cohen, 2007), why are women and girls often seen as the primary users of phones? 
Answering this question “obliges us to view gender as an integral part of the social shaping of 
technology” in a constructivist approach where technology and society mutually shape each other 
(Faulkner, 2001, p.90). For example, when associating technology with women or men, one is led 
to make other gender distinctions such as “people-focused” (i.e. women) and “machine-focused” 
(i.e. men) (Faulkner, 2001, p.85). These gender dichotomies call to mind the popular stereotypes of 
women as being more empathetic, socially oriented, family-focused, cooperative and interested in 
the communicative function of new technologies than men (e.g. Faulkner, 2001; Chong et al., 
2012; Mitra and Jones, 2012; see also Cameron, 2010). Hence, the portrayal of girls with digital 
media focuses on the “relational” aspect of technology. Moreover, studies about the gendering of 
mobile communication demonstrate that these stereotypes are still quite prevalent (Döring, 2006; 
Selwyn, 2007; Lemish, 2007) and that the “level and frequency of stereotyping in print 
advertisements seems to show no clear decrease” (Döring & Pöschl, 2006, p.174). For instance, the 
idea that women are mainly interested in social relations and the family is still ubiquitous and can 
help to explain the focus on this “relational aspect” in the portrayal of women with digital media. 
This is particularly interesting since many think of digital communication as non-gendered. The 
gendered representation of digital media is thus the product of popular associations that change 
over time, where gender and technology mutually shape each other. Since gender is a cultural 
construct, technology cannot be “masculine,” even though the media (and other influences such as 
education) may try to make such gender roles seem natural. Therefore, the metadiscursive 
comments ones finds in the media are tightly connected to gender ideologies (and to language and 
media ideologies). In fact, “it is also through metalanguage that ideologies are formulated, 
reproduced and reinforced” (Galasinski, 2004, p.132). This brings me to the next and final 




The way that lay people or public institutions talk about digital discourse is what is called 
metadiscourse (discourse about discourse, or metalanguage – language about language). The concept 
of metalanguage is particularly useful in understanding how people value certain forms of 
discourse and communication. When lay people comment on language and communication, they 
make judgments on how language/communication functions and how it should be used; they 
portray language/communication in a certain way, and these portrayals can become naturalized 
and common knowledge, without ever truly being questioned. As a result, “metalanguage can 
work at an ideological level, and influence people’s actions and priorities in a wide range of ways” 
(Jaworski et al., 2004, p.3; see also Woolard & Schieffelin, 1994). In other words, when 
metadiscourse about certain communicative practices becomes commonplace, it begins to 
structure people’s understanding of language and communication, and also of people themselves 
(who speak a certain way or who use certain communicative technologies). As Thurlow et al. 
(2019) argue, metadiscourse about digital media is thus tightly connected with the language 
ideological processes of “iconization”, “erasure”, and “recursivity” (cf. Irvine & Gal, 2000) as well 
as with media ideologies (cf. Gershon, 2010c). In sum, they reveal important matters related to the 
“social meanings” (i.e. the social significance for people themselves) and “cultural discourses” (i.e. 
the macro-level ideological processes of public discourses) of digital media and digital 
communication.  
 With regard to research on metadiscourse about digital media, I follow Spilioti (2015), who 
offers a critical overview of research concerned with discourse about digital communication. She 
reviews four key areas of research in studies investigating discourses about digital communication, 
in the mass media (the news media in particular), and in social media.  
- Discourses about digital sociality (i.e. utopian and dystopian discourses about the impact of 
digital media on people’s social relationships) 
- Discourses about digital equality and diversity (i.e. utopian and dystopian discourses about 
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digital spaces being open, transparent, equal, and diverse) 
- Discourses about youth and digital media (i.e. utopian and dystopian discourses about 
digital nativism) 
- Discourses about digital language (utopian and dystopian discourses about the impact of 
digital media on language use and practices) 
Spilioti (2015, p.145) remarks that although popular discourses fluctuate between positive and 
negative commentary and can change over time, people tend to remain anxious about the same 
issues such as the loss of stability with regards to language standards/norms and social structures. 
Previous research regarding the linguistic and visual metadiscourse about digital media has 
discussed the prevalence of “moral panic” discourses, which are based on ideologies of 
prescriptivism and technological determinism. Since I discuss “moral panics” in greater detail 
throughout this thesis (particularly in Chapter 6), here I only briefly define the concept. I follow 
Critcher (2008, p.1140) who defines “moral panics” as “extreme forms of risk discourses integral to 
the process of moral regulation”. In other words, moral panic discourses are a reflection of 
people’s worries about certain risks, and serve to regulate and counter immoral behavior by 
seeking sociocultural power (Critcher, 2008; see also Buckingham & Jensen, 2012). [9] In this 
regard, I take into account previous metadiscourse studies such as Tagliamonte & Denis (2008), 
Jones & Schieffelin (2009), and Thurlow (2006, 2014) which examine discourses of moral panic in 
the media, with a focus on digital communication. These studies all highlight a common 
ideological discourse: one that revolves around fear and concerns about the way that digital media 
affect (standard) language. The media comments that Thurlow (2006, 2014) analyzes in his studies 
reveal judgments that are naturalized and portrayed as common knowledge. For instance, the idea 
that “netspeak” is dumbing down English and leading to a breakdown of Standard English is very 
popular in the press. Such comments presuppose the notion that standard language is necessarily 
better; as a result, anything that is not standard (i.e. new media language) is thus incorrect and 
bad. Likewise, Squires (2010) investigates value judgments found in social media, which revolve 
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around notions of linguistic and grammatical correctness and normativity. For example, online 
participants comment on the use of “internet language” as being a “linguistic plague”, 
“unprofessional” or “nonsense” (p.473). Here, these ideologies about digital language are set 
against the backdrop of prescriptivism. Besides being motivated by a standard language ideology, 
popular discourses about digital communication also draw on an ideology of technological 
determinism which emphasizes a causal/deterministic relationship between digital media and 
social changes, as many scholars have demonstrated (e.g. Androutsopoulos, 2011; Deumert, 2014; 
Georgakopoulou, 2006; Lister et al, 2009; Spilioti, 2015; Squires 2010). Popular representations of 
digital language and communication in the media often accentuate a sort of moral panic where 
digital media is construed as being the main cause of language and communication changes; such 
comments also highlight deep-seated media ideologies (cf. Gershon, 2010c). Here, digital media 
and digital language are responsible for broader communicative issues such as literacy problems 
(e.g. Thurlow, 2006, 2014). Hence, discourses that claim that people no longer know how to write 
properly are often associated with digital language, but they are also concerned with a broader 
sense of societal and cultural threat. This closely aligns with Critcher (2008) and Buckingham & 
Jensen (2012) who emphasize the fact that moral panic discourses are often about wider concerns 
about social changes and a fear of modernity and technological change. Although pessimistic 
framings of digital media and digital communication in the media are often connected to the 
digital media practices of young people/teenagers (see Thurlow, 2014), other demographics are 
also targeted by the news media: young children and women/girls. As such, I am also informed by 
research concerning children and their digital media use (e.g. Buckingham & Jensen, 2012; 
Chaudron, 2015; Livingstone et al., 2018), as well as studies of “moral panic” with regards to girls 
and digital media (e.g. Jeffery, 2017; Vickery, 2014). Finally, although most studies have 
investigated linguistic metadiscursive commentary about digital media, I closely follow Thurlow 
(2017) and Thurlow et al. (2019) who expand digital discourse scholarship by including a 
multimodal perspective in their investigation of visual metadiscourse about digital media.  
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Overarching research questions 
 
As I said, it is well known that digital discourse is often depicted negatively in the news, 
particularly in English-language contexts (e.g. Thurlow 2006, 2007, 2014; Tagliamonte & Denis, 
2008; Vickery, 2017) where discourses of “moral panic” appear ubiquitous. These metadiscursive 
framings are closely related to media ideologies (Gershon, 2010c), that is, people’s beliefs about the 
different media they use and their effect on users. By the same token, people’s beliefs about digital 
media are shaped by deep-seated social stereotypes and political economies such as gender. In the 
current thesis, I offer new perspectives in the field of digital discourse studies by examining the 
“cultural discourses” and “social meanings” of digital media from a multimodal and a multilingual 
perspective. I analyze different discursive examples that reveal the interplay between language 
ideologies, media ideologies, and gender ideologies. In the first part of this thesis, I focus on public 
discourses (i.e. cultural discourses) about digital communication, and in the second part, I explore 
the social meanings of such discourses in actual readers and users’ personal stories. Ultimately, I 
am interested in the relationship between public discourses and private experiences and how these 
two connect or disconnect. In order to structure my argument, I follow two broad sets of research 
questions: 
1. How do multinational and multilingual news stories “make sense” of digital media? More 
specifically, what language, media, and gender ideologies are produced in their articles?  
2. What is the relationship between these top-down cultural discourses and the bottom-up 
social meanings of the users of digital media? Specifically, how do female 






As I specified in the Preface, this thesis was undertaken as part of the larger inter-university project 
“What’s up, Switzerland? Language, Individuals, and Ideologies in Mobile Messaging”, which was 
funded by the Swiss National Foundation. The overall goal of the project was to investigate the 
linguistic and communicative properties of digital communication with a special focus on 
Whats’App. My thesis was specifically aligned with sub-project D, “The Cultural Discourses and 
Social Meanings of Mobile Communication”, which served as a meta-level framing for the other 
three sub-projects that focused more on the grammatical and graphical properties of Whats’App 
messages. Along these lines, Sub-project D was organized around two complementary strands of 
research (which follow the thesis’s research questions). Strand I involved the creation of a unique 
archive of regional, national, and international news stories concerned with digital language and 
communication (the Digital Discourse Database – DDD), and the analysis of those news stories (all the 
sources of the newspaper extracts analyzed are listed in Appendix A). Strand II comprised a more 
ethnographic perspective with the implementation of a focus group study in order to analyze 
people’s digital media use and practices. In sum, Sub-project D was designed to complement the 
other sub-projects by taking a metadiscursive and language-ideological approach to digital 
communication. Therefore, since I attempt to tease out specific ideologies in discourse, my work 
follows the tradition of critical discourse studies, which together with multimodality, makes up my 
methodological approach to this thesis. In the following section, I would like to outline this 
approach. 
 
Methodological approach: Multimodal critical discourse analysis  
In this thesis, I define my approach as a multimodal critical discourse analysis (Machin, 2013), and 
I often follow Fairclough (1989, p.20-21) and Thurlow & Aiello (2007, p.313) in order to structure 
my analyses around two steps: one more descriptive, and one more interpretive and critical. 
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Depending partly on whether I am focusing on verbal and/or visual discourse, my analyses draw 
on a range of techniques including (visual) content analysis (e.g. Bell, 2001), corpus-supported 
CDA (e.g. Baker et al., 2008) using the corpus analysis toolkit AntConc (see Anthony, 2018), and 
social semiotics (e.g. van Leeuwen, 2005). Since each chapter utilizes different methods and 
includes a section outlining the methods being used, here I only describe the general 
methodological approach that informs my thesis: multimodal critical discourse analysis (Ledin & 
Machin, 2018; Machin; 2013). Ledin & Machin (2018) discuss “multimodal critical discourse 
analysis” as they attempt to address the limitations of  “multimodality” as a grand theory by taking 
into account the critical aspect of critical discourse studies (CDS).  
 The purpose of critical discourse studies is to explore social phenomena beyond the mere 
description of language in use; therefore, critical discourse analysts are interested in how language 
shapes our social world and is shaped by it and in revealing whose interests are at stake (e.g. Gee, 
2011; van Dijk, 2001; Wodak, 2004; Wodak & Meyer, 2016). Critical discourse analysis (CDA) 
focuses on the linguistic characteristics of social processes and argues that power relations lie in 
discourse. Hence, critical discourse scholars’ aim is to deconstruct discourses in order to reveal 
relationships of power and inequality and resist them. CDA sets out to expose what seems to be 
natural, normal, and objective in discourse itself. Therefore, critical discourse scholars are 
particularly interested in exploring the construction of ideologies since “ideological structures are 
necessarily concerned with the analysis of power relations and social discrimination” (Jaworski & 
Coupland, 2014, p.27). In this regard, CDA is an approach that is oriented towards social change 
and that sees discourse as shaping and constructing our vision of reality through the transmission 
of ideologies (Fairclough, 2003; van Dijk, 2001). CDA has been most commonly used in the 
analysis of media discourse, particularly because media institutions have the power and capacity to 
influence public opinion (e.g. Bell & Garrett, 1998, p.6). The fact that most media discourse 
analyses take a critical approach is not surprising when one considers the role of CDA in the 
uncovering and challenging of power relations. News stories are not simply “recounted”; they are 
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structured in a specific way which reveals a particular position or point of view. They also present 
certain values and attitudes as “natural” and “normal”. What Ledin & Machin (2018) ultimately 
suggest is to add such a critical approach to the principles of multimodality – which draw on 
Halliday’s (1985) tradition of systemic functional linguistics (SFL).  
 Multimodality draws on the tradition of “social semiotics”, which allows for the study of 
“the semiotic potential of a given semiotic resource” and for exploring “how that resource has 
been, is, and can be used for purposes of communication” (van Leeuwen, 2005, p.5; see also 
Djonov & Zhao, 2018; Jewitt et al., 2016; Ledin & Machin, 2018, for recent overviews of the field). 
Since discourse scholars increasingly address semiotic modes different from language, a social 
semiotic approach can be especially useful. Also, just as CDA can be useful for the analysis of news 
media discourse, so is social semiotics. Indeed, news media discourse is multimodal since “its 
meaning is realized through more than one semiotic code” (Kress and van Leeuwen, 1996, p.183). 
In the case of print news stories, the stories are produced using both written words and images, 
two semiotic modes, each of which warrant a different type of analysis. In the study of visual 
design (and any other type of communication), one explores semiotic resources that perform a 
particular sort of semiotic work, or metafunction (cf. Jewitt & Oyama, 2001, p.140). In the case of 
visual analysis, it is important to keep in mind that images do not have only one true meaning. 
Rose (2012) suggests that the best way to analyze images is to try to justify one’s reading; in order 
to do this, one needs an explicit visual methodology (Rose, 2012, p.xviii). Following on the 
tradition of systemic functional linguistics (SFL) and Michael Halliday (1985), Kress and van 
Leeuwen (1996) developed a visual grammar to analyze images and examine visual resources 
which create meaning.  In their visual grammar, they address the three metafunctions of (visual) 
language: representational (i.e. depiction of the world), compositional (i.e. textual 
arrangement/layout), and interactional (i.e. relation with audience). In sum, a social semiotic 
approach to images allows us to deconstruct a text and explore how textual strategies are adopted 
to convey certain meanings. These textual strategies (e.g. image layout, point of view, modality) 
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are semiotic resources that create meaning potentials. These “possible” meanings are infinite, but 
those who produce images often direct them towards one “preferred” meaning (see Hall, 1997). As 
a result, a social semiotic analysis aims to explore how these preferred meanings are constructed 
and what their ideological end is, following the three metafunctions explained above: 
representational, interactional, and compositional (see also Aiello, 2006). While these three 
metafunctions of communication form the “core” of multimodal analysis, Ledin & Machin (2018) 
argue that there are some limitations in the ways scholars use these tools. In order to address the 
often too descriptive nature of multimodal analysis, the authors suggest taking a more “critical” 
perspective by taking into account the connection between texts and social practices and 
associated “canons of use” (i.e. the “traditions of use” of instances of communication) (Ledin & 
Machin, 2018, p.501). [10] Therefore, although I draw on different methods throughout my thesis 
(which all fall under the broader spectrum of CDS), my ultimate goal is always critical in the sense 
that I attempt to challenge what seems to be taken for granted and “natural” by exploring the 
“cultural discourses” and “social meanings” of digital media. This brings me back to my two 
strands of research activity, which I outline below.  
 
Strand I: The Digital Discourse Database 
One of the main goals of Sub-project D was the creation of a multinational and multilingual 
repository of newspaper articles dealing with digital media language and communication, that 
would be useful for other scholars and students working in the field of digital discourse. With the 
help of a web-designer based in Switzerland and under the supervision of the director of Sub-
project D, Prof. Dr. Crispin Thurlow, we created the Digital Discourse Database with three main 
sections (see Appendix B). The About section presents the DDD and how to use it; the Search section 
lists the news articles (on the right) and the search tags (on the left); and the Post section allows any 
researcher to post a relevant entry.  
 All of the articles archived in the DDD are concerned with language and communication 
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in digital media contexts, and were published between 2014 and 2018. The archive is multilingual 
and multinational; it covers Swiss, European and international news in different languages – 
primarily German, French, and English. The archive is also multimodal since it includes links to 
news stories with images. Additionally, it is important to note that the archive contains a “core 
dataset” of articles which resulted from a consistent and rigorous search in Nexis (formely 
LexisNexis) which utilized 1) the same keywords, 2) the same news outlets, and 3) the same 
timeframe, in addition to other more “random” subsets from other time periods, countries, and 
sources different from Nexis. These other “random” articles are articles that my colleagues sent 
me (because they were relevant for my research), others come from another study which 
specifically focused on “sexting” (n=45), and others are articles from online newspaper platforms 
different from Nexis that a research assistant and I used to find relevant articles before we had 
established our “core parameters” (n=95). Because Nexis did not contain all of the publications we 
had listed in the proposal for Sub-project D of the overall SNF project, we had to seek out the 
websites of those publications not provided by Nexis. However, the search engines on these 
newspaper websites are far less sophisticated than Nexis’s search engine, which is why those 
searches are not as systematic. Moreover, the time period of a search cannot be set on these sites. 
Therefore, the DDD database is slightly swayed and not completely representative. However, this 
research design limitation does not alter the purpose of my research which is to investigate how 
news stories discuss the same issues across borders, and the ideological implications that ensue. 
Here is a breakdown of the “core dataset”, which contains news outlets from Nexis:  
Switzerland (French): Le Matin, La Tribune de Genève, 24 Heures, Le Temps 
Switzerland (German): Tages-Anzeiger, Appenzeller Zeitung, Sonntagszeitung, Die Weltwoche 
Germany: Süddeutsche Zeitung, Frankfurter Allgemeine, Hamburger Abendblatt, Die Zeit, Die Welt 
US: The New York Times, The Washington Post, The LA Times, USA Today 
UK: The Telegraph, The Guardian, The Mirror, The Daily Mail, Metro 
France: Le Figaro, Les Echos, L'Express, Le Monde 
 
The selection of the specific news outlets above was based on the Research Proposal of Sub-project 
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D – which suggested specific news outlets (those that are underlined above) – and also based on 
the available publications on Nexis. The dataset includes both print and online news stories, and a 
wide selection of newspapers representing diverse readerships. All in all, we selected the above 
newspapers in order to include a range of news outlets and to include high-circulation newspapers. 
Although the whole DDD includes articles from 2014 until 2018, the “core dataset” only includes 
articles between January 2016 and September 2017. The articles that fall outside of the timeframe 
between January 2016 and September 2017 all come from other “random” subsets (see above).  
 The “core” keyword searches were made up of the following combinations of words: 
 
 WhatsApp AND language 
 
 Facebook AND language 
 
 smartphone AND language 
 




The choice of the above keywords was based on my research purposes and interests, and those of 
the larger Sinergia project, which investigates multimodal communication on WhatsApp. 
Although we had originally planned on using more keywords, time did not permit us to do so, 
especially because our research assistant’s contract was limited. After the keyword search identified 
specific articles, we removed duplicate articles and also omitted articles that did not focus on 
language/communication in digital media contexts (e.g. articles about artificial intelligence, or 
about Mark Zuckerberg).  
 All of the relevant articles that were selected for inclusion in the DDD were then coded 
with “tags” in order to facilitate the search and retrieval of specific articles. Each news story was 
coded with the following tags: the name of the newspaper, date of publication, language, country, 
topic (a news story could be tagged with more than one topic tag), and image (a news story could 
also be tagged with more than one image tag). Finally, each news story in the database includes a 
short summary of the article as well as a hyperlink that directs users to the Nexis link to the article 
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or the original link. Regarding the criteria used to select the topic tags and image tags, our student 
assistant and I only chose tags that were directly relevant to my research purposes (topic tags such 
as “youth”, “emojis”, and “language threat”, and image tags such as “male” and “female”) as well 
as tags that were recurrent in various articles (topic tags such as “artificial intelligence” and 
“autocorrect”, and image tags such as “keyboard” and “logo”). Therefore, if an article included an 
image with, for instance, an American flag, we did not include the image tag “flag” because it 
would not be directly relevant to my research and would be a tag that would not be recurrent. 
Regarding images, it is important to note that articles stored in the DDD with a Nexis link do not 
include any images simply because Nexis only reproduces the verbal texts of news stories. 
Therefore, when possible (Nexis sometimes adds a link to the original article), we added the link to 
the original article in the DDD, in order to have access to the images accompanying the text.  
 I display below in Tables 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 general statistics about the DDD, which 
contains a total of 1403 articles as of December 2019. [11]  
 
 














Table 1.2: Languages represented in the DDD 
 
 
Table 1.3: Countries represented in the DDD 
 
 
In the above diagrams, it is important to note the overrepresentation of English-language and 
German-language articles when compared with French-language articles, which shows that the 
topic investigated seems to be less prevalent in the French-speaking news. I did not rectify this 
number imbalance in order to respect the consistency and systematization of the search (i.e. same 
keywords, same timeframe, and same news outlets from Nexis). All in all, the DDD covers a wide 
range of news stories which serve as evidence of dominant cultural discourses (including visual 
representations) about digital media and communication. Eventually, my goal is to investigate 
how/if those cultural discourses found in the news media shape the meanings and uses of digital 


















Strand II: Focus groups 
I decided to conduct a focus group study because I wanted to learn how young women responded 
to and made sense of news media discourse regarding digital media and digital communication 
(i.e. how they “spoke back” to news media discourse). I was particularly concerned with their 
feelings and insights on problematic gender and media ideologies recurrent in the Western press. 
Therefore, I used the empirical evidence that I had found in my news discourse analysis as a 
stimulus in four focus groups conducted with young women, and gave them the opportunity to 
“speak back” to what they saw in the news media. In this way, I examined the complex 
intersection of top-down cultural discourses and bottom-up social meanings and/or practices. This 
intersection serves to highlight how media ideologies (Gershon, 2010c) are produced across 
multiple domains as well as the ways in which they are either taken up or resisted by regular 
people. The trigger questions that I asked the participants concerned the representation of women 
and men using digital media in news media imagery as well as questions concerning other more 
general media ideologies, such as those regarding children’s use of digital media and the concept 
of digital addiction (see questionnaire in Appendix C). [12] 
 I conducted four focus groups with a particular type of participant (young women between 
18 and 30 years old, who own and use digital devices) in order to look for patterns and themes 
across the groups. The goal was “to conduct focus groups until [I] [had] reached theoretical 
saturation” (Krueger and Casey, 2015, p.27), and four focus groups seemed to be an ideal 
number. The four groups were composed of the same type of participants. I did not divide the 
groups based on any other features (e.g. occupation, age, class, education, or race). Therefore, I 
utilized a “single-category design” (Krueger and Casey, 2015, p.28). [13] Table 1.4, displayed 






Focus group 1 (FG 1)  
       
Focus group 2 (FG 2) 
 
Location: Martigny, Valais, Switzerland 




Location: Lausanne, Vaud, Switzerland 
Date: 28 May 2018 
Duration: 57:15 
 
1. Julie, 24, a marketing assistant 
2. Cindy, 24, a social worker 
3. Melanie, 24, an insurance agent 
4. Anna, 25, a physical therapist 
5. Tania, 24, a beautician 
 
Focus group 3 (FG 3)  
 
1. Jennifer, 28, an HR assistant 
2. Sophie, 28, a university assistant  
3. Sandra, 28, a management consultant 
4. Tiffany, 28, a management consultant 
 
 
Focus group 4 (FG 4)                                                 
 
Location: Vernayaz, Valais, Switzerland 




Location: Martigny, Valais, Switzerland 
Date: 1 June 2018 
Duration: 58:10 
 
1. Charlotte, 19, a student 
2. Veronica, 19, a student 
3. Samantha, 18, an apprentice employee 
4. Julie, 22, a commercial employee 
5. Adelina, 23, a teacher 
 
 
1. Pauline, 30, a makeup artist 
2. Ines, 30, a social worker 
3. Aline, 30, a social worker 
4. Janice, 30, a graphic designer 
 
 
Table 1.4: List of participants in each focus group 
 
Taking a cue from feminist media research which looks into “inequalities and constructed (often 
symbolic) differences in media practices with very real consequences in everyday life” (Bachmann 
et al., p.4), my thesis seeks to explore the same issues through two levels of analysis: a “micro-level” 
analysis and an “external level” of analysis (cf. Byerly, 2016). The micro-level analysis focuses on 
media representations of women and is mainly descriptive; it aims to explore issues of 
underrepresentation, misrepresentation, and stereotypes in the media. The external level of 
analysis is concerned with the audience’s response and the ways in which the audience (i.e. 
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women) are impacted by the media’s messages. In the external level of analysis, I employ 
ethnographic methods such as focus group studies. However, my research does not include other 
important levels of analysis proposed by Byerly (2016) such as the meso-level (i.e. concerned with 
the generation of media content), and the macro-level (i.e. concerned with the institutional and 
financial aspects that influence media messages). Nevertheless, my thesis aims at investigating to 
what extent news media representations (i.e. micro-level analysis) shapes users’ meanings and uses 
(i.e. external level of analysis).  
 
Thesis overview  
	
Part I: Cultural discourses  
The first part of my thesis consists of three chapters which critically analyze news media discourse 
regarding digital communication. In Chapter 2, I outline the language and semiotic ideologies 
prevalent in news media discourse while focusing on articles concerning emojis. [15] I chose to 
focus on emojis because this type of visual communication is an important aspect of the overall 
WhatsApp project of which this thesis is a part. Ultimately, I analyze the construction of a 
discourse of “language endangerment” (cf. Duchêne & Heller, 2007) in the news and show how 
such a discourse reveals journalists’ “semiotic ideologies” (Keane, 2003) and what modes of 
communication they view as being superior to others. The news media’s discourse of “moral 
panic” with regards to the perceived threat posed to language by digital visual communication (i.e. 
emojis) shows that journalists truly “misrecognize” the nature of language, visual communication, 
and digital media. Then, in Chapter 3, I focus on a different kind of “moral panic” discourse 
where I analyze the news media’s representations of children’s digital media practices. I focus on 
“children” because I noticed that the words “children” and “enfants” were frequent nouns in the 
English and French datasets of news stories that I collected. Also, since past research has focused 
on moral panic discourses surrounding young people and teens’ digital practices (e.g. Thurlow, 
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2006, 2014; Thurlow et al., 2019), I hope to shed new light on a different demographic. In 
Chapter 3, I ultimately show how news stories linguistically and visually “construct” an idealized 
concept of a risk-free childhood. The news media’s ideologies are often framed around a discourse 
of “risk”, which is problematic, misleading, and narrowing since this view justifies practices 
centered on surveillance and restriction, in the name of children’s safety (see Vickery, 2017). 
Finally, Chapter 4 also examines media ideologies, and is the first “gender” chapter of this thesis. 
This chapter serves as a way for me to set the scene regarding the treatment of gender in the news 
media (see Harp et al., 2018). In Chapter 4, I quantitatively and qualitatively analyze news media 
images representing women/girls using digital devices. I examine how news media discourse about 
digital media constructs a particular “regime of truth” regarding the ways women and girls use – 
or are supposed to use – digital media. I discuss two noteworthy phenomena: first, that a majority 
of news media images choose to portray young women with digital devices as opposed to men with 
digital devices, and secondly, that these women are depicted in very narrow visual terms that focus 
on women’s conversational skills and emotions.  In sum, although each of the three chapters of this 
first part has a distinct focus, they nonetheless all demonstrate how the news media misrepresents 
certain aspects of digital communication as well as certain groups of users and how the media 
constructs problematic “regimes of truth” across modes, languages, and nations.  
  
Part II: Social meanings 
In the second part of my thesis, I analyze four focus group interviews which I conducted with 
young female users of digital media. The treatment of young women by the news media (cf. 
Chapter 4) made me curious about what young women themselves thought about the news 
media’s representations. Therefore, Chapter 5 centers on young female users and readers’ 
responses to the news media’s visual representation of women’s digital media practices. Following 
a feminist post-structuralist approach (Baxter, 2003), I ultimately demonstrate how the female 
participants in my focus groups negotiate the news media’s gendered representations of women 
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and digital media, and how they (re)produce and challenge gender ideologies. Indeed, although 
women reproduce some of the news media’s gendered ideologies when discussing digital media 
use, they also challenge such ideologies, which shows that audiences do not blindly accept 
anything the news media says (cf. Hall, 1997). Finally, in Chapter 6, I elaborate on these young 
users’ own “media ideologies” (see Gershon, 2010c). I outline how the news media shapes people’s 
ideologies about digital media through the analysis of three themes that circulate across 
participants and across groups: the participants’ acceptance of the news media’s moral panic 
discourse; their negotiation of the meaning of digital media in relation to older media; and their 
negotiation of privacy and surveillance concerns. Ultimately, I discuss the circulation of moral 
panic discourses between the news media and actual users, and show how users genuinely struggle 
to make sense of digital media.  
 By exploring the cultural discourses and the social meanings of digital communication, I 
demonstrate the multiple ways in which digital media discourse circulates across languages and 
nations, across linguistic and visual modes, and between institutions (e.g. the news media, stock 
photography) and actual users. Although the same negative and reductionist discourses are present 
in multiple international news outlets, it is ultimately up to readers/viewers/users themselves to 
either take up or reject such ideologies. With Hall’s (1997) “circuit of culture” in mind, I 
investigate the representational function of the media and its role in the reproduction of social 
power and inequalities as well as the representational work done by the audience, with a particular 
focus on the feelings and emotions provoked by public discourses and private responses to them. 
Therefore, I conclude this thesis by discussing the emotional and affective undercurrent that 
imbues all of the chapters, across news media discourse and in everyday conversation. Following 
scholars who examine “affect” (e.g. Ahmed, 2004; Clough & Halley, 2007; Grossberg, 1992; 
Massumi, 2002; Wee, 2016), Chapter 7 focuses on how affective states and practices travel and 
circulate across different domains, how the press can influence its audience’s affective state, and 




















“Emoji is dragging us back to the dark ages”: 
Discourse of “language endangerment” in 





Setting the scene: Visualizing digital discourse 
	
In digital discourse studies, it is well established that newsmakers often maintain an unduly 
negative perspective on the impact of digital technologies especially vis-à-vis young people’s 
linguistic and communicative practices (Thurlow 2006, 2007; also Tagliamonte & Denis 2008). 
With their particular institutional and cultural investment as elite language workers or wordsmiths, 
journalists consistently reproduce language-ideological depictions of digital discourse which 
exaggerate its newness and distinctiveness, and which erase individual variation, reflexivity and 
creativity. In this chapter, we examine an emerging but closely allied metadiscursive framing of 
digital discourse: the perceived threat to language posed by visual communication and, specifically, 
emojis. [16] In this case, we witness how long-standing narratives of linguistic degradation or ruin 
usually attributed to technology are redirected to the deleterious impact of visual communication. 
We refer to this as a discourse of language endangerment (cf. Duchêne & Heller, 2007). Instead of a 
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concern to defend (minority) languages from other (majority) languages, however, we find 
language itself being construed as autonomous and superior, and, more importantly, in need of 
protection from visual communication. As we will argue, this perceived threat to language is 
underwritten by deep-seated beliefs and/or misconceptions about how communication works, 
how meaning is made, and how different communicative modes (e.g. words, images) intersect; all 
of which are quintessential matters of semiotic ideology (cf. Keane, 2003; also Thurlow, 2017). As 
a case in point – and as a good starting point – we offer a typical story from the UK’s Guardian 
newspaper extracted in Figure 2.1 below, where we see the kind of public push-back at the core of 
this chapter: 
 
      
Figure 2.1: The Guardian, UK, 25 June 2015. Original image caption: Emojis are merely a depiction of the body 
language signals that humans have been reading for centuries. (Image source: Flickr).  
 
 
Figure 2.1 displays a dramatic – possibly playful – story about emojis taking over and replacing 
words. As the by-line explains, ‘Emojis are the fastest growing language in the UK – what does this 
mean for the future of communication?’ The doom-and-gloom stance of the article is cued further 
by the use of an emoticon in the headline for expressing dismay or despair. No less importantly, 
the accompanying image also does some important framing work (see Thurlow, Aiello & 
Portmann, 2019); here, we have a photograph of an old-fashioned typewriter with the letter keys 
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replaced by emojis. The image is itself framed and anchored with the following tagline: ‘Emojis 
are merely a depiction of the body language signals that humans have been reading for centuries.’  
In the short, opening space of this news story, we have a quintessential encapsulation of the 
language endangerment discourse and the various ways it is rhetorically accomplished. In a 
nutshell, we find emojis being framed explicitly as a bona fide language and as an external, 
unwanted and destructive assault on not only language but human communication altogether. 
Meanwhile we have language itself being restricted to written language, and in a way which is 
patently anachronistic – perhaps specially for journalists, a nostalgic, self-referential appeal to the 
typewriter. Finally, we see how emojis are dismissively and erroneously (see ‘merely a depiction’) 
rendered equivalent to so-called body language. As it happens, this short story, for all of its 
dubious views on language and communication, turns out to be fairly measured, answering its own 
“end of language as we know it” provocation with an emphatic “no”, and with a clear 
understanding that human communicative practice is always changing over time. Nonetheless, 
such is the power of the headline, the influence of subeditors and picture editors, that the story as a 
whole presents readers with an overarchingly negative view. [17] 
 This chapter locates itself in digital discourse studies (see Thurlow, 2018, for a recent 
overview), a field which typically focuses on sociolinguistic and discursive phenomena in and 
around digital media. More specifically, the chapter examines commentary about digital discourse. 
As such, our goal here is not to analyze digital discourse per se and comment on the use of emojis 
as a digital practice, but rather to explore popular discourse about emojis as a means of revealing 
how the endangerment discourse hinges on important semiotic questions related to language, 
mode, and communication. In sum, we investigate language about language or discourse about 
discourse – hence metadiscourse. And this is particularly important when it comes to high-stakes, 
high-authority spaces like the news media. 	
Studies of metadiscourse orient heavily to – or are allied with – the notion of language 
ideologies which, as Woolard and Schieffelin (1994, p.55-56) explain, “envision and enact links of 
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language to group and personal identity, to aesthetics, to morality, and to epistemology.” In other 
words, when people get to talking about other people’s ways of speaking or communicating, they 
are invariably (more) invested in wider acts of social categorization and judgement. Metadiscursive 
commentary, like language ideologies, is almost always organized by the same three discursive 
features or actions: iconization, erasure and recursivity (Irvine and Gal, 2000). Respectively, what 
this means is that certain stereotypical linguistic features or practices are singled out for critique or 
ridicule; individual variation, creativity and other benefits are meanwhile overlooked; and the 
ostensibly linguistic “facts” are extrapolated to other aspects of speakers, such as their intellectual 
capacity, social behavior, or moral rectitude. When it comes to digital discourse, and following 
Gershon (2010), we also find metadiscursive commentary bound up in tightly related media 
ideologies, which is to say beliefs about, for example, the material affordances of technology, the 
nature of authorship, and the apparent newness of everything. 
 Increasingly, scholars of digital discourse have been considering the ways language 
intersects with other modes of communication, thereby addressing the inherently multimodal 
nature of discursive practice. There are certainly good reasons for opening up digital discourse 
studies to a broader multimodal perspective; the most obvious of which lies in simply paying more 
attention to visual communication. We know well, for example, that even text-based digital 
discourse is often as much visual as it is linguistic, concerned as much with the look of words as 
with their semantic or stylistic properties (e.g., Vaisman, 2014). In addition to research on issues 
like orthographic and typographic design, however, there is also more and more work being done 
on the communicative uses of visual resources such as emoji, video, GIFs, and non-moving images 
(e.g., Androutsopoulos & Tereick, 2015; Dürscheid & Siever, 2017; Dürscheid & Meletis, 2019). 
There is also value in considering how visuality in digital discourse is depicted in, for example, 
commercial advertising, print or broadcast news, cinema and television narratives and/or public 
policy and educational settings. Certainly, and as Thurlow (2017; also Thurlow, Aiello & 
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Portmann, 2019) has shown, visual discourse encodes and combines a range of language and 
media ideologies.  
Finally, as in Thurlow’s (2017) study of mediatized representations of sexting, we too are 
keen to consider how metadiscursive framings of digital discourse are also structured by semiotic 
ideologies (after Keane, 2003; see also Parmentier, 1994 for the first reference of semiotic ideology). 
In this case, we find speakers expressing their beliefs about meaning-making and the relative value 
of different semiotic modes. This is very evident in the ways people – journalists and others – 
discuss the interplay between language and visual communication, and the ways they understand 
(or not) the particular affordances of different semiotic modes; for example, in ideas about the 
realism of pictures or the intellectual, civilizational importance of words. Specifically, our interest 
lies in the beliefs and attitudes regarding the perceived superiority/inferiority of two modes: 
images and writing. While orality is often perceived as being inferior to literacy, we explore the 
dominant ideology regarding the value of words vis-à-vis images.  
 In essence, against the backdrop of previous research on the metadiscursive framing of 
digital language, we examine common beliefs and misunderstandings surrounding a specific type 
of digital discourse (i.e. emojis) and shed light on language and semiotic ideologies. This chapter is 
thus structured in a way to answer the following research questions:  
1) What are the main language-related discourses about emojis in French and English-
language news stories? 
2) In what ways is discourse of “language endangerment” organized? 




Here, we draw on a sample of 70 different English-language and French-language news reports 
from between 2014 and 2017 (see Appendix D for a list of the sources of the news articles). The 
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articles are all drawn from the Digital Discourse Database (DDD). As a reminder, the DDD is an 
open-access archive populated with newspaper stories addressing language and communication in 
various digital-media contexts (cf. Chapter 1). For the current dataset, we first selected all stories 
from the period January 2014 to September 2017. All 910 articles (717 English-language articles 
and 193 French-language articles) from the DDD were then imported into AntConc, a freeware 
concordancer intended for corpus-linguistic analysis (see Baker et al., 2008). In this way, we started 
with two corpora – one in French, one in English – and used the in-built concordance tool for 
focusing on keywords and their semantic clusters. We selected out all uses of language (in English) 
and langue and langage (in French) as a way to focus on instances where journalists were specifically 
and explicitly referring to language. We were left with 715 occurrences of language and 393 of 
langue/langage (see Appendix E for snapshots of the Antconc French and English concordances of 
the words language and langue/langage). Given our specific interest in emojis, we then sub-sampled 
further by attending only to stories about language and emojis, manually discarding cases 
addressing, for example, foreign languages, language skills in general or language in artificial 
intelligence. In this way, our final dataset comprised 62 French-language instances and 106 
English-language instances of stories which, much like the Guardian article above, focused 
specifically on the relation between language and emojis – altogether a total of 168 distinctive lines 
of data.  
 The analysis is thus organized into two steps: one more quantitative and descriptive, one 
more qualitative and interpretative and critical (cf. Fairclough, 1989, p.20–21; Thurlow & Aiello, 
2007, p.313). In the first step, we rely mostly on the concordance analysis for revealing basic 
numerical trends and for identifying the most common rhetorical tactics used in the news media’s 
framing of the emoji-and-language relationship. We performed a corpus-based analysis of 
expanded concordances of the word “language” (in both French and English) in order to identify 
the most common rhetorical tactics by which discourses about language and emojis are usually 
framed/organized. Corpus-based linguistics refers to research conducted using a large collection of 
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data electronically stored and focuses on the quantity of data analyzed. When used in conjunction 
with CDA, corpus-based research has proved very successful in the analysis of news media 
discourse because it adds a quantitative dimension that CDA lacks (e.g. Baker et al., 2008; 
Mautner, 2007). The two main processes that are used in corpus-based analysis are “collocation” 
(i.e. what words certain words are frequently associated with) and “concordance” (what a word’s 
context looks like). In this chapter, we combine the critical approach of CDA with a more 
quantitative perspective, but not necessarily in the same ways that Baker et al. (2008) or Mautner 
(2007) do. Specifically, we use techniques taken from corpus linguistics to visualize data and to 
generate systematic and consistent data using Antconc (see Chapter 3 for a similar approach). We 
used a corpus-based “concordance” analysis to obtain two representative corpora of all of the 
instances of “language” related to emojis. On this basis, we arrived at the larger metadiscursive 
strategy of language endangerment which becomes the focus of the second step of the analysis 
where we look more closely at examples from our dataset with a specific view to semiotic 
ideologies. The distinction we draw between rhetorical tactics and discursive strategies is borrowed 
from De Certeau (1984), although in a less political, more analytical sense; strategies refer to 
larger-scale formations and tactics to the specific actions by which formations are achieved. 
 
Analysis 
Step 1: Pinpointing “language endangerment”  
Following a loosely organized content analysis, we identified three rhetorical tactics across our 
French- and English-language data. These were not the only tactics or tropes at work but they 
were the three most common ones (see the indicative percentages given below). To be clear, a 
single line or instance generated by AntConc could be coded more than once if it indexed any two 
or all three of the rhetorical tactics. As far as possible we have tried to draw examples from 
different papers and stories; we have also tried to give examples in both languages, indicating 
(underlining) the parts of the extract under consideration. This is not to say that the rhetorical 
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tactics were equally represented across the two languages; such a comparative analysis is beyond 
the scope of the current chapter. In the initial descriptive step, we offer just two examples of each 
rhetorical tactic; other examples follow in Step 2 where we consider the third tactic in more detail 
along with a few German- and Spanish-language examples for good measure.  
 
First rhetorical tactic: Emojis as a (new) language 
By far the most common trope to appear in our dataset (57.5%), emojis are commonly treated as 
equivalent to language/s. Take, for example, Extract 2.1 with its use of “langage emoji” (emoji 
language) or Extract 2.2 which refers to the “UK’s fastest growing language” – a simultaneous 
appeal to its alarming rise and spread (see next section). 
 
Extract 2.1  
 
Les participants doivent décoder des messages en langage emoji. (Le Figaro, France, 17 July 
2017) 
 
Participants need to decode messages in emoji language.  
 
 Extract 2.2  
 
As the UK's fastest growing language, emoji characters need to represent of a broad range 
of people. (The Mirror, UK, 23 January 2017) 
 
As with texting style, emojis are framed explicitly or implicitly as foreign or cryptic and therefore 
in need of translation or decoding (‘décoder’). Emojis may be indirectly rendered a language when 
set in comparison or contrast with references to real or proper language – or, from Extract 2.4 
below, so-called traditional languages (‘langues traditionelles’). (Nor does it help when academics 
themselves speak in similarly problematic, reductionistic terms; see Ge & Herring, 2018.) Indeed, 
the driving objective in defining emojis as a language is to call attention to the negative impact this 
is having on language per se, as we see in the third rhetorical tactic. But the rhetorical stepping-
stone for this is the depiction of “emoji language” as rapidly expanding and pervasive. 
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Second rhetorical tactic: The rise and spread of emojis 
Emerging in 21.5% of our dataset, we find evidence for the same kind of “revolutionary” rhetoric 
Thurlow (2006) identified in relation to mediatized representations of text-messaging; in this case, 
we find dramatic appeals to the alarming rise and spread of emojis (See Extract 2.8 below for an 
explicit reference to ‘révolutionné’ (revolutionized).) This revolutionary framing of emojis is 
produced also through their apparent or relative newness – sometimes with comical effect, as in 
Extract 2.3 with its invocation of “the fastest growing language in history”. 
 
Extract 2.3  
 
Emojis, a popular way to replicate non-verbal communication, are used six billion times a 




Extract 2.4  
 
Mais face à la déferlante de symboles, faut-il craindre un appauvrissement des langues 
traditionnelles? (La Tribune de Genève, Switzerland, 6 February 2016) 
 
But facing the surge of symbols, should we fear an impoverishment of traditional languages?  
 
As Thurlow (2006, p.676) also noted, statements like “six billion times a day” (seldom given a 
source) are perfect examples of the kinds of “statistical panic” favoured by journalists and, 
following Tannen (1989), their function is largely to authenticate the narrative and to legitimate its 
central claims. In our French-language example from Switzerland (Extract 2.4), we find another 
well-established conceit: the clichéd metaphor of emojis as an inundation (i.e. ‘la déferlante’, 
surge). Through these patently negative allusions, journalists move a step closer to their idée fixe: 
the deleterious impact of emojis on language, cultural and intelligent life.   
 
Third rhetorical tactic: Linguistic, cultural, and intellectual degradation 
In just over a fifth (20.9%) of our dataset we found explicit reference to the deleterious impact of 
emojis, most specifically with regards cultural, intellectual and especially linguistic decline. In 
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Extract 2.4, we have already seen a negatively loaded reference to ‘appauvrissement’ 
(impoverishment) as well as the invocation of tradition; this same sense of degradation is carried 
more explicitly in the following extracts: 
 
 
Extract 2.5  
 
Les emoticônes sont parfois perçus comme un danger pour la langue. Certains voient dans 
leur usage une régression de la langue. (Le Figaro, France, 7 August 2017) 
 
Emoticons are sometimes perceived as a danger for language. Some people notice in their usage a regression of 
language.  
 
Extract 2.6  
 
But a number of us older folks, including academics, are more than a little worried about 
what the popularity of communicating with pictographs is doing to our language and 
literature. (Huffington Post, USA, 13 August 2015) 
 
 
In Extract 2.5, we see explicit reference to the danger posed by emojis for language (‘un danger 
pour la langue’) and, specifically, the decline of language standards or a so-called linguistic 
regression (‘une régression de la langue’) as possible outcomes of this threat. In the same extract, 
we also witness how journalists often serve as echo chambers for other people’s anxieties, even if 
these are largely anecdotal or made-up sources. Extract 2.6 does much the same thing with its 
somewhat disingenuous blending of “a number of us older folks” and “academics” (presumably 
not all of them?). Notably here, we have a repeated concern about the impact of emojis 
(‘pictographs’) on language and, specifically, literature. We will take this particular point up again 
shortly. 
It is across these three rhetorical tactics that we sense the broader discursive strategy of 
“language endangerment” emerging. Things culminate most clearly in the third tactic (i.e. 
linguistic degradation), but the idea of emojis’ language-like qualities and the supposedly 
unprecedented rise and spread serve to compound the imagined threat. Unlike Thurlow’s (2006, 
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2007) study, therefore, we have a case not of standard language under threat from digital 
discourse; instead, we find language in toto under threat from visual discourse. (Of course, the 
added moral panic about the impact of digital media continues to undergird everything.) Although 
the word language (in either English or French) is used, it typically collapses speech and writing 
which we otherwise know to be two very different modes of communicating. This is a matter to 
which we also return later. With this chapter, we are hoping to offer a useful extension of earlier 
work by offering not only an up-to-date perspective but also a multilingual one. More importantly, 
and in keeping with recent discussions by Thurlow (2017), our contribution lies also in the 
necessary shift from language ideologies to semiotic ideologies. This is where we turn next. 
   
Step 2: Semiotic ideologies in action 
Initially coined by Parmentier (1994, p.142), the notion of semiotic ideologies has been made more 
prominent for language scholars by Keane (2003). It is Keane’s lead that we are following here, 
borrowing also from Thurlow (2017). Put simply, semiotic ideologies are concerned with people’s 
beliefs about signification or meaning-making, and, specifically, issues such as intentionality, 
agency and arbitrariness. A key point that must also be made about semiotic ideologies is that, like 
language and media ideologies, they point to wider systems of social differentiation and symbolic 
authority – what Keane calls “representational economies” – and people’s beliefs about meaning-
making are always “enmeshed with the dynamics of social value and authority” (p. 415). In other 
words, the way we talk about meaning-making says a lot about whose ways of making meaning are 
considered better and whose beliefs about meaning-making are most powerful or influential. This, 
needless to say, is why it matters what journalists have to say about emojis and their relation to 
language. 
 One of Keane’s specific concerns is the prevailing notion (in Western cultures) that 
language is often treated as meaningful, while other ways of communicating (e.g. material culture) 
are treated as more practical and less sophisticated. In this sense, it is possible to view semiotic 
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ideologies as being essentially related to questions of multimodality, prompting the following types 
of questions: What is the relative importance or value of language vis-à-vis other modes of 
communication? Which modes are thought to “carry” meaning better or more reliably? Which 
modes of communication – which resources – are given status/authority? What social values 
(negative or positive) are attached to different modes of communication? Closely related to 
ideologies of language and media, these other sorts of ideological processes direct us to another 
way digital discourse can be metadiscursively framed. We see this clearly in the way emojis are 
depicted in our dataset. We thus return to the third of our rhetorical tactics from above (i.e. 
linguistic regression) together with some additional examples. In fact, for the sake of demonstrating 
the multilingual production and circulation of “language endangerment” we will also draw on a 
convenience sample of illustrative German- and Spanish-language examples from our larger 
archive.			
 
Extract 2.7  
 
Le Smiley a révolutionné les premières années du numérique. Jusqu'au règne de l'émoji sur 
le téléphone portable. Son créateur, Nicolas Loufrani, revient sur l'incroyable histoire de ce 
langage qui a conquis la planète. (Le Figaro, France, 7 August 2017) 
 
The Smiley revolutionized the early years of digital technology. Until the reign of emoji on the mobile phone. 




Extract 2.8  
 
Beherrschen Sie Emoji, die am schnellsten wachsende Sprache der Welt? (Zeit, Germany, 
16 March 2017) 
 
Can you master Emoji, the fastest growing language in the world? 
 
 
Extract 2.9  
 
Emojis, un nuevo lenguaje universal (La Vanguardia, Spain, 28 November 2016) 
 
Emojis, a new universal language 
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In order to make the claim that emojis are replacing words (see below), different modes of 
communication must also be rendered somehow equivalent so that one mode (emojis) can 
substitute for another (words). It is for this reason that emojis are so often depicted as being a 
distinctive language in and of themselves. In academic, theoretical terms, none of this is technically 
correct. At the very least, language requires three core features: modality, meaning, and grammar 
(Cohn 2013, 2016; Jackendoff, 2002). All other modes must follow suite. As Cohn (2013, p.3) 
suggests, when modes such as sounds, gestures, or images follow “a structured sequence [emphasis 
added] governed by rules that constrain the output – i.e. a grammar – it yields a type of language”. 
For instance, the sequential images of comics form a (type of) language. Although emojis express 
meaning using visual graphic signs as a modality, research by our colleagues Dürscheid & Siever 
(2017) show that they lack a grammar. Unlike the visual graphic signs of comics, emojis do not 
form structured sequences of visual signs, for example. None of which, of course, seems to bother 
newsmakers who, like many people, tend to use language in its more metaphorical sense – as in 
“body language” (as we saw above) or “the language of flowers”. People combine different modes 
in their interactions, which demonstrates that “humans are built with one expressive system that 
manifests conceptual information in three complementary modalities, each of which has its own 
properties and structures” (Cohn 2016, p.3). In sum, combining emojis and words is a natural way 
of communicating since human interaction is naturally multimodal (e.g. Dresner & Herring, 2010; 
Siever, 2015; Skovholt et al., 2014). By assuming that semiotic modes are necessarily 
interchangeable and incompatible, news media discourse misrecognizes the way human 
communication works.  
 Having settled on the distinctiveness and putative validity of emojis as a language, 
newsmakers are better positioned to pursue its antagonistic, colonizing relationship to language. As 
we say, one of the other common ways language endangerment is produced is through the tactical 
framing of emojis’ dramatic rise and spread. This, in turn, lays the groundwork for the overall 
framing of threat and, eventually, decline, which we want to discuss is more detail. To start, 
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though, we want to note how the rise-and-spread rhetorical tactic is organized most obviously 
through various forms of lexical exaggeration: numerical claim (‘six billion times a day’); 
superlatives (‘fastest’), and metaphors of disaster (‘la déferlante’). We also find a somewhat warped 
sense of history; recall “fastest growing language in history” in Extract 2.1 to which we now have 
‘die am schnellsten wachsende Sprache der Welt’ (the fastest growing language in the world) in 
Extract 2.8. In Extract 2.7, meanwhile, talk of ‘l'incroyable histoire’ (the incredible history) of 
emojis is clearly a type of scalar excess. Elsewhere, we also find metaphors of war (e.g. ‘invasion’) 
and references to the ubiquitous nature of emojis (e.g. ‘across cultures’). In Extract 2.10, we have 
the same kind of lexical excess (‘massivement’ – massively) as well as telling evidence for the spread 
of emojis: their appearance in dictionaries even. Note also the kind of agency given to emojis – 
their rudely having invited themselves into the dictionaries! 
 
Extract 2.10  
 
Massivement utilisés, ils s’invitent jusque dans le dictionnaire (Le Monde, France, 15 March 
2016) 
 
Used massively, they are even inviting themselves into dictionaries  
 
Extract 2.11  
 
Schreiben Sie noch oder emojisieren Sie schon? Über die Bilder, welche die Handysprache 
erobert haben. (Tagblatt, Switzerland, 15 October 2014) 
 
Are you still writing or are you already emojing? On the images that have conquered mobile language. 
 
Extract 2.12  
 
Es el nuevo lenguaje de las emociones. Los emoticones se apoderan de la propuesta juvenil. 
(La Prensa, Honduras, 30 August 2016) 
 
It's the new language of emotions. Emoticons have taken control of youth-oriented marketing. 
 
 
Extract 2.10 is revealing in some key ways. Emojis are not only presented as a powerful – 
potentially destructive – phenomenon, but also as an agentive process somehow bringing about 
changes by itself. It is not the users of emojis who are at fault but instead it is emojis that are shown 
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to be spreading, growing and generally infiltrating our lives. All of which is a typical expression of 
technological determinism – the belief that technology drives cultural change rather than vice-
versa, and that technology dictates communicative or social practice as opposed to being shaped 
by communicative and social needs or uses. However, although technologies might shape and 
influence certain uses, their mere existence does not imply a causal relationship between digital 
media and social changes. Hence, such a deterministic view does not have any basis in fact. 
Ultimately, people do not question these statements presented as facts; indeed, as Thurlow (2014, 
p.486) claims about the mediatized depictions of digital discourse, “their credibility is less 
important than their dramatic, narrative effect”. In portraying emojis this way, journalists paint 
emojis as an undesirable and deleterious enemy. Indeed, in the present dataset, the “value 
assumption” that emojis are undesirable is triggered by specifications of, for instance, high-scale 
movement, rapid growth, and attack. Following Fairclough’s reasoning (2003, p.57), if emojis are 
invading us and are uncontrollable due to their non-stop and high-scale growth, then emojis are 
undesirable. In this case, journalists evaluate one type of digital communication practice as 
intrusive and invasive – and thus assume it is bad. This creates an effect of moral panic that 
ultimately explains the negative arguments put forth in regards to the deleterious impacts of 
emojis: a cultural, intellectual, and linguistic degeneration. But this way of thinking about – and 
depicting – emojis also encodes a semiotic-ideological belief in the exteriority and thingness of 
language. It is akin to what Cameron (1990; also 1995, p.5) characterizes as the “organic fallacy” – 
the mistaken belief that language, like a tree, just grows somehow willy-nilly beyond human 
control. This sense of (visual) communication gone wild – rampantly spreading – certainly serves 




With emojis you can send virtual flowers and kisses, so perhaps the question now is, will real 







Assiste-t-on alors à un appauvrissement de la langue? La chercheuse observe en tout cas un 
phenomène nouveau par rapport aux premieres emoticônes: aujourd’hui, des emoji 
remplacent des mots et ne font plus que venir en complément. (Le Matin, Switzerland, 24 
April 2015) 
 
Are we thus witnessing an impoverishment of language? The researcher observes in any case a new 
phenomenon compared to the first emoticons: today, some emojis are replacing words and are not only used as 
a complement.  
 
 
Extract 2.15  
 
‘Verhunzen die Smileys unsere Sprache?’ fragte die Schweiz am Sonntag. Inflationär und 
gedankenlos eingesetzt, erschweren diese modernen Hieroglyphen bei SMS oder 
Whatsapp-Mitteilungen das Verständnis, statt die Kommunikation zu vereinfachen. (Tages-
Anzeiger, Switzerland, 11 February 2015) 
 
‘Are smileys ruining our language?’ asks Schweiz am Sonntag. Used excessively and thoughtlessly, these 




Extract 2.16  
 
Abusar de los ‘Emojis’: ¿El nuevo enemigo del lenguaje? (Infobae, Argentina, 12 January 
2016) 
Emoji abuse: The new enemy of language? 
 
Perhaps not surprisingly, Extract 2.13 comes from the same Guardian article as Figure 2.1; with its 
headline “Emoji invasion: the end of language as we know it :/”, the stance of the article is quite 
unambiguously pessimistic: words are being over-run and “real language” will be overtaken. In 
other words, language is being replaced. (In effect, we have a circular argument: if there is the 
possibility of emojis replacing words, then they must be capable of functioning like a fully-fledged 
language.) In the same way, Extract 2.14 moves swiftly from the potential impoverishment of 
language by emojis (‘un appauvrissement de la langue’) to the concern that words are to some 
extent being replaced (‘des emojis remplacent des mots’). Our Spanish-language example makes 
the case most clearly by invoking the notion of an enemy of language (‘enemigo del language) – 
another agentful misattribution – and by laying the blame, in principle, with emojis or, at least, 
their uncontrolled use (‘abusar de los Emojis’ – emoji abuse). As with our German-language 
example (Extract 2.15), the issues are framed as questions (e.g. ‘Verhunzen die Smileys unsere 
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Sprache?’ – Are smileys ruining our language?), but even asking the question raises the possibility, 
especially when it is flagged in the main headline.  
   These comments point not only to a simplistic relationship of cause and effect, but also to 
the belief that emojis and words cannot function together, that they are inherently and/or 
inevitably incompatible. Indeed, the cause and effect structure (more emojis leads to fewer words) 
negates the possibility to see both the use of emojis rising and people continuing writing. The use of 
emojis might well rise, this does not mean that people will stop writing – or stop knowing how to 
write. These kinds of comments underscore the deeper concern that emojis (actually the use of 
emojis) will lead not only to linguistic degradation but also to intellectual and cultural regression. 
We see this most clearly expressed in the following English-language extracts which refer, 
respectively, to backwards evolution, a return to ancient hieroglyphics and the end of civilization. 
 
Extract 2.17  
 
We are evolving backwards. Emoji, the visual system of communication that is incredibly 
popular online, is Britain’s fastest-growing language according to Professor Vyv Evans, a 
linguist at Bangor University. (The Guardian, UK, 27 May 2015) 
 
 
Extract 2.18  
 
Language and communication classes are incorporated into a school's curriculum to teach 
students how to use words to tell a story and communicate effectively. If these classes need to 
incorporate the language and symbols used in the mobile/digital world, aren't we just 
regressing back to the age of hieroglyphs? (CNBC, USA, 24 June 2015) 
 
 
Extract 2.19  
 
Some have questioned whether they represent the end of civilisation as we know it. Would 
Shakespeare turn in his grave if he could see what has become of our language? (Telegraph, 
UK, 8 August 2016) 
 
 
These are, of course, all too familiar ways in which digital discourse practices are metadiscursively 
framed, although for slightly different ends. In his work on the news media’s depiction of texting 
style, Thurlow (2006, p.680) also picked up on references to hieroglyphics; in this case, however, 
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journalists used the term for exaggerating the distinctiveness and unintelligibility of digital 
discourse. In Extract 2.18 above, hieroglyphics is being invoked for its supposed “primitiveness” in 
terms of both its being non-modern and pictographic rather than alphabetic. (Recall from Extract 
2.15 the ironic reference to ‘moderne Hieroglyphen’ – modern hieroglyphs.)   
As something of an aside, we note that, in the same article extracted in 2.17, Professor 
Evans is actually reported as being a lot more circumspect: ‘‘People get hot and bothered about 
good language use, but emoji is not a language,’ he says. ‘Its job isn't to replace language; it's 
enhancing our communications.’’ As Thurlow (2006, p.683) has noted before, these otherwise rare 
moments of nuance are often undermined anyway by the driving narrative and/or concluding 
remarks of the article. 
  The over-riding tone or stance of Extracts 2.17, 2.18 and 2.19 is one of pessimism – or 
what Thurlow (2006) might characterize as moral panic. Emojis are depicted unforgivingly and 
one-dimensionally as a backward form of communication leading not only to the demise of 
language but, as a consequence, to intellectual and cultural stultification. This shows that moral 
panics are not necessarily concerned with emojis and/or digital practices, but that they are often 
demonstrative of wider concerns regarding social order and social changes, as Critcher (2008) and 
Buckingham & Jensen (2012) suggest. Here we have a perfect example of recursivity, which, with 
reference to language ideologies, Irvine & Gal (2000) identify as the often unfounded extrapolation 
of isolated (iconized) linguistic features or practices to whole new domains of life. The idea here is 
that any putative linguistic regression is equivalent to intellectual and cultural regression. Through 
recursivity, people assume that emoji is a “bad” form of communication. Assumptions have the 
capacity and social power to shape what is accepted as common knowledge (Fairclough, 2003, 
p.55). As Fairclough notes (2003, p.40), “what is ‘said’ in a text is ‘said’ against a background of 
what is ‘unsaid’, but taken as given”. Here, people assume that emoji-based communication is a 
negative development and that verbal language is superior. In the extracts above, “regressing back 
to the age of hieroglyphs” (Extract 2.18) and “evolving backwards” (Extract 2.17) means moving 
	 62	
towards cultural darkness (i.e. a time when images were used to communicate). These comments 
in turn imply that emojis are “bad” and words are “better”. Moreover, this value assumption is 
connected to another assumption: the belief that there actually exists such a thing as a 
better/worse communicative mode, and thus that a mode can be inherently good or bad. In this 
regard, news media discourse hinges on an appeal to a supposed “golden age” when written 
language (the “good” mode) was at its peak (see Milroy, 1998). This is all a matter of semiotic 
ideology insofar as language is evidently upheld as the only and/or ideal bearer of culture and 
vehicle for intelligent expression. Of course, and as we have already seen in Extract 2.7, it is not all 
language which is regarded in this way. Implicitly or not, we are reminded that written language 
and particularly literary language are the true markers of culture, intellectual life and civilization. 
It is for this reason alone that, in true form, the British press turns worriedly to Shakespeare 
(Extract 2.19) as the ultimate arbiter of good, proper or real language. It is assumed that 
Shakespeare’s time was a golden age with regards to (English) language; therefore, incorporating 
tiny visual symbols in today’s language is perceived as an affront to “good language”. In his study, 
Thurlow (2006, p.679) cites the following 2003 example from his data: “And to think this 
happened in the land of Shakespeare. If the bard were alive today, he’d probably write, ‘2B or not 
2B’.” Over fifteen years later, one could well imagine a journalist somewhere bemoaning the use 
of something like this: 
    
 
 
The kinds of metadiscursive framing we have looked at so far clearly hinge on – and reproduce – a 
range of well-worn language ideologies (e.g. about standard language) which, in turn, are 
organized through the usual processes of iconization and erasure – selectively singling out some 
aspects and ignoring others. (We come to recursivity in a moment.) But our main focus here 
continues to be on the semiotic ideologies at play; in particular, the apparently irremovable divide 
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or irresolvable contest between words and images, between language and visual communication. 
Everything it seems boils down to the issue of mode/modality. Indeed, this is a particular semiotic 
ideology which Riley (2011) actually chooses to label as a distinctive “modal ideology”. (Riley is 
herself concerned with how cultural beliefs about language acquisition affect language 
socialization.) It seems that conflicting beliefs about the superiority/inferiority of images and 
writing are something which play out across the lifespan. In this regard, Kress and van Leeuwen 
(2006, p.16) comment on the status of images at school; for instance, although pupils are 
encouraged to draw at school, their illustrations are rarely seen as a means to communicate, unlike 
words. And as they become older, students focus more and more on writing at the expense of 
images. Similarly, Cohn (2013, p.3) explains how drawing is usually only viewed as a “skill” 
compared to writing which is seen as a “rule-governed system”. Writing is thus commonly and 
widely regarded as a sign of progress and culture. This helps to explain the emergence of language 
endangerment and perhaps some of the fierceness with which it is expressed.   
 Here, the language of the press “misrecognizes” certain semiotic modes as being 
necessarily better/worse than others, highlighting a Manichean and hierarchical vision of modes. 
Indeed, people actually assume that a mode can be inherently good or bad. This belief is set 
against the backdrop of prescriptivism, the idea that one code/variety is better than others. 
Moschonas & Spitzmüller (2010, p.23) define prescriptivism as a corrective practice that follows 
three steps: prohibitive, normative, and explicative. The authors give the following example of 
corrective practice: “one should not say or write X – one should say or write Y because X is 
incorrect and Y is more appropriate” (p.23). According to Moschonas & Spitzmüller (2010, p.25), 
the explicative step is a value judgment that usually indexes a form of ideology and relies on 
common assumptions and presuppositions. The explicative step, which is related to ideologies, 
tends to remain constant over time. Likewise, Cameron (1995, p.1) talks about verbal hygiene as 
“[p]ractices (…) born of an urge to improve or ‘clean up’ language”. She claims that “our norms 
and values differ” but “what remains constant is only that we have norms and values” (ibid, p.9). In 
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the above examples, the press highlights a common ideological frame (connected to norms and 
values) that is indirectly stated: we should use words and not emojis because emojis are bad (they 
are hindering linguistic and intellectual skills). In this case, the explicative judgment presupposes 
that there is a norm (words) and that this norm is superior.  
 As Cameron (1995, p.9) claims, everyone is a prescriptivist, or “verbal hygienist”. As a 
result, we are less interested in the fact that people’s comments are normative, and more in 
how/why discussing good/bad communicative modes actually misrecognizes the nature of human 
communication. Such a dichotomy is a result of classifications, which is how systems of 
representation function (cf. Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006). Emojis are portrayed as being an 
inherently simple code that results in limited thought. In sum, the above examples of recursivity 
point to the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, or the idea that the language you use influences your 
intellectual capacity (Whorf, 1956). Indeed, the press claims that words allow for the development 
of thought, ideas, arguments, and articulation, which presupposes that emojis do not permit the 
growth and maturation of cognitive and intellectual skills, as Extract 2.18 exemplifies. Indeed, in 
Extract 2.18, students need to be taught “how to use words to tell a story and communicate 
effectively” (my emphasis). The concept of recursivity allows us to understand the meaning of the 
differences between various modes of communication as well as the construction of specific 
ideologies. Through recursivity, people classify things (i.e. modes) according to “norms”, revealing 
relationships of power, authority, and inequality. In the case at hand, the difference between 
emojis (shallow communication) and words (deep communication) is extrapolated onto cultural 
and intellectual levels, forming specific beliefs and attitudes about the nature of communication, 
where modes have the capacity to be inherently good or bad. However, by assuming that semiotic 
modes can be intrinsically better or worse than others, news media discourse misrecognizes the 
way human communication works; people actually have at their disposal different semiotic 
resources to express a specific meaning, and they choose the mode that they think is the most 
appropriate (or the “best”) to transmit this meaning, depending on different factors.    
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There is one other point of theory which we would like to offer in the way of explanation. 
While writing is itself inherently visual (Cohn, 2013; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006), it is different 
from other types of visual discourse because, argues Cohn (2013, p.6), for alphabetic scripts at least 
it is “based on the correspondence that graphic signs have with sound”. This makes is more 
difficult – in theory and practice – to draw a neat distinction between the written mode and the 
visual mode, although one might reasonably distinguish between the written mode and the image 
mode. With regards the emojis-and-language relationship, moral panic arises when emojis are 
perceived to be substituting for words; as such, we do not see a rejection of visual communication 
in toto. This is how Kress & van Leeuwen (2006, p.17) put it: “the opposition to the emergence of 
the visual as a full means of representation is not based on an opposition to the visual as such, but 
on an opposition in situations where it forms an alternative to writing and can therefore be seen as 
a potential threat to the present dominance of verbal literacy among elite groups”. We might 
argue, therefore, that newsmakers and others are not rejecting image-based communication 
because it is visual, but because they give more importance to words and writing – and without 
recognizing that it, too, is a form of visual communication. The relationship between words and 
images is ultimately constructed as a necessarily competitive one. 
 
Discussion: Misrecognizing communication 
 
This kind of visual literacy (the “old” visual literacy) has, for centuries now, been one of the most 
essential achievements and values of Western culture […] No wonder that the move towards a new 
literacy, based on images and visual design, can come to be seen as a threat, a sign of the decline of 
culture. (Kress & van Leeuwen 1996, p.15) 
 
More than twenty years ago, Kress & van Leeuwen (quoted above) commented on the rise of 
visuality and design as powerful – perhaps even dominant – communicative modes in 
contemporary life. There was, they argued, an ever-growing importance attached to visual literacy 
but that this shift from conventional, logocentric notions of literacy would inevitably be met with 
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resistance and anxiety. In many ways, it is precisely this kind of cultural reaction or public back-
lash that we have been documenting in this chapter. The language endangerment is certainly a 
discourse being played out across the multilingual news-media data. Arguably for the reasons we 
have just discussed, this seems to be something which has captured the public imagination, fed in 
no small part by newsmakers. In this regard, and as a way to start wrapping up, we offer the 
following headlines from more recent data (also archived in the Digital Discourse Database), two 
stories from more conservative newspapers in the UK from April 2018. 
 
Extract 2.20  
 
Emoji ‘are ruining the English language because young people use them to communicate 
and don't bother with words’ (The Daily Mail, UK, 18 April 2018) 
 
 
Extract 2.21  
 
Emoji ‘ruining people's grasp of English’ because young rely on them to communicate (The 
Telegraph, UK, 17 April 2018) 
 
 
The study being cited in these two stories is, it transpires, concerned with popular perceptions, as 
the first article explains: “Of the two thousand adults, aged 16 to 65, who were asked their views, 
94 per cent reckoned English was in a state of decline, with 80 per cent citing youngsters as the 
worst offenders.” (It is perhaps all the more ironic that the use of “reckoned” in this sentence might 
well be considered “bad English” by many. For that matter, another pet peeve of grammar police 
appears with “regressing back” in Extract 2.18.) More to the point, and quite contrary to the 
driving argument of the headlines and the body of the articles, we also learn the following about 
the survey’s results: “around three-quarters of adults rely on emoji to communicate”. It seems that 
popular beliefs and feelings about emojis are generally quite confused; in the UK at least there 
certainly seems to be a double-standard about who is to blame for the demise of language. 
Regardless, the biggest nonsense in this story is the persistent suggestion – by survey participants 
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and the journalists – that people (young or otherwise) no longer “bother with words” or must now 
rely exclusively on emojis for communicating. 
 As wordsmiths, journalists not surprisingly take a very logocentric view of emojis, assuming 
that words are necessarily superior. Theirs is an inherently ingrained belief that words are likely to 
be more sophisticated, more reliable bearers of meaning than images. But theirs is also an 
especially powerful, privileged position from which to reproduce and promote these beliefs. Even 
in the apparently innocuous act of valuing one mode of communication over another, journalists 
“have the potential to re-scale social, cultural, and symbolic capital, and thereby ‘re-shuffle’ 
authority and expertise on particular issues” (Milani & Johnson, 2010, p.6). They are also able to 
shore up their own authority, using their position as workers-cum-arbiters of language “in the 
service of the struggle to maintain or acquire power” (Woolard, 1998, p.6). They do so by trying to 
fix certain semiotic ideologies, making them seem obvious and commonsensical. The media does 
not merely attempt to mirror reality; it circulates a naturalized, but often distorted version of 
reality in which certain voices are privileged over others and in ways which often contradict or 
erase what people are actually doing in their everyday communicative practices. 
 Emojis are everywhere and consistently portrayed by journalists as inherently simplistic 
and limited – in Bernstein’s (1971) famous terms, this is a seriously “restricted” code – with the 
implication that they cannot possibly be as meaningful or sensible as words. It is not that we 
regard newsmakers are necessarily wrong, although they are sometimes clearly making things up. 
(Note the oddly inconsistent quotations in the two headlines above.) As Cameron (1995, p.9) 
remarks, everyone is a prescriptivist or “verbal hygienist” of one kind or another – even academic 
linguists. We are less interested therefore in the inaccuracy and/or normativity of journalists’ 
comments which are sometimes to the point of discriminatory when it comes to young people 
(again, cf. Thurlow, 2014). It is not for us to confirm or deny the central premise of the language 
endangerment discourse, even though we may disagree or even disapprove. Rather, we are 
interested in tracking how “popular” discussions of putatively good or bad modes misrecognize 
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communication in ways which expose underlying semiotic ideologies – that is, dominant cultural 
discourses about signification and meaning-making. By “misrecognition”, we refer to Bourdieu’s 
(1984) sense that something is not recognized for what it truly is but is instead attributed to another 
realm of meaning (cf. James 2015, p.100). Things are not recognized for what they are because of 
naturalized assumptions that are deeply ingrained through a set of cultural, social, political 
processes. Consequently, people are not fully aware of – or willing to entertain – the complex 
nature of emojis, of language or the functioning of different semiotic modes. Of course, even 
experts like academics spend a great deal of time trying to figure these things out and arguing 
between themselves about the nature and relative merits of semiotic actions.  
 The “language endangerment” discourse we have pointed to here reveals a troubling but 
not altogether surprising misrecognition of language, visual communication and the inherently 
multimodal nature of all communication. In short, journalists appear simply unwilling to address 
the significant difference between semiotic modes – or to challenge the simplistic ways other 
people speak of these issues. The bottom line, as Kress and van Leeuwen (2006, p.19) observe, is 
that not “everything that can be realized in language can also be realized by means of images, or 
vice versa”. It all depends on the particular affordances of different mode or semiotic resources. 
More to the point, it seems that most ordinary speakers invariably find ways to express meaning 
using a combination of different modes; they also understand – intuitively or not – when meaning 
might be “lost in translation” if the “wrong” mode is used. Likewise, they are aware of the fact that 
written language is not necessarily the most effective mode in all situations/contexts; this is why 
their communicative practices require them to choose the mode(s) that they think would express 
their meaning the best. Human beings have at their disposal different semiotic resources to express 
a specific meaning, and they choose and use the medium and mode that they think is the most 
appropriate to transmit that meaning. According to Jay Lemke, verbal language, for instance, is 
particularly good for classifying and categorizing things into groups (Hestbaek et al., 2015, p.127). 
Yet, although users select the “best” mode(s) according to the situation, a mode is not intrinsically 
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good or bad, as the press would lead us to believe. In reality, different semiotic modes can function 
together (i.e. they are compatible) even if they don’t necessarily express meaning in the same way 
(i.e. they are not interchangeable).  
 In other words, news media discourse highlights a misconception of the sign-making 
process in giving one mode of communication more value than another and in discarding the fact 
that human communication is naturally multimodal. Newsworkers’ semiotic ideology is comprised 
of a naturalized belief that words are more powerful than images in their capacity to express 
meaning; in other words, they think that words actually express “better meaning”. As a result, the 
hierarchical relationship between modes (i.e. powerful and good - weak and bad) is taken for 
granted. However, such a contrast is created in discourse. Indeed, through their language, 
newsmakers create connections between forms and ideas, and these connections are rarely 
questioned. They become real and true in the discursive process; therefore, ideological 
relationships do not simply “exist”; they become naturalized in their performance. Newsmakers 
create relations of authority and inequality through their discursive acts and beliefs, utilizing 
“discourse” as a form of social action. It is not just emojis which come off poorly from the news 
media reporting, therefore, but also everyday speakers themselves who are effectively treated as 
unwitting or incapable dupes. Perhaps this is how journalists see the rest of us. Perhaps this is how 





















“Screens are like crack to children”: A multimodal 
critical discourse analysis of “harm-driven 





Setting the scene: Children and their digital media practices 
 
On May 27th, 2018, the Swiss public television channel, RTS1, broadcast a television report 
detailing developmental and social issues affecting children today as a result of their overexposure 
to screens (cf. Sommer, 2018). In the report, speech pathologists and doctors discussed the dangers 
of digital media use for young children while examining specific cases of children who had 
developed a variety of health issues such as language delay and motor and communication 
disorders, and who exhibited behavior similar to that of autistic children. Similarly alarming, in 
2017, the British online newspaper, The Mirror, went so far as to compare children’s use of digital 
media to drug addiction – and not just to any drug, but to crack, a powerful form of cocaine: 
   
Extract 3.1 
 
And parenting expert Tanith Carey said: “This sounds unhealthy – screens are like crack 
to children. It might sound radical and free thinking but computers are highly addictive to 
children.” (The Mirror, UK, 2 February 2017) 
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The RTS TV report and the extract from The Mirror are just two recent examples that one finds in 
today’s European mediasphere (i.e. television, newspapers, radio, etc.) which highlight popular 
beliefs and concerns regarding the (mainly negative) impact that digital media can have on 
children. These kinds of discourses in the media are imbued with powerful ideologies related to 
children and technology, particularly what journalists or adults’ beliefs are about children and 
their digital media practices. These beliefs and interpretations are often framed solely around a 
discourse of risk, a focus that is problematic, misleading, and narrowing, although not terribly 
surprising, as I argue in this chapter.  
 Previous research has investigated discourses of risk regarding young people and their 
digital media practices. Such scholarly work (e.g. boyd, 2014; Buckingham 2007; Haddon & Stald, 
2009; Jeffery, 2017; Jones & Schieffelin, 2009; Spilioti, 2015; Ponte et al., 2009; Thurlow, 2006, 
2007, 2014; Vickery, 2017) examines the discourse of “moral panic” (cf. Buckingham & Jensen, 
2012; Critcher, 2008) that the press employs to frame young people’s digital media practices as 
dangerous and destructive as opposed to offering a balanced discussion between risks and 
opportunities. Indeed, when it comes to reviewing young people’s digital skills, the press tends to 
take a technologically deterministic position which often ends up portraying young people as 
incompetent and vulnerable in the face of the threat digital technologies pose. However, as some 
scholars (e.g. Buckingham & Jensen, 2012; Critcher, 2008; Thurlow 2014) have noted, the panic 
regarding young people’s digital media use and practices is not necessarily about the users 
themselves, but often reflects other broader sociocultural issues, such as a fear of modernity and of 
social changes (Buckingham & Jensen, 2012). While most empirical work on the subject has 
investigated linguistic data, multimodal data is also ideologically revealing in regards to young 
people and their digital media use (see Thurlow et al., 2019), which is the approach I take in this 
chapter.  
 Importantly, I take into account a new wave of concerns that has emerged in the media, as 
more and more toddlers and young children have gained access to digital media. As the RTS 
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television report mentioned earlier and Extract 3.1 demonstrates, and as Blum-Ross & Livingstone 
(2016) contend in their report, media comments often focus solely on the health effects that digital 
media supposedly have on children. Indeed, “Reports about screen time in the popular media 
frequently link screen time to adverse effects on physical and mental health, for example that 
screen time makes children ‘over-stimulated’, ‘moody, crazy and lazy’, ‘cross-eyed’ and ‘obese’” 
(Blum-Ross & Livingstone, 2016, p. 7). As I show in my analysis, these types of comments related 
to health issues are more and more present in today’s mediasphere, and tell us much about 
underlying societal ideologies. Although I am aware that investigating discourses of moral panic 
with regards to young people’s digital media use is not new, and that the same popular anxieties 
tend to recur with the arrival of each new technology (Buckingham & Jensen, 2012), my goal here 
is to shed new light on journalists’ framing of the issue, from a multimodal and multilingual 
perspective. Moreover, I wish to offer new insights into metadiscourse about young children’s digital 
media use, which is a demographic that has been less studied. In this way, I also expand on 
previous work (e.g. Thurlow, 2006, 2007, 2014, and also Thurlow et al., 2019) that focuses on 
teens.  
 Early moral panic discourses concerning children’s access to the internet started in the 
1990s and emphasized a disconnect between the “real” offline world and the “unreal” virtual 
world, and also between children (who were viewed as “digital natives”) and parents (who were 
viewed as “digital immigrants”) (Facer, 2012; Livingstone et al., 2018; Prensky, 2001). 
Consequently, as Facer (2012) suggests, such discourses challenged the old “parent-child” model 
that viewed parents as experts and children as learners, and shaped a new understanding of 
“childhood” that ran contrary to the notion that children belong in the “safe” private space of 
their home. In other words, the arrival of the internet shook up the old understanding of 
“parenthood” and “childhood”, as children started to get involved in the “public” space, which 
was previously thought to be reserved for adults (Facer, 2012; Lupton, 1995; Lee, 2001). It was the 
challenging of these old beliefs that brought about discourses of moral panic (Facer, 2012). When 
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discussing these early moral panics and anxieties, Lupton (1995, p.110) claimed: “the home is now 
no longer a place of safety and refuge for children, the computer no longer simply an educational 
tool or source of entertainment but is the possible site of children’s corruption. ‘Outside’ danger is 
brought ‘inside’, into the very heart of the home, via the Internet”. Early moral panic discourses 
about children’s digital media highlighted an idea of “childhood” tied to geographical space (and 
more specifically to “private space”); such an ideology tied children to certain characteristics such 
as passivity and vulnerability (Facer, 2012; Holloway & Valentine, 2000; James & Prout, 1997; 
Lee, 2001). While early research on childhood focused on “biologically reductionist approaches” 
(James & Prout, 1997, p.xi), the field quickly moved to encompass a more social constructionist 
perspective, where notions such as “child” and “childhood” were thought to be discursively 
produced (Burman, 1994; Holloway & Valentine, 2000; James & Prout, 1997; Jenks, 1996; 
Stainton-Rogers & Stainton-Rogers, 1992). Meanwhile, research about children and their digital 
media use also evolved so as to focus on children’s perspectives and the potential benefits of digital 
media, and started taking into account the agency of children as social actors; this social 
constructionist approach was used to counter moral panic discourses (Buckingham & Jensen, 2012; 
Livingstone et al., 2018).  
 In this regard, current empirical research on children’s relationships with digital media 
proposes a perspective oriented towards the opportunities and benefits that digital media offer. For 
instance, the EU Kids Online is an example of an ongoing multinational and multidisciplinary 
research project based at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), which 
seeks to investigate the risks, opportunities, and online practices of children in different European 
countries (see Livingstone, 2014, for an overview of methods and findings, and Livingstone et al., 
2018, for a historical overview of European research on children’s digital media use, and an 
outline of the research agendas of the EU Kids Online project). The project’s goal is to provide 
cutting-edge European research (published in peer-reviewed journals) in order to foster awareness 
of our children’s digital media practices, and thus to collaborate with policy-makers so that they 
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can use these empirical findings in the development of their guidelines and policies. As Livingstone 
et al. (2018, p.3) note, empirical research is especially useful in order to counter the discourse of 
moral panic found in the media – a discourse that can in turn strongly influence policy-makers 
into making decisions that focus on online risks, safety, and restrictions at the expense of online 
benefits and opportunities. In fact, empirical research on children’s digital media use does not 
justify the common fears and anxieties found in the media; rather, it presents children as actors 
who are capable of taking advantage of the opportunities of the digital world while at the same 
time dealing responsibly with the risks that they may encounter online (Livingstone et al., 2018). 
Thus, such research focuses on “opportunity-driven expectations” (cf. Vickery, 2017) that can 
eventually help children become media literate and thus facilitate their participation in a world 
that is more digitally connected than ever before. Moreover, there is now a desire to investigate 
the effects of digital media on children “in terms of [children’s] embodied, located and social as 
well as online selves” – in other words, from a holistic perspective (Livingstone et al., 2018, p.10). 
Such a perspective contends that while research should still focus on the variables that influence 
children (e.g. demographic, social, and cultural factors), it should also examine the effects that the 
digital world can have on children’s well being, and thus hear what children have to say. All in all, 
as Livingstone et al. (2018, p.12) argue, future research should venture to “recognize children’s 
agency, to contextualize their internet use in particular countries or contexts of childhood, to keep 
both risks and opportunities in view and to recognize the interconnections, to design research and 
policy that respects children’s lives holistically, and to eschew moral panics in favour of the 
contribution of rigorous theory and evidence”. In alignment with Livingstone’s (2018) directives, 
some important empirical studies do focus on children’s points of view and discuss the influence 
that public anxieties can have on children. For example, Mascheroni et al. (2014) analyze 
children’s response to the discourse of “moral panic” in the news media and show that children’s 
perceptions of risks and dangers are highly influenced by what they see/hear in the news, 
especially in regards to the dangers related to meeting strangers online. Likewise, Vickery (2017, 
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p.7) seeks to understand “how expectations shape the everyday “lived experiences” of actual 
youth” and thus explores young people’s responses to risk discourses. These studies show that 
children’s perceptions about “digital media” and “risk” are discursively constructed.  
 Likewise, ideas about “childhood” and “space” are discursively produced. As Holloway & 
Valentine (2000, p.778) note, “the discursive construction of children as innocent is informing an 
understanding of cyberspace as an inherently risky space for children, a space where they are in 
need of protection”. However, every child does not necessarily experience the risks posed by 
digital media in the same way. While being exposed to risk is a part of children’s lives, their 
resilience to risk depends on a wide range of factors, as research demonstrates (e.g. Luthar, 2006; 
Masten et al., 1990; Rutter, 1999). Indeed, Luthar & Cicchetti (2000, p.858) define ‘resilience’ as 
“a dynamic process wherein individuals display positive adaptation despite experiences of 
significant adversity or trauma”. As Smith & Carlson (1997, p.236) claim, “many, or even most, 
children exposed to risk do no go on to negative outcomes and instead are “resilient”, that is, able 
to overcome developmental hazards and adversity without apparent negative outcome”. 
Therefore, children do not all respond the same to online risks, and mere exposure to risk does not 
necessarily lead to harm (e.g. Vandoninck et al., 2012). While modern conceptions of “risk” focus 
mainly on potential negative outcomes, “[b]efore the era of modernity, [risk] was a neutral term, 
concerned merely with probabilities, with losses and gains”, as Fox (1999, p.12) claims (see also 
Lupton, 1999b; Douglas, 1992). In this chapter, I follow Vickery’s (2017, p.7) standpoint 
concerning the concept of “risk” in order to analyze it “from a social constructivist perspective that 
is focused less on objectively identifying the probability of harms and dangers than on 
understanding how society identifies, mediates, and constructs understandings of what is 
considered to be a risk”. Although the press has a tendency to conflate the concepts of “risk” and 
“harm” by implying that all risk automatically leads to harm, it is important to understand that 
these are actually distinct terms. A risk can lead to harm, but it can also lead to benefits, a 
perspective which is not found enough in the media, as I demonstrate. Rather, the news media 
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exposes what Vickery (2017, p.8) calls “harm-driven expectations”, which “are revealed through 
policies, practices, and narratives that are based on fear and anxiety”. As I show in my analysis, 
these “harm-driven expectations” – or ideologies of harm, as I sometimes refer to them in this 
chapter – in turn influence the way journalists think about what should be done when giving 
advice and recommendations to readers (Vickery, 2017). Indeed, their advice and 
recommendations frequently espouse a rhetoric of abstinence which favors restriction, 
surveillance, and prohibition. In other words, “Harm-driven expectations rationalize restrictive 
policies, intuitions, and practices that try to control technology” (Vickery, 2017, p.8).   
 With the above research agenda in mind, I now wish to shed new light on news media 
discourse related to children’s digital media practices. In the current chapter, I show that the same 
“harm-driven expectations” (cf. Vickery, 2017) circulate across national and linguistic borders, 
both verbally and visually, and I reveal the impact of such “media ideologies” (cf. Gershon, 2010) 
through the way journalists and other news editors frame and understand the concepts of 
“children” and “childhood” with regard to digital media. I understand the news media’s ideologies 
of harm (or “harm-driven expectations”) as being part of the broader concept of “media 
ideologies” which Gershon (2010c, p.283) defines as “the metalanguage that emphasizes the 
technology or bodies through which we communicate”. In keeping with the above theoretical 
background, this chapter addresses the following research questions:  
1. How are the concepts of risk and harm represented in recent news stories about children’s 
digital media use? 
2. What kinds of advice and recommendations do the news media offer to combat such risks?  
3. What are some of the recurrent semiotic resources employed in images representing 
children with digital media? 
4. What do “harm-driven expectations” reveal about journalists’ understanding of 
“children”? 
Ultimately, I hope that this chapter contributes to current debates regarding children’s digital 
	 78	
media use and practices and that it demonstrates the need to counter the misconceptions 




In this chapter, I investigate the news media’s framing of children’s digital media use and 
practices. As a reminder, I have decided to focus on “children” for two main reasons. First, I 
noticed that the words “children” and “enfants” were frequent nouns in the English and French 
datasets (see Appendix F). Second, while other studies have focused primarily on the 
representation of teens in linguistic narratives (e.g. Thurlow, 2006, 2007, 2014) and in visual 
narratives (e.g. Thurlow, 2017; Thurlow et al., 2019), few have investigated the depiction of younger 
children’s digital media use in the news. In the news media, the term “children” is frequently used 
to refer to different age categories, from toddlers to teenagers – a phenomenon that can also be 
seen in empirical research. Indeed, researchers often use the general terms “child(ren)” to refer to 
their participants. Consequently, the use of the word “child(ren)” aligns with what Van den Bulck 
et al. (2016) asserted when they stated that “the concept of “child” […] refers to the position of a 
person in a family’s constellation, not to a developmental stage” (p.31). For example, in the EU 
Kids Online studies, the age of children can vary from 0 to 19, and thus the studies include research 
on babies and toddlers, young children, adolescents, and young adults, depending on the purposes 
of the investigation. Although most research has been conducted with children from 9 to 16 years 
of age (e.g. Livingstone et al., 2011), new studies have focused on children under the age of 9, as 
more and more younger children gain access to digital media. As a result, Chaudron (2015) and 
Holloway et al. (2013) focus on the age group 0-8 in order to examine very young children’s digital 
media practices, risks and opportunities, as well as the role of their parents and caregivers. 
Consequently, by focusing on “children” in my linguistic analysis, I capture a whole range of age 
groups, including young children. In my visual analysis, my focus on young children allows me to 
	 79	
expand on previous work by Thurlow (2017) and Thurlow et al. (2019) which focus on the visual 
representation of young people’s digital media practices.  
 
Step 1: Linguistic narratives 
In this chapter, I draw on a sample of 137 different news stories between 2014 and 2017 (51 
English-language news stories, 17 French-language news stories, and 69 German-language news 
stories) which are all drawn from the DDD (see Appendix G for a list of the sources of the137 news 
stories). For the current dataset, I first selected all stories published between January 2014 and 
September 2017. All 1325 articles (193 French-language, 717 English-language, and 415 German-
language news stories) from the DDD were then imported into AntConc (see Chapter 2 which 
utilizes a similar analytical approach). In this way, I started with three corpora – one in French, 
one in English, and one in German – and used the concordance tool in order to focus on keywords 
and their semantic clusters. I searched Antconc for all instances of child* in English (843 
occurrences) and enfant* in French (316 occurrences), and a student assistant helped me gather 
German-language data and searched for all instances of Kind* in German (205 occurrences). 
Given my interest in children’s digital media use and practices, we then sub-sampled further so as 
to only attend to news stories that specifically discussed children’s digital media practices and/or 
the impact of digital media on children. We were left with 86 French-language instances, 168 
English-language instances, and 130 German-language instances of stories which focused 
specifically on the relation between children and their digital media use – altogether a total of 384 
distinctive lines of data.  
 My goal here is not to offer a quantitative study of popular anxieties with regards to 
children’s digital media practices, but rather to analyze how news stories discuss the same issue 
across borders, and the ideological implications that follow. Therefore, as Thurlow’s (2006, p.671) 
study, this chapter relies on an “ interpretive, critical approach that highlights striking themes 
rather than statistical patterns”. Since previous studies (e.g. Jeffery, 2017; Mascheroni et al., 2014; 
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Tagliamonte & Denis, 2008; Thurlow, 2006, 2014, 2017) have discussed how the press often 
frames young people’s digital practices in terms of harmful outcomes, my analysis expands on these 
previous studies by including Vickery’s (2017) conceptualization of “harm-driven expectations”. 
Vickery states that “[t]he mere threat of individual harm – that is, the risk itself – serves as 
justification for fear-based policies, decisions, and practices” (Vickery, 2017, p.8). This embodies a 
rhetoric of “problem-solution” (cf. Machin & van Leeuwen, 2003) where risks are seen as a 
problem, to which solutions such as policies must be established. Machin & van Leeuwen (2003) 
see this “problem-solution discourse schema” as a “dominant mode of constructing the world of 
the Cosmopolitan woman” (p.507). In this chapter, I demonstrate how different news stories employ 
this rhetoric of “problem-solution” and the ideological impact of such a rhetoric by investigating 
“typical” examples of the ways in which international news stories frame children’s digital media 
use.  
 
Step 2: Visual narratives 
In this section, I analyze news media images in order to demonstrate how ideologies of harm are 
realized multimodally. The seven examples that I look at here come from a dataset of 33 images of 
young children with digital devices (see Appendix H for a montage of these images) and serve as  
“typical” representations of how the news media depicts children’s digital media practices. The 
first step of the data selection was to search the image tags “smartphone”, “computer/laptop”, and 
“tablet” – which are tags of digital devices – from the DDD; I thus gathered a total of 269 images 
of smartphones, laptops, and tablets. The second step was to discard images that did not portray 
people; I thus only kept 214 images of people with digital devices. Finally, the third step was to 
focus on images portraying children between 0 and 12 years old (n=33) that come from 24 
different news stories. I give a rather wide age range since it is impossible to determine the exact 
age of the represented participants, but associating them with a wider age group is relatively 
feasible.  
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 In this chapter, I offer a social semiotic analysis (e.g. van Leeuwen, 2005) of seven typical 
images of young children’s digital media use and focus on the images’ three metafunctions: 
representational, interpersonal, and compositional (cf. Kress and van Leeuwen, 2006). I thus 
investigate how the semiotic signs of the news media images attempt to represent reality (i.e. 
representational metafunction), how they create social relations between participants (i.e. 
interpersonal metafunction), and how they form a coherent whole (i.e. compositional 
metafunction). I draw on Kress and van Leeuwen’s (2006) grammar of visual design, Machin’s 
(2007) multimodal framework and Barthes’s (1977) analysis of carriers of connotation. 
Furthermore, I provide some comparative analysis on the visual representations of young children 
and teenagers. In this regard, my study aligns with Thurlow et al. (2019) and their visual analysis 
of teens and technology in image banks. To my knowledge, no other study has focused on the 
visual representation of younger children and digital media; this is why I focus my social semiotic 
analysis on visual examples from this age group. Here, I do not offer a visual content analysis of 
the images because the dataset of news media images of younger children and digital media is 
rather small (n= 33). I am therefore less interested in the number of images than how they are 
composed.   
 All in all, the social semiotic analysis of the news media images reveals a specific type of 
cultural discourse related to children and digital media, which circulates beyond modes and 
beyond borders. These images – together with their headlines, leads, and captions – communicate 
a specific discourse of childhood, of what it is to be a child, and more specifically, a child using 
technology; they depict children as innocent victims of evil new technology.  
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Analysis: Identifying “harm-driven expectations” 
Step 1: Linguistic narratives 
In this section, I show how “harm-driven expectations” (cf. Vickery, 2017) are discursively 
produced by analyzing typical news media examples from the three datasets in French, English, 
and German. Examples in French and German are translated into English for comprehensibility; 
unfortunately they cannot always capture the full meaning and nuance of the original version. 
Here, I focus on a discourse of “problem-solution” (see Machin & van Leeuwen, 2003), which, I 
argue, reveals journalists’ ideologies about children’s digital media practices. Specifically, I explore 
the ways in which digital media is commonly described as the cause of many health-related issues, 
and then how this fabricated problem in turn justifies abstinence-focused solutions. The extracts I 
analyze below were gathered using Antconc, which gave me a total of 384 distinctive lines of data 
(see above). These extracts are not necessarily representative of the entire dataset, but they were 
selected because they are typical of the ways in which the news media portrays children’s digital 
media habits (see Thurlow, 2006).  
 
1. Identifying problems 
When the news media discusses how the use of digital media has negative effects, they utilize two 
problematic framings that create an atmosphere of moral panic. First, they describe all risk as 
automatically leading to harm, and second, they tend to solely focus on health-related 
consequences when it comes to children’s digital media use. The conflating of the concepts of risk 
and harm can be seen in Extract 3.2 below, which comes from the British newspaper, The 
Telegraph. The news article introduces Elisabeth Kilbey – a clinical psychologist – and her opinion 





 Extract 3.2 
 
1 Kilbey's clarion call for change could not come soon enough. Just this week the National  
2  Association of Head Teachers revealed that alarming numbers of four year olds are  
3 starting school this week unable to speak properly because language is delayed. The British  
4 Heart Foundation has reported that sedentary children who amuse themselves online are with  
5 all the attendant risks. And a 2015 poll carried out for Channel 4 News found that 43 per cent  
6 of parents believed their children were 'emotionally dependent' on technology. Many reported  
7 that attempts to restrict usage were met with hostility and sometimes aggression. Screen time –  
8 games and social media affirmation-stimulates the reward centres in young brains which makes  
9 kids crave ever more hits, hence some commentators have taken to using the term 'digital  
10 heroin'.  
 
 (The Telegraph, UK, 7 September 2017) 
 
 
Although scholars highlight the importance of distinguishing risk from harm – a risk does not 
necessarily lead to harm, but can lead to harm; it is the “probability of harm” (Livingstone et al., 
2018, p.5) – the last sentence of the extract (lines 8 to 10) demonstrates how the news media does 
not make such a distinction. Digital media (i.e. games and social media in Extract 3.2) are 
considered risky because they could have negative effects depending on certain factors (e.g. personal 
and demographic characteristics, and context of use). However, here, the addictive potential –
which is compared to heroin addiction – is described as if it were a direct consequence of ‘screen 
time’ (line 7), and more specifically, of ‘games and social media affirmation’ (line 8). In other 
words, digital media use is portrayed here as an unredeemable risk. This exemplifies a 
misunderstanding of the relationship between risks and harm, and more importantly, an erasure of 
other influential factors. Indeed, no details are given concerning the children’s digital media usage 
(where, when, how, how much), that is, the nature of the children’s use of digital media, which 
could lead to risks or opportunities. Although the extract mentions ‘screen time’ (line 7), there is no 
reference to the exact amount of time spent playing games or on social media. Thus, it is implied 
here that any amount of time spent online (on games or social media) necessarily leads to addiction, 
which creates a simplistic and misleading discourse meant to strike fear into the reader as it comes 
off as exaggeratedly alarming. As Blum-Ross & Livingstone (2016, p.4) suggest, popular comments 
should stop focusing on “screen time” (the quantity of time spent online); rather, they should take 
into consideration the context of use, the content of digital media, and the 
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connections/relationships that are made possible or not. In sum, by conflating risk and harm, the 
press reveals their understanding of risk, and as such, demonstrates that risk is a social construction 
(cf. Lupton, 1999). Here, the press constructs an idea of risk solely based on harm-driven fears 
while omitting the possibility of encountering risks that do not lead to harm or that may even lead 
to opportunities and benefits. In such a discourse, the news media portrays “all risk as 
unacceptable” (Livingstone, 2009, p.174).  
 The focus on risks and harm and the conflating of both concepts creates a discourse of 
“moral panic”, which should come as no surprise when one considers previous scholarly work 
investigating news media discourse concerning young people’s digital media practices (e.g. 
Thurlow, 2006, 2014). In Extract 3.2, the discourse of moral panic is constructed through various 
rhetorical means. First, journalists employ a rhetoric of persuasion through the barrage of three 
different sources: The National Association of Head Teachers (line 2), The British Heart 
Foundation (line 4), and Channel 4 News (line 5). These sources all point to the same alarming 
issues regarding the dangers of digital media use for children. Listing three different sources one 
after the other has a persuasive function, just as providing numbers and statistics serves the same 
persuasive function (e.g. Thurlow, 2006). The reader assumes that if multiple sources point to the 
same conclusion, then the alarming discourse in the article must be warranted. Although the three 
sources are completely unrelated, “stuffing” or “cramming” them this way has the striking effect of 
an escalating danger. Besides for a rhetoric of persuasion, the extract utilizes words that trigger 
panic because of their negative connotations: ‘alarming’ (line 2), ‘delayed’ (line 3), ‘risks’ (line 5), 
‘hostility’ (line 7), ‘aggression’ (line 7), ‘emotionally dependent’ (line 6), and ‘digital heroin’ (lines 9-
10). Readers are thus presented with a metaphorical picture where digital technologies are 
dangerous tools that delay kids’ language development, that render them aggressive like criminals, 
and dependent/addicted like drug addicts.  
	 85	
 In a similar vein, Extract 3.3 from the German newspaper Die Zeit exposes a 
misunderstanding of what risks are and when they can lead to harm, which also serves to create an 
atmosphere of moral panic meant to scare the reader.  
 
 Extract 3.3 
 
 1  “Wer viel drinnen vor dem PC sitzt oder in der Ecke mit seinem Gameboy oder Smartphone  
 2  beschaftigt ist, bewegt sich weniger. Haltungsfehler, Kopfschmerzen, Nervositat, Ruhelosigkeit,   
 3 Schlafstorungen konnen die Folge sein. Kurzsichtigkeit hat bei unseren Kindern deutlich   
 4 zugenommen. Dann haben wir die psychische Gefahrdung. Abhangigkeit ist eine Gefahr, PC-  
 5 Spiele bergen einen hohen Suchtfaktor. Hiervon fuhlen sich besonders die Jungs angezogen.   
 6 Madchen werden eher kommunikationssuchtig und sind per Facebook, WhatsApp oder   
 7 Twitter auf Daurempfang. Beides wirkt sich in der Regel negativ auf die Schulnoten aus.   
 8 Mobbing in den sozialen Medien ist ebenfalls ein Thema.”  
  (Die Zeit, Germany, 20 October 2016) 
   
  Whoever spends a lot of time in front of a computer or is busy with their Gameboy or  Smartphone in a corner  
  will move less. This can result in postural disorders, headaches, nervousness, restlessness, and sleep disturbances.  
  Myopia has increased significantly in our children. Then we have the mental hazards. Dependence is a danger;  
  computer games carry a high addiction factor. These are particularly attractive to boys. Girls are more   
  communication-dependant and are always available on Facebook, WhatsApp or Twitter. Both usually have a  
  negative effect on school grades. Bullying on social media is also an issue. 
 
Here, spending a lot (line 1: ‘viel’) of time in front of a computer, a Gameboy, or a smartphone is 
described as a direct cause of the multiple ills presented. Consequently, the listing of problems 
resulting from an overexposure to screens (lines 2-3) has a persuasive effect which triggers a feeling 
of moral panic. The panic effect is all the more dramatic because of the collapsing of different 
health-related problems, form physical troubles (e.g. line 2: ‘Kopfschmerzen’ –headaches; line 3: 
‘Kurzichtigkeit’ –myopia) to behavioral ones (e.g. line 3: ‘Schlafstörungen’ –sleep disturbances) 
and psychological ones (e.g. line 4: ‘Abhangigkeit’ –dependence; line 8: ‘Mobbing’ –bullying). As 
illustrated in Extract 3.2, “cramming” different information without further detail creates the 
illusion of a danger. Here, impacting the reader emotionally is more important than reporting 
facts. Furthermore, besides causing health-related problems, computer games and social media – 
referred to as “both” (line 7: ‘Beides’) – are described as usually having a negative effect on school 
grades (line 7). This shows again that journalists do not distinguish risk from harm; indeed, they 
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present digital media as having a negative impact on people, without providing any contextual 
information about usage. However, if there were a distinction between risks and harms in both 
Extracts 3.2 and 3.3, the framing of children’s digital media practices would be less dramatic since 
it would take into account influential other influences that could lead to harm or not. Once again, 
the news media’s framing emphasizes a social constructivist approach to risk. In this particular 
news media context, risk is framed in a way that recognizes a determinacy of digital media use in 
relation to negative consequences (i.e. harms). However, in order to accurately and objectively 
assess the potential harm and benefits of online experiences, it is essential to hear what children 
have to say about the way in which they cope with risky situations online (see Vandoninck & 
d’Haenens, 2014 for a mapping of preventive measures children take), which is not a perspective 
that the press offers. As a result, children are depicted in news media discourse as passive victims of 
harmful technology, and not as the agents that they actually are in the digital world. [18] 
 The non-agency of children can also be observed when one considers how it is the 
technologies themselves that get blamed as the main causes of a variety of health-related problems. 
In a technologically deterministic way, French-speaking news writers often blame ‘écrans’ (screens) 
and other material devices such as ‘smartphones’ (smartphones) and ‘tablettes’ (tablets) for causing 
problems. In the English-language data, the same technologies are blamed as well as ‘screen time’. 
Extracts 3.4 and 3.5 below both illustrate the naming of different digital media (in bold) as the 
causes of multiple health issues.   
 
  
 Extract 3.4  
 
 1 One of the best actions to protect young people’s mental health (Editorial, 22 September) is to   
 2 ban mobile phones in schools. Progressive schools have already done so, recognising the   
 3 relentless impact that social media and screen time have on the emotional and mental   
 4 health of their students.  
 







 Extract 3.5 
 
 1 Nous recevons de très jeunes enfants stimulés principalement par les écrans, qui, à 3 ans, ne   
 2 nous regardent pas quand on s'adresse a eux, n'écoutent pas les consignes, ne communiquent   
 3 pas, ne recherchent pas les autres, sont très agités ou très passifs 
 
   (Le Monde, France, 28 June 2017) 
 
    
  We receive very young children mainly stimulated by screens who, by the age of 3,  
  do not look at us when we talk  to them, do not listen to instructions, do not communicate,  
  do not look for others, are very agitated and passive   
 
 
When news writers blame screens or the time spent in front of screens for children’s health issues, 
they victimize children by not giving them agency for their actions. As both extracts above 
demonstrate, children are passive victims of what “screen time” and “screens” (both agents) do to 
them. Furthermore, what is particularly striking in Extract 3.4 is the collapsing of totally different 
“technologies” as if they were all the same. Indeed, ‘social media’ (i.e. the content of internet in the 
form of a website or application) and ‘screen time’ (i.e. the time spent in front of a screen) (line 3) 
are two different “risks” of digital media that can have negative (or positive) outcomes. However, 
this is confusing for readers because the news writer claims that in order to ‘protect young people’s 
mental health’ (line 1), schools should ban ‘mobile phones’ (line 2). Is it the mobile phone in itself 
(i.e. the material device), the content or application/website used online (i.e. social media), or the 
amount of time spent online that is to blame? As I stated earlier, news writers have a tendency to 
pack unrelated items together in order to produce a more striking and dramatic effect. 
Nevertheless, journalists miss what is truly important when it comes to the impact that digital 
media can have on children; it is not so much the materiality of the technology in itself, mere 
exposure to screens (i.e. screen time), or access to certain content online that is harmful, but a mix 
of different factors such as personal and demographic characteristics, context of use, family 
structure (e.g. Blum-Ross & Livingstone; 2016; Livingstone et al., 2018) that are usually not 
exposed in news media discourse. As I expose below in the semiotic analysis of news media images, 
the same issue can be found when digital devices (i.e. the “material” aspect of technology) are 
placed in the forefront of the blame game; thus images too miss what is really significant in the 
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relationship between children and digital media.  
 The next problematic framing with regards to children and their digital media use has to 
do with a single-minded focus on health consequences, a resultant blind reliance on health 
specialists at the expense of all other experts. Although Extract 3.2 (lines 3, 6, 7, 9, 10) and Extract 
3.3 (lines 2, 3) illustrate this point quite well, I would like to offer other examples. For instance, 
Extract 3.6 below from the Swiss-French newspaper La Tribune de Genève compares the 
consequences of children’s overexposure to screens as similar to symptoms of autism (line 3) –
which echoes the exaggerated comparison to heroin addiction from Extract 3.2; the consequences 
are as serious as can possibly be imagined.  
 
 Extract 3.6 
 
 1  La surexposition numérique engendre une kyrielle de maux. Quel que soit le milieu social, ces   
 2 spécialistes décrivent des enfants qui ne se développent pas normalement: ils ne parlent pas, ne   
 3 communiquent pas, se montrent très agités ou à l'inverse passifs. Des troubles proches, selon les   
 4 auteurs, des symptômes de l'autisme –à la difference majeure qu'ils disparaissent en supprimant   
 5 les écrans.  
 
  (La Tribune de Genève, Switzerland, 26 August 2017) 
   
   
  Digital overexposure causes a never-ending string of woes. Whatever the social background, these  
  specialists describe children who do not develop normally: they don’t speak, don’t     
  communicate, get very agitated or inversely, passive. Disorders that are close, according to the  
  authors, to symptoms of autism –with the exception that they disappear when 
  screens are gone.  
 
 
Here, journalists implicitly demonize autism, implying that it is an abnormal condition and that 
children who are overexposed to screens will not develop normally (line 2: ‘normalement’). To 
make the situation even more dramatic, it is implied that all children are affected, even children 
from affluent backgrounds (line 1: ‘quel que soit le milieu social’ –whatever the social background). 
Moreover, overexposure to screens does not just cause woes; it causes ‘une kyrielle de maux’ (a 
never-ending string of woes/pains), which sounds more alarming. The listing of developmental 
and linguistic woes (lines 2-3) mirrors the typical portrayal of autism in the news media. As Holton 
et al. (2014, p.200) demonstrate, “journalists rely heavily on labels and psychiatric symptoms when 
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covering autism”. As a consequence, they treat “autism as a generally poor outcome that is 
potentially harmful at the societal level. This suggests to the public that individuals with autism 
should be avoided when possible because, if nothing else, they are not “normal” and are 
connected with a certain amount of negativity” (Holton et al., 2014, p. 201). The popular framing 
of autism in the media and in society in general is transposed here onto the consequences of digital 
overexposure, which in turn reinforces the sentiment of fear and panic. Also, in order to convince 
readers more forcefully, the article relies on the opinion of health professionals, which is a 
powerful rhetorical tactic. Indeed, the “specialists” (line 2: ‘spécialistes’) and “authors” (line 4: 
‘auteurs’) are health professionals who are referred to earlier in the news article as pediatricians, 
child psychiatrists, psychologists, and speech pathologists. People usually trust health professionals, 
thus what they say here is to be taken as fact. In sum, the implicit message is the following: if 
autism is a condition that should be avoided, so should symptoms related to digital overexposure. 
Therefore, as the last sentence of the extract (lines 4-5) suggests, the cure for the “disease” is simply 
to eliminate the use of digital devices altogether. 
  As Extracts 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 demonstrate, the press never questions these health-
focused statements, which are presented as facts. As Thurlow (2014, p.486) claims about the 
mediatized depictions of digital discourse, “their credibility is less important than their dramatic, 
narrative effect”. The resultant moral panic ultimately explains the press’s focus on risks and 
harms (especially centered around health) related to digital media use, and also actual users and 
readers’ opinions (see focus group analysis in chapter 6). Such a strong focus on health issues by 
the news media can be explained by the rise of health researchers in the field of media and 
children (Bickham et al., 2016). Furthermore, the opinions of pediatricians can be extremely 
influential since they “[play] a direct role in guiding parents to optimize the physical, mental, and 
social development of their children” (Bickham et al., 2016, p.186). The news media has a 
tendency to follow medical specialists and cite work from medical journals as opposed to other 
journals which are more oriented towards communication, sociology, or cultural studies; as a 
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result, news media discourse often frames children’s digital practices “within an illness framework, 
tilting it towards investigating negative effects of media” (Bickham et al., 2016, p.192), as we can 
see in the examples above, and in Extract 3.7 below.  
 
 Extract 3.7 
  
 1 For children that young, the official line from the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) is   
 2 that exposure to screens arrests language development and social skills. Until recently, the APP   
 3 advised that for children under two, parents should permit absolutely no screen time   
 4 whatsoever. In October last year, reflecting popular usage, it revised the wording of this advice,   
 5 so that “avoid all screens under age two” became “avoid solo media use in this age group”.  
 
  (The Guardian, UK, 10 August 2017) 
 
Extract 3.7 comes from the British newspaper, The Guardian, and references the American 
Academy of Pediatrics’ (AAP) recommendations. This extract relies on medical sources to 
convince readers and win parents’ trust, however, it actually misrepresents what its sources 
originally said. The original AAP article referenced by The Guardian does not state that ‘exposure to 
screens arrests language development and social skills’, as Extract 3.7 states (line 2). Rather, the 
AAP article states: 
 
 Extract 3.8 
 
 1 Population-based studies continue to show associations between excessive television viewing in   
 2 early childhood and cognitive, language, and social/emotional delays, likely secondary to   
 3 decreases in parent-child interaction when the television is on and poorer family functioning in   
 4 households with high media use.  
 
  (AAP Council on Communications and Media, 2016, p.2) 
 
Besides mentioning influential factors such as quantity of media consumption (line 1: ‘excessive’), 
quality of parent-child interaction (line 3: ‘decreases in parent-child interaction’) and quality of 
family functioning (line 3: ‘poorer family functioning’), the article goes on to discuss the influence 
of other crucial factors such as the age of children when they first have access to media, and the 
content of the medium (e.g. violent, educational, etc.). As a result, the idea that The Guardian 
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presents omits crucial information with regards to what factors could lead to developmental issues 
in children and thus conveys a distorted message that implies that the mere ‘exposure to screens 
arrests language development’ (cf. Extract 3.7). Moreover, the last sentence of Extract 3.7 is also 
misrepresented. It is indeed true that the AAP article advises to ‘avoid solo media use in this age 
group’ (cf. Extract 3.7 and AAP Council on Communications and Media, 2016, p.3). However, 
the framing of Extract 3.7 centers on a negative framework that emphasizes restricting digital 
media use (e.g. line 5: ‘avoid’). But what the original AAP article states is more positive and 
balanced. Indeed, they tell parents: ‘if you want to introduce digital media, choose high-quality 
programming and use media together with your child. Avoid solo media use in this age group’ 
(p.3), advice which is less alarmist and more instructive for parents. Even though The Guardian 
article misrepresents the original AAP article, people tend to trust medical sources. So why should 
they doubt what they read in the press? Unfortunately, such news media examples only serve to 
feed people’s fear and panic regarding children’s digital media consumption and prevent them 
from devising a reasonable approach to the risks and opportunities inherent in digital media.  
 In addition, relying solely upon medical claims can be misleading for the public. In the 
previous examples, we see a simplistic and deceitful discourse that creates a dichotomy between 
“healthy” vs. “sick” (Bickham et al., 2016, p.192) transposed onto a similar dichotomous 
relationship between “no technology” (healthy) and “technology” (sick). Such a simplistic 
dichotomy might help to explain comments that imply or directly recommend getting rid of 
technology. In sum, this almost exclusive reliance on medical research in news media discourse has 
a double effect: it does not allow other empirical studies on media and children to be heard (e.g. 
EU Kids Online), and it misleads the public (especially children and parents) into adopting a mindset 
of moral panic that is unwarranted when one takes into account the valuable work being done in 
other disciplines. As suggested by Bickham et al. (2016), research on children and the media could 
benefit greatly from more collaborative and interdisciplinary work. Medical scholars and 
media/social/communication scholars could engage each other in order to promote children’s 
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wellbeing while accepting the fact that we live in a world where the use of digital devices is not 
necessarily negative.    
 In sum, news media discourse on the risks and harmful effects of digital media on children 
reveals two problematic framings that create a perspective of moral panic. First, risks are described 
as automatically leading to harm, which scares readers and convinces them that the only available 
solution is to get rid of the cause of the harm (i.e. digital media). However, in such a discourse, 
people are not made aware of where the blame actually lies, that is, influential factors such as the 
context of use and access (e.g. where, when, how much, with whom), the content of digital media, 
and the child’s demographic and personal characteristics. These are the issues to look out for and 
to monitor, not our screens, computers, tablets, smartphones, games, or apps in and of themselves. 
Second, the press tends to focus on health issues with regards to children’s digital media practices. 
Such an emphasis on medical problems is also misleading since it creates an atmosphere of moral 
panic that ignores other empirical work which offers different perspectives on the effects of digital 
media on children. Moreover, when the press mentions medical publications or medical claims, it 
does not take into account a major challenge that medical researchers face: “the need to translate 
results of individual studies into actionable recommendations” (Bickham et al, 2016, p.196). We 
often see references in the press to special cases and individual stories that can mislead parents. 
This is why interdisciplinary collaboration between medical and non-medical researchers is 
valuable, and why the news media ought to turn to other empirical research when discussing 
children’s relationship with digital media. When it does not, news media discourse on the risks and 
harmful effects of digital media on children eventually shapes a discourse of childhood/children 
that is misleadingly limiting.  
 
2. Identifying solutions 
Next, I investigate the guidelines and recommendations that the news media proposes to readers. 
The solutions that they present in their news stories are mostly based on “harm-driven 
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expectations” (cf. Vickery, 2017), and they also tend to follow a negative framework since they 
mostly center on prohibition or restriction (e.g. the emphasis on avoid in Extract 3.7). I argue that 
this type of framing centered on restriction and prohibition is a direct consequence of the portrayal 
of the health-related problems exposed above. Ultimately, I focus on one problematic issue of the 
press’s discourse of advice and recommendations: the misleading expectation that parents are 
active agents and children are passive recipients.  
 Extract 3.9 below comes from the Swiss French newspaper, Le Temps, and discusses 
parents’ strategies for coping with their children’s digital media use.  
 
 Extract 3.9 
 
 1 D'autres choisissent de couper le Wi-Fi à partir d'une certaine heure. Et ceux qui comptent sur   
 2  solutions techniques: filtres parentaux ou logiciels de captures d'écran à intervalles   
 3 automatiques. Ceux qui délimitent des plages horaires: jamais le matin avant l'école, ou jamais   
 4 le soir avant de dormir. Ceux qui délimitent des espaces physiques: pas de téléphone à table, ni   
 5 dans les chambres à coucher, les écrans uniquement dans les pièces communes. Beaucoup   
 6 accordent un 'crédit écran', qui va croissant avec l'âge de l'enfant, par exemple une demi-heure   
 7 deux fois par semaine.  
 
  (Le Temps, Switzerland, 31 January 2015) 
 
    
  Others choose to cut off Wifi after a certain hour. And those who rely on technical solutions:    
  parental filters or automatic screenshots taken at regular intervals. Those who delimit certain    
  time slots: never in the morning or before school, or never at night before going to bed. Those    
  who set physical spaces: no phone at the table, nor in the bedrooms, screens only in communal    
  rooms. Many grant a ‘screen credit’ that increases with the child’s age, for example a half an    
  hour twice a week.  
 
 
Here, we notice the construction of a cultural narrative centered on surveillance and restriction 
through the use of: ‘couper’ (line 1: cut off), ‘filtres parentaux’ (line 2: parental filters), ‘délimitent’ 
(lines 3,4: delimit), ‘jamais’ (2x line 3: never), and ‘crédit écran’ (line 6: screen credit). In this 
example, the solution that the news media proposes to parents relies solely on restricting, checking, 
and prohibiting children’s digital media use and practices, which creates a negative framework of 
abstinence that ultimately influences readers into adopting an all or nothing approach, where the 
use of digital media is seen as inherently bad, and the non-use of digital media is seen as inherently 
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good. The following extract below from the German newspaper Die Welt contains a similar 
discourse that also favors abstinence from digital media.  
 
 Extract 3.10 
 
 1 Der “digital divide” wird also künftig nicht smarte Nutzer und dumme Nichtnutzer trennen,   
 2 sondern umgekehrt: diejenigen, die als Datensklaven an ihren Endgeräten hängen, und die,   
 3 denen ihre Eltern die Endgeräte verbieten, ihnen Bücher vorlesen und Zeitungsabonnements   
 4 schenken. “Die Grossmeister im Silicon Valley wissen das schon längst”, schreibt der   
 5 Politikwissenschaftler Andre Wilkens in seinem Buch “Analog ist das neu Bio”: Ihre Kinder   
 6 schicken sie auf analoge Schulen ohne Smartboards und Laptops, sondern mit Kopfrechnen   
 7 und Basteln.  
 
  (Die Welt, Germany, 29 October 2016) 
 
   
The “digital divide” will no longer separate smart users from stupid non-users, but rather vice versa: those who depend 
on their devices as data slaves from those whose parents prohibit digital devices, read them books, and give newspaper 
subscriptions. "The Grand Masters in Silicon Valley have known this for a long time", writes political scientist Andre 
Wilkens in his book "Analogue is the New Organic": Send your children to analogue schools without Smartboards and 
laptops, but with mental arithmetic and crafts.  
 
 
Through the words ‘verbieten’ (line 3: prohibit) and ‘ohne’ (line 6: without), Extract 3.10 also 
emphasizes the prohibition and restriction of digital media. Moreover, by portraying digital media 
users as dependent slaves (line 2: ‘Datensklaven’) and non-users as children who must have parents 
who prohibit digital devices (line 3: ‘Engeräte verbieten’), read books to their kids (line 3: ‘ihnen 
Bücher vorlesen’), and offer them newspaper subscriptions (line 3-4: ‘Zeitungsabonnements 
schenken’), journalists indirectly tell parents that they should forbid their children from using 
digital media which will make them stupid and dependent. The reverse is also true. It is implied 
that children will be more intelligent if they do not use digital devices. Such a discourse based on a 
dichotomy between “no digital media” (smart) and “digital media” (stupid) is similar to the illness 
framework exposed earlier between healthy and sick. All of these examples utilize the same 
rhetoric of moral panic which relies heavily on dichotomies that do not leave any room for 
discussion. As a consequence, parents are portrayed as active agents who need to protect their 
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children by prohibiting and monitoring their digital media use, while children are viewed as 
passive and voiceless recipients of their parents’ measures.  
 The problem with framing parents as police officers is that this can prevent children from 
learning and taking advantage of the benefits of digital media. Rather, parents/caregivers should 
be seen as “guides”. With regards to parental mediation and recommendations, empirical research 
looks for successful ways for parents to guide their children and engage with them, in a more positive 
framework. Prohibiting, restricting, and constantly monitoring will not help any child become 
media-literate. Indeed, although restrictive measures can prevent children from accessing risky 
content online, they do not allow children to acquire any digital media skills at all (Livingstone et 
al., 2017; Vickery, 2017; Warren, 2016; Zaman & Nouwen, 2016) – something they would be able 
to learn through active mediation or discussions with their parents, for example. Moreover, a focus 
on surveillance can further “privacy concerns and may erode the relationship of trust between 
parents and children”, as Sun Sun Lim (2016, p.25) notes. Consequently, the rhetoric that many 
news articles promote is not beneficial for parent-child relationships or for the future of children in 
a digital world. Instead of protecting children from harm when arguing for a zero-risk childhood, 
restrictive measures strengthen the barriers between parents and children in ways that could be 
detrimental to children in the future. Indeed, as a consequence of such measures, children may be 
deprived of skills that would allow them to both be actors in the digital world and be well-
equipped to cope with risks online.   
 Furthermore, in news media articles that favor supervision and restriction, children are 
framed as voiceless and vulnerable victims. Therefore, the news media produces a particular 
discourse of “childhood” by framing children as “subjects” (see e.g. Holloway & Valentine, 2000; 
James & Prout, 1997). Such a discourse does not address “children’s rights to provide for their 
needs or participate in the (digital) world” (Zaman & Nouwen, 2016, p.5) and goes against 
empirical research which views children as actors. For instance, Van den Bulck et al. (2016) argue 
against the traditional unidirectional framework, which considers parents as actors socializing their 
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children and children as passive recipients of their parents’ rules. Rather, they argue in favor of the 
“child-effect” theory, a bidirectional socialization process where parents can also become 
recipients ready to be socialized, and children can be actors who influence their parents. In this 
way, parents are also learners and thus, as Zaman and Nouwen (2016, p.7) suggest, “it is 
important to move beyond the presupposition of the parent as protector and the (all-knowing) 
teacher”. However, as I have demonstrated in Extracts 3.9 and 3.10, the news media’s framing of 
the parent-child relationship is rather simplistic and unidirectional: children are depicted as 
passive recipients of rules and recommendations, and parents are portrayed as responsible actors 
who must teach and protect their children (by restricting, monitoring, and prohibiting). As Warren 
(2016, p.179) claims, “Effective mediation is more than just building fences, and parents will 
always want to be better informed about their children’s media choices”. Therefore, as the above 
extracts demonstrate, news media discourse is not the best place for parents to seek for effective 
ways to guide and engage with their children; instead, the news media fosters moral panic and tells 
parents that constantly monitoring their children is a safe practice. As research shows (e.g. 
Livingstone et al., 2017), restrictive measures concerning children’s digital media use tend to be 
adopted by fearful and less digitally skilled parents. Since the news media has a tendency to spread 
fear and panic, this can have a significant impact on parents’ mediation’s style and direct them 
towards restrictive-mediation as opposed to enabling-mediation. Although parents can obtain 
useful and constructive advice from other influential sources, the press remains a powerful starting 
point for the discussion of social issues; this is why it is so important to improve news media 
discourse by offering a more balanced perspective which could allow for more balanced 
recommendations for parents of digital media users. 
 In sum, the problem-solution rhetoric that I have analyzed here leads to the construction of 
a particular discourse of “childhood” built on specific ideas of “space” and “risk”. Not only does 
the notion of “space” shape people’s understanding of “children”, but ideas about childhood and 
children also shape the meaning and use of particular spaces, as Holloway & Valentine (2000) 
	 97	
argue. More precisely, the press portrays the digital space as risky for children, and children as 
vulnerable and passive. This closely aligns with Holloway & Valentine (2000, p.777) who claim: 
“the understanding of children as angels, as innocents who are less competent than adults, has led 
to concerns about children's safety in public space”. As a consequence, the authors argue that 
“[t]his is leading parents to control and limit their little angels' independent use of public space” 
(Holloway & Valentine, 2000, p.777; see also Valentine 1997a, 1997b). Ultimately, it is the social 
construction of these discourses that is problematic because they shape people’s ideas and use of 
digital media in terms of danger and restriction. This then leads to a redefining of public space and 
who should be allowed to use it. 
 
Step 2: Visual narratives 
Below are seven visual examples of young children and digital media that I selected because they 
are typical of the ways in which the press visually depicts children’s digital media practices. In 
order to demonstrate how ideologies of harm are produced visually, I selected two images from 
French-language news, three from English-language news, and two from German-language news. 
Although I will not spend too much time discussing the sources of the images selected, it is 
nonetheless important to mention the increasing use of stock images by news editors, and as such 
the complex relationship between image banks and the news media (see Aiello & Woodhouse, 





     
 
          
 
 Figure 3.2: Tages-Anzeiger, Switzerland, 21 May 2017. Original headline: Wie Whiskey für kleine Kinder (Like 
Whiskey for young kids). Original image caption: Gerade für Kinder haben Smartphones ein gewisses Suchtpotenzial. 




Figure 3.1: Beobachter, Switzerland, 22 August 2014. Original headline: Meine Jungs sind so passiv (My kids are so 
passive). Original image caption: Noch vor ein paar Jahren waren Tablett-Computer kein Thema, heute sind sie gar in vielen 
Kinderzimmern zu finden (A few years ago tablets had not become an issue yet, today they can even be found in a lot of 
children’s bedrooms) (Image source: Thinkstock Kollektion) 
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Figure 3.4: Le Matin, Switzerland, 3 July 2017. Original headline: Alerte aux écrans pour les enfants en bas âge 
(Young children should be wary of screens) Original image caption: Pour les spécialistes, les enfants de moins de 4 ans ne 
devraient pas se retrouver devant un écran plus d’une heure par jour. (According to specialists, children under 4 years old 
should not spend more than one hour a day in front of a screen). (Image source: Stocklib) 
Figure 3.3: Le Monde, France, 28 June 2017. Original headline: Ecrans, la grande déconnexion parents-bébés 
(Screens, the big disconnect between parents-babies). Original image caption: Smartphone ou tablette font aujourd’hui 







               




Figure 3.5: The Guardian, UK, 2 March 2016. Original headline: How Silicon Valley’s parents keep their children safe 
online. Original image caption: Child psychologist Richard Freed says children as young as 11 are becoming hooked on 
pornography. Technology, he believes, pulls children away from their most developmentally important places: family and school (Image 
source: Alamy)                        
	
Figure 3.6: The Mirror, UK, 6 October 2016. Original headline: The secret cyber-life of 10 year olds: Children admit to 
actively hiding their online activity from parents. Original image caption: A ten year old boy uses an Apple Ipad tablet computer 




                         
 
 
In this section, I demonstrate how harm-driven ideologies can also be realized visually through 
the three “metafunctions” of communication.  I thus explore how images represent the world 
(i.e. representational metafunction), how they create relationships between participants (i.e. 
interpersonal metafunction), and how they form a coherent whole (i.e. compositional 
metafunction) (cf. Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006). 
 
1. Representational meanings  
According to Kress and van Leeuwen (2006), images can either be narrative or conceptual in their 
way of representing the world and the relationships between the represented participants. If they 
are narrative, they usually depict “unfolding actions and events, processes of change, transitory 
spatial arrangements”, and if they are conceptual, they focus on “participants in terms of their 
generalized and more or less stable and timeless essence [emphasis added]” (p.79). The visual examples 
above – all of which come from image banks – are best described as conceptual. As Machin and 
Figure 3.7: The Telegraph, UK, 4 May 2017. Original headline: Tablets and smartphones damage toddlers’ speech 
development. Original image caption: Children under 18 months should not be given handheld devices (Image source: Alamy) 
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van Leeuwen (2007, p.151) argue, the strong reliance on stock images on a global level nowadays 
(including in the news media industry) shows a significant shift in the “world’s visual language from 
one which emphasised the photograph as witness, as record of reality, to one which emphasises 
photography as a symbolic system”. As one notices in the images selected, they are typical of stock 
photography; their generic and symbolic nature is such that we could easily swap them and each 
news story would keep its core message. More specifically, their generic and symbolic nature is 
revealed through the lack of contextualization, which makes them more conceptual than narrative. 
This also aligns with what Thurlow et al. (2019) argued in their analysis of the visual 
representation of teens and technology in image banks. The lack of background and/or details in 
these images leads viewers to focus their attention on what little they can see and on the 
connotations of the few visible/salient objects. Therefore, these images do not tell a specific story, 
they rather symbolize an idea – here, the idea of what it is to be a child using technology.  
 The images above depict one or two children staring at a digital device (a smartphone or a 
tablet) alone. The combination of these two participants (child + digital device) is symbolically 
powerful. Although such images show “typical” and “generic” participants who could easily be 
interchangeable, and although stock images such as Getty images are intended to be 
“meaningless” in order to be used in any context (cf. Machin and van Leeuwen, 2007, p.151), 
these images acquire a specific meaning when one considers them from a multimodal perspective, 
that is, with the linguistic text that surrounds them. Whereas children usually represent innocence, 
vulnerability and purity, smartphones and tablets are seen here as disrupting or spoiling children’s 
innocent nature (e.g. Buckingham & Jensen, 2012). Smartphones and tablets are recurrent props 
in stock photography and can have different connotations depending on the context (e.g. work, 
business). Here, it is the dangerous nature of these digital devices that is made salient through the 
relationship between text and images. Indeed, images either highlight the negative headlines and 
image captions transmitted verbally (e.g. Figures 3.3 and 3.5 – children looking downwards in a 
dark room) or are rather contradictory (e.g. Figures 3.1 and 3.4 – children smiling/playing); in the 
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latter case, it is the discordance between negative headlines and “happy” images that makes digital 
devices seem all the more sinister; they are the ones disrupting children’s innocence, in a 
technologically deterministic way. Although there is not necessarily a direct connection between 
the headline and the image – as is often the case (cf. Thurlow et al. 2019) – the contrast between 
the two is nonetheless meaningful; it can highlight children’s innocence and their unawareness of 
any danger, and as such emphasize the need to protect them.  
 Furthermore, the fact that these children are depicted alone, without adult supervision, 
increases the element of danger bestowed upon the smartphone or tablet. Whereas empirical 
research (e.g. Zaman & Nouwen, 2016) underscores the importance of adult supervision and 
guidance when it comes to young children’s use of digital media, the news media presents a totally 
different picture which emphasizes children’s lack of adult supervision and solitude. In any case, 
the digital device (i.e. the smartphone or tablet) is understood as corrupting children’s innocence; 
as such, readers/viewers come to believe that children must be protected from these devices. In 
images portraying teens and digital devices, it is not the presence or lack of adult supervision that 
matters, but rather whether there is “intergenerational contact”; and as Thurlow et al. (2019, p.14) 
show, “ ‘teens and technology’ is thereby seldom conceived in terms of intergenerational contact 
or familial settings”.  
 In sum, the representational meanings in these news media images regarding children and 
technology are quite powerful conceptually. It is quite relevant to distinguish younger children 
from teenagers in the way they are visually represented; indeed, both kinds of images reveal 
different cultural discourses. Whereas digital media is often seen as a de-socializing tool in images 
of teens and technology (cf. Thurlow et al., 2019), it is rather seen as a corrupter of innocence in 
images of younger children (e.g. Buckingham & Jensen, 2012). In both cases, we are dealing with 
harm-driven ideologies.   
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2. Interpersonal meanings 
On a social and interpersonal level, the images selected also portray harm-driven ideologies. First, 
the represented participants (i.e. the children) do not address the viewer directly; consequently, 
these are “offer” images as opposed to “demand” images, according to Kress and van Leeuwen’s 
(2006) definitions. In “offer” images, the viewer is “subject of the look, and the represented 
participant is the object of the viewer’s dispassionate scrutiny” (p.119). However, in the visual 
examples above, the viewer (i.e. the knowledgeable adult) is an actor and the represented 
participant (i.e. the clueless child) is a passive recipient of the viewer’s look. Although the examples 
selected highlight a detached scrutiny through the participants’ gaze (see also Thurlow et al., 
2019), the viewer is nonetheless brought into the child’s intimate sphere through the choice of 
frame. Figures 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6, are all close shots that suggest “close personal distance” 
where one would be able to touch the other person (cf. Kress and van Leeuwen, 2006, p. 124). 
Although Figures 3.1, 3.2, and 3.7 depict a greater social distance, the viewer still has a feeling of 
being in the children’s intimate sphere or with them in the same room. Perhaps such a feeling 
arises because young children such as these should be in the presence of an adult when using 
digital media. In both cases (close and further social distance), it is as though the viewer observes 
the children through a caregiver’s eye, that is, from the perspective of someone who is socially 
close to these children. In sum, the size of the frame of the visual examples and the fact that the 
children are depicted alone gives us the impression that the participants represented could be our 
children, which strengthens the desire to protect them. As in Thurlow et al.’s (2019, p.17) study 
and their theory of the “double-disconnect”, the represented participants are “shown isolated from 
each other as well as being always isolated from (mostly adult) viewers”. The viewer may feel 
connected to the children shown in the images, but these children are not connected to the viewer. 
Rather, they are focused on something else altogether: digital devices (see Thurlow, 2017; 
Thurlow et al., 2019) 
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 Colors and other modality markers are other semiotic resources that provoke an emotional 
response from the viewer. In Figures 3.2, 3.4, and 3.7, the scale of color differentiation is rather 
low, gearing more towards monochrome images with their light, soft and pastel colors. Here, color 
coordination emphasizes the fact that these images are staged (Machin and van Leeuwen, 2007, 
p.157). Also, the blank background of these images creates a feeling of pureness, which highlights 
the children’s innocence and unawareness. Figures 3.3, 3.5, and 3.6 are different and have a high 
degree of illumination (i.e. play of light and shadow) where the very dark background contrasts 
with the children’s faces which are lit up by the digital devices. In an almost creepy manner, the 
phone reveals – through its vibrant light – the child’s unhappy facial expression. Here, rather than 
conveying a feeling of lightness, softness, and innocence, these images look ominous and 
underscore the danger of digital devices. These are very evocative images that emphasize the 
sinister nature of digital media. The pitch-dark room further emphasizes the loneliness of the 
child, but also fear since children are often afraid of the dark. Thus, the kind of environment 
depicted in Figures 3.3, 3.5, and 3.6 is not reassuring; it is because of the high degree of 
illumination that the intensity of the images’ emotional response is revealed. These children look 
as if they are doing something they should not be doing, and worse, they are doing it alone, 
unsupervised (see Thurlow, 2017, and Thurlow et al., 2019). Consequently, we, as viewers, feel for 
these children and want to protect their innocence (e.g. Figure 3.4) and save them from any visible 
danger (e.g. Figure 3.5).  
 
3. Compositional meanings 
As I will contend, the composition of the seven visual examples also plays a role in producing an 
ideology of harm, and closely mirrors what Thurlow (2017) and Thurlow et al. (2019) argued 
regarding the portrayal of teens with digital media. The salience of participants and objects is an 
important compositional characteristic and is quite relevant here. I already showed that light from 
the screens illuminates the children’s faces in Figures 3.3, 3.5, and 3.6. It is their unhappy faces 
	 106	
that are made salient here, and as such, this creates an unsettling feeling. More importantly, the 
digital device itself is made salient in all of these images. Since there is no detailed background and 
the images only show few participants, the viewer is led to focus his/her attention on what he/she 
can see and on the connotations of the few visible/salient objects: the child and the digital device 
(see Thurlow 2017; Thurlow et al., 2019). Furthermore, the smartphone or tablet is made visible 
because it is the target of the children’s gaze and also because of its color, shape, and size. In 
Figures 3.3 and 3.4, the prominence of the smartphone is such that it even partially hides the 
children’s faces. It is as if the digital device “erases” the child because of its importance. Regarding 
the framing in each image, there is a sense of belonging; the device looks as though it is connected 
to the child and is part of the child (see Thurlow 2017). Indeed, there is no empty space between 
the child’s body and the device. Therefore, the salience (i.e. importance) of the device and the fact 
that it is represented as if it were a part of the child makes it all the more dangerous. As Thurlow 
(2017) and Thurlow et al. (2019) argue, this focus on the material object arises from the concept of 
materiality (cf. Gershon, 2010), the notion that the focus on the physicality of a particular 
technology affects people’s ideologies about the medium. Such a focus on materiality is 
ideologically significant, especially when one also considers the linguistic text surrounding the 
images, which often blame “smartphones”, “tablets”, or “screens” of harmful consequences, as I 
explained in the linguistic analysis. These ideologies of harm in turn justify any fear and desire to 
protect children by getting rid of the “material”, that is, digital devices. However, by visually (and 
linguistically) focusing on digital devices as the main cause of multiple ills, these images miss what 
is important regarding the relationship between children and digital media and the different 
factors (e.g. demographic, social, cultural, contextual) that can have an impact (positive or 




Discussion: The discursive construction of a “risk-free” childhood  
 
In this chapter, I have shown how journalists and news editors visually and linguistically frame the 
relationship between children and digital media as one of inherent risk and harm that necessitates 
surveillance and prohibition. Indeed, we see in the news media’s framing of risks and harm the 
erasure (cf. Irvine and Gal, 2000) of digital media’s benefits, a language ideological process that 
intersects with media ideologies (see also Thurlow, 2017). The linguistic and visual narratives 
about children and digital media exclude crucial information from their stories or representations. 
As such, news media discourse presents problematic and narrowing cultural discourses about 
children and their digital media use. Furthermore, the news media’s framing of risk – through 
narratives based on moral panic – leads to media ideologies that are harm-driven. In turn, these 
ideologies of harm justify a social prescription centered on surveillance and restriction, in the name 
of children’s safety. Ultimately, these mediatized discourses are problematic on two different levels; 
it deceptively constructs (1) childhood as risk-free, and (2) children as a homogenized group who 
are voiceless, passive, and vulnerable.   
 First, news media discourse shapes an understanding of children and digital media by 
implying that childhood is or should be risk-free (Kehily, 2010; Livingstone, 2013). Such an 
ideology fosters fear and anxiety, which helps to explain discourses constructed around the desire 
to avoid all risk (e.g. Vickery, 2017). As Livingstone (2009, p.174) notes, “media panics effectively 
construe all risk as unacceptable”. However, the social construction of childhood as risk-free is 
deceiving because risk is part of childhood; it is thus unrealistic to try to create a completely risk-
free environment for kids. Also, trying to avoid all risk “will, paradoxically, exacerbate rather than 
reduce the very vulnerabilities it seeks to protect by undermining the development of resilience” 
(Livingstone, 2013, p.24). Taking risks is part of children’s development into becoming 
independent and autonomous beings. Although it is true that taking risks may lead to negative 
outcomes, risk taking may also have positive effects, which is why risk-avoidance discourses and 
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practices deprive children of the chance to access all of the opportunities and benefits that digital 
media offer. The ways in which the concept of risk is constructed and mobilized in news media 
discourse – both verbally and visually – creates an idealized concept of childhood, where children 
need constant protection and supervision. However, the protective measures suggested by the 
media are problematic; their focus on restriction, prohibition, and surveillance becomes 
naturalized in discourse and in turn intensifies parents’ feelings and desire to protect their children 
from all evil (see Vickery, 2017). Monitoring children at all times has already become a trend in 
modern Western society, and this practice is becoming normalized (Barron, 2014; Rooney, 2010). 
However, as Barron (2014, p.401) suggests, “Children are not passive recipients of parental 
surveillance and power, rather they are increasingly playing an active role in negotiation with 
parents and actively resist monitoring of their everyday lives to both make meaning anew and 
produce culture”. Thus, there is a gap between journalists’ expectations of children and their 
digital media practices, and what children actually do. However, although children may be more 
active and rebellious than the press would have us believe, the danger of depriving children of 
online opportunities and benefits is exacerbated through risk-avoidance discourses and practices.  
 Secondly, children are problematically homogenized in the press. When discussing 
“children”, journalists often universalize them by omitting personal and demographic details, 
which would help to personalize and differentiate children. Such details are crucial since they can 
be influential risk factors (e.g. Smahel et al., 2014). As a consequence, readers are led to believe 
that all children, when overexposed to screens, will suffer devastating consequences. This 
universalization is also constructed visually through the use of typical stock images, which are 
inherently impersonal and universal since they can be employed for multiple different purposes, 
and through the erasure of race and class differences. Although I did not discuss these 
“problematic intersectionalities at work” (Thurlow et al., 2019, p.14) in this chapter, it is 
something that Thurlow et al. (2019) remarked in their analysis of news media and stock images of 
teens and digital media. As the authors argue, discourses of childhood are inherently gendered, 
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raced, and classed into a homogenous ideal (i.e. female, white, and middle class). Moreover, 
although empirical research has been trying to “[move] away from universalizing assumptions (the 
‘child’, ‘internet use’)” (Livingstone et al., 2018, p.5) while putting a new emphasis on children’s 
perspectives and background, the media’s discourse of moral panic continues to frame all children 
in the same way: as defenseless and voiceless victims. In images representing children with digital 
devices, all the “transmitters of meaning” (i.e. objects, colors, participants, setting) create an 
identity for these children; they tell us who they are, what kind of children they are. More 
precisely, they constrain them in a very specific role: children are vulnerable because of digital 
media (i.e. the material). However, children are not only vulnerable because of the technology 
itself, but also because they are left alone with such a dangerous device, without adult supervision. 
Children are portrayed here as passive, innocent and unwitting victims of digital media, and 
digital media is portrayed as corrupting children’s innocence. As Smahel et al. (2014, p.233) show 
in their analysis of young people’s responses to online risks, their experiences are “interconnected 
with the developmental contexts of peer relationships, parent-child relationships, romantic 
relationships, school, sexuality, identity, health, and morality”. The authors highlight the 
importance of not homogenizing “children” since they all come from different backgrounds and 
have distinctive experiences that can influence their online practices. Therefore, giving a voice to 
children is crucial since it would allow us to “recognize the vital indeterminacy between evidence 
of risk […] and evidence of harm” (Livingstone et al., 2018, p.7). If children were individualized as 
opposed to homogenized in news media discourse, readers would be made aware of what factors 
could actually lead to harm, and as such, not all children would be considered vulnerable and 
passive. However, the press does not let readers “hear” children’s voices, even though research has 
already begun exploring children’s own perspectives as well as their active role and participation, 
and their rights (e.g. Livingstone, 2016; Mascheroni et al. 2014; Vickery, 2017).   
 In sum, through a social constructivist approach of risk, I have demonstrated how the 
concept of risk is constructed and negotiated in news discourse, and what ideological consequences 
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such a framing can have. Through typical examples, I have shown how news discourse 
problematically portrays childhood as if it is or should be completely risk-free; this, in turn, shapes 
an understanding of children as a homogeneous group of passive, vulnerable beings. Therefore, 
“childhood” is a concept that is itself socially and discursively produced in news discourse (e.g. 
Burman, 1994; Holloway & Valentine, 2000; James & Prout, 1997; Jenks, 1996; Stainton-Rogers 
& Stainton-Rogers, 1992). It is with this in mind that I offer the following image (Figure 3.8) from 
Time magazine, which encapsulates the ideas discussed in this chapter. [19] 
 
 
                           




Figure 3.8 comes from the 1995 issue of Time and depicts an innocent child faced with one of the 
more sinister aspects of new technology. As in the images analyzed in this chapter, the 
“interpersonal meaning” of Figure 3.8 (e.g. the illumination of the shocked face of the child) shows 
that there is a long precedent for moral panics and mediatized “scare tactics”.  
 While the same ideologies circulate multimodally across national, linguistic (and historical) 
borders, it is essential to emphasize why such misleading conceptions are problematic. Not only do 
they have implications for children themselves, but also for parents and caregivers. Although 
parents and adults in general have a responsibility to protect children, certain measures are better 
than others, particularly ones based on rational argument and proven research. Protecting 
children does not equal creating a totally risk-free environment. We need to find a way to both 
protect children from potential harms that they may encounter online and allow them to become 
media literate. Such a perspective is already being investigated in empirical research (e.g. 
Livingstone et al., 2018; Vickery, 2017). But, unfortunately, the press does not take into account all 
the valuable work being done on children and their digital media use. If policy-makers can 
collaborate with researchers – as can be seen in the project EU Kids Online – why cannot journalists 
and news editors also take a more objective stance from empirical research? In doing so, their 
expectations and ideologies would be different and more “opportunity-driven” (cf. Vickery, 2017), 
and audiences would be represented differently. People would be more likely to trust children to 
participate in this technologically advanced society, which would allow them to learn how to cope 
with risk in a responsible way while at the same time benefiting from the positive opportunities 










From salads to phones: The representation of 





Setting the scene: Gender and technology 
 
Although we live in an era where women are being celebrated for their achievements and where 
“sexism” and “feminism” are considered outdated terms (Lazar, 2014), feminist media scholarship 
goes against such a “postfeminist” ideology and reminds us that women’s situation and the media’s 
depiction of them remains very similar to Tuchman’s (1978) concept of “symbolic annihilation” to 
describe the ways in which women were represented in the media. Two recent edited volumes 
(Cerqueira et al., 2016; Harp et al., 2018) provide a current overview of feminist and media 
theories, methodological approaches, and research. Their goal is to “theorize about the status of 
women and the nature of gender in mediated messages and practices” (Bachmann et al., 2018), to 
explore relations of power, and expose ideologically significant patriarchal discourses in media, 
among other goals. One research arena that is particularly significant today concerns activism and 
strategies of resistance in order to promote social change. For instance, the recent #MeToo 
movement highlights a “trend of the public’s willingness to engage with resistance and challenges to 
sexism, patriarchy, and other forms of oppression via feminist uptake of digital communication” 
(Mendes et al., 2018, p.236-237). Chen et al. (2018) has also explored the potential of women’s 
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voices through digital media and how women can become empowered in the digital world. 
Therefore, feminist discourse is not only found in academic work, but also in online public 
platforms such as social media, where women’s use of digital media offers them the opportunity 
and power to produce change in today’s society, as other studies have demonstrated (e.g. Dixon, 
2014; Keller et al., 2018; Thrift, 2014).  
	 However, in contrast to the active role that women have taken in regards to digital media, 
the press continues to frame the relationship between women/girls and digital media in 
unfavorable terms. Women are no longer viewed as the agents of change of the #MeToo 
movement; they are shown as passive users of digital devices who must be protected from the 
dangers of the digital world. Although research on women’s digital media use and practices has 
seen the potential of digital media as a safe space for women that can allow them to express their 
voices and to produce social change (e.g. Mendes et al., 2018; Kanai & Dobson, 2016), news 
media discourse often frames women/girls and their relationship with new media around a 
discourse of moral panic and risk – especially regarding the sexual content of digital media. For 
instance, contemporary scholarly debates (e.g. Jeffery, 2017; Renold et al., 2015; Ringrose et al., 
2013; Ringrose & Harvey, 2015; Thurlow, 2017) shed a critical light on popular discourses of risk 
and moral panic surrounding teens and especially girls, their sexualization, and their digital media 
practices. As Thurlow (2017, p.13) notes, there is a “never fully explained representation of sexting 
as somehow a decidedly female practice (or issue)”; in turn, such cultural discourses conceptualize 
young women and girls as vulnerable and in danger. The news media’s portrayal of women’s 
digital media practices reinforces the notion that women are not competent actors in the world, 
and that they need protecting. As Vickery (2014) demonstrates, media discourses of risk 
surrounding girls and their new media practices have led to increased (normalized) parental 
surveillance. In response to such media discourses of moral panic and risk, scholars such as 
Ringrose & Eriksson Barajas (2011), and Jackson & Vares (2015) argue against an exploration of 
gender and new media around the sole framework of risk. Rather, they argue in favor of a binary 
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in which risks as well as opportunities are explored. However, more often than not, the picture 
painted by the press is not one where the opportunities provided by digital media are explored; 
rather it is one where women are at risk and in need of protection. 
	 Furthermore, images in the news media tend to portray women in a way that does not 
reflect the contemporary realities of their life, often resorting to traditional “stereotyping” as a 
means of fixing hegemonic definitions of femininity (and masculinity). Stereotypes are a means of 
reducing the complexity of the individual to a few simplistic characteristics, and in so doing, they 
fix and naturalize difference (Hall, 1997, p.258). The way women are represented in the media 
today still tends to marginalize, sexualize, objectify, and dehumanize them (e.g. Collins, 2011; Jia 
et al., 2016; Landreth Grau & Zotos, 2016). Recent studies have shown that women tend to be 
underrepresented (i.e. quantitatively) (e.g. Berkers et al., 2016; Shor et al., 2015) and unequally 
portrayed (i.e. qualitatively) (e.g. Jia et al., 2016) in the media. For instance, regarding stereotypes, 
Collins’s (2011, p.290) meta-analysis of 19 articles from the journal Sex Roles reveals that women 
are more often depicted in the media as “nonprofessionals, homemakers, wives or parents, and 
sexual gatekeepers”. Some studies (e.g. Aiello & Woodhouse, 2016; Machin & Thornborrow, 
2003) do consider how gender representations can flip the stereotypes with women being 
portrayed in more “masculine” and powerful roles and positions. However, as Machin & 
Thornborrow (2003, p. 468) note, such images are depicted as mere “playful fantasies”: “[they 
are] only a game to play”. Aiello & Woodhouse (2016, p.365) also identify the limitations of such 
apparently “equal” representations. In their study, they find “an uneven approach to the 
communication of differences, which privileges a version/vision of cisgender and heterosexual 
adults” who are well-integrated socially at the expense of “non-gender conforming individuals 
[who] are relegated to a canon of visibility that is limited to their bodily attributes”. Beyond a 
feeling of equality, inclusivity, and emancipation, the representation of women in the media is 
evidently still ideological and problematic.  
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	 The representation of women in the media is all the more problematic because it has real-
world implications. According to Giddens’s (1984) structuration theory, which explores the 
relationship between people and their environment, “although individuals have agency, they are 
bound or constrained by social structures that they, in turn, reinforce” (Dixon et al., 2014, p.992). 
With regards to technology, women/girls and men/boys are socialized to perceive and use 
technology in different ways, and the media plays an integral role in this socialization. One of the 
consequences of this socialization is the place of women in technology-oriented careers and global 
business, which remains unequal, unfair, and sometimes hostile, as the April 2017 issue of The 
Atlantic (Mundy, 2017) demonstrates with its main article entitled “Why is Silicon Valley so Awful 
to Women?” In the tech industry, women continue to be grossly underrepresented and are often 
victims of sexual harassment and discrimination. As Marwick (2018) claims, Silicon Valley is not a 
meritocracy, as some people tend to think. Those who manage to work in the social media 
industry are not solely judged based on their skills (but also on their gender) which makes it all the 
more difficult for women to access the IT industry and be recognized as equal to men – provided 
they succeed in getting a position there in the first place. Indeed, women are still treated differently 
and are victims of discrimination. When new communication technologies first started to become 
common, there was hope and optimism that they would narrow the gender divide and help 
liberate and empower women (see Leach & Turner, 2015; Skog, 2002; Wajcman, 2007). However, 
as more recent research suggests, there are still major inequalities between men and women in the 
IT workplace (e.g. Marwick, 2018; Nogueira Couto Pereira, 2017; Wynarczyk & Ranga, 2017). 
One of the reasons why the gender divide is still significant has to do with cultural beliefs and 
practices that are deeply engrained in our society. Scholars such as Dixon et al. (2014), Leach & 
Turner (2015) and Wynarczyk & Ranga (2017), all elaborate on the influence of stereotypes, 
social/institutional structures and social expectations that socialize boys/men and girls/women 
and direct them into one way of thinking and behaving with regards to technology. For instance, 
girls seem to show less interest and confidence in using computers due to the belief that they are 
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less competent digitally than boys are (Cooper & Weaver, 2003; Cooper, 2006; Dixon et al., 2014). 
The influence of these ideologies has real-world effects when it comes to the gendered divisions 
present in the professional world. 
	 Against this backdrop, I wish to examine the ways in which women/girls and men/boys 
are visually represented in news stories about digital communication. Using a social semiotic 
framework, I show the persistent “regime of truth” that exists in the media, and argue that the 
cultural discourses circulating are powerful tools for the socialization of young women/girls. 
Indeed, these skewed discourses show female users what technology is/should be for them, and 
what their role vis-à-vis technology is/should be. Moreover, I argue that such discourses take a 
very essentialist view of gender and technology while perpetuating traditional gender roles and 
stereotypes as well as problematic media ideologies – even under the apparent guise of celebrating 
(young) women’s use of digital media. As an illustrative case in point, I take the following image 




Here we have three young women depicted in playful poses in a kind of fantasy world; they are 
certainly not embedded in a real world setting or social practice. In fact, their poses carry 
connotations of modeling (as in a fashion magazine) and play time (through their similarity with 
	
Figure 4.1: Die Welt, Germany, 30 September 2017. Headline (trans.): Do you know what these Emojis really 
mean? (Image source: Getty Image)  
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Barbie dolls and their exaggeratedly happy and delighted expressions). The presence of the ‘red 
heart’ emoji, ‘smiling face with heart-eyes’ emoji, and the ‘winking face with tongue’ emoji also 
connote a sort of playfulness and romance. Here, these women are not using digital media in any 
serious way; they are merely playing. Moreover, their depiction represents an essentialist view of 
gender and digital media. As Marwick (2014, p.63) explains, an essentialist position would claim, 
for instance, that “women’s participation in Facebook is due to their superior multitasking and 
social skills”. Here, in this image from Die Welt, these young women’s behavior with digital media 
is seen as a natural female practice because women are more often stereotypically associated with 
modeling, romance, and gossiping.  
	 In this chapter, my goal is to offer first a descriptive analysis of news media images that 
mainly focus on these types of problematic, essentialist views on gender and digital media. I then 
present a more interpretive analysis to go beyond the media’s perception of gender differences as 
innate and to rather “focus on behavior that is encouraged, discouraged, rewarded, or prohibited 
and how it maps to ideal understandings of “men”, “women”, “feminine”, and “masculine”” 
(Marwick, 2014, p.63). Therefore, this chapter is a way for me to explore and analyze the complex 
relationship between gender and digital media while investigating news media images portraying 
women and men with digital devices. In this regard, this chapter addresses the following 
overarching research questions: 
1) In numerical terms, are women “present” in news media images about digital  
communication? In other words, are women and men equally represented (i.e. 
quantitatively) in these images? 
2) How are women “present” in news media images about digital communication? In other 







In this chapter, I am particularly interested in the visual representation of women’s digital media 
practices in newspaper stories. The first step I took in order to select the relevant news media 
images for this chapter was to search the whole DDD for images portraying digital devices. In the 
DDD, I searched the image tags “smartphone”, “computer/laptop”, and “tablet”. Through the 
use of these specific image tags, I was able to gather a total of 269 images of smartphones, laptops, 
and tablets. Since I was interested in the relationship between people and their digital devices, the 
second step consisted in discarding images that did not portray people. For example, some images 
showed only a finger (or part of one) touching a smartphone. Although a finger is a part of the 
human body, I discarded such images because they were not relevant for the purpose of this 
gender-oriented study. However, I kept images that showed a whole hand since it was easier to 
note the gender of the user in such images. The final dataset that I used for this study – after 
having discarded all the images that did not depict people – is composed of 214 images. They all 
depict people with digital devices, and come from 167 different news articles (some articles contain 
more than one image). 
 Following Fairclough (1989, p.20-21) and Thurlow & Aiello (2007, p.313), I divide my 
analysis into two steps: one more descriptive and one more interpretive and critical. First, from my 
dataset of 214 news images of people with digital devices, I offer a descriptive content analysis (cf. 
Bell, 2001) in order to reveal the patterned representational politics that apparently govern such 
news images. In this descriptive phase, I am interested in investigating whether the common 
underrepresentation of women in the news and in the tech industry holds true with regards to 
news stories about digital communication, and whether/how (in numerical terms) the 
representation of women’s physical characteristics is depicted differently from men’s. Regarding 
content analysis, Bell (2001) states that it is “an empirical (observational) and objective procedure 
for quantifying recorded ‘audio-visual’ (including verbal) representation using reliable, explicitly 
defined categories (‘values’ on independent ‘variables’)” (p.13) and that it is used to make 
	 120	
“generalizations about the relative frequencies of visual representations of particular classes of 
people, actions, roles, situations or events” (p.10) in the media. It is a quantitative and technical 
method which highlights dominant representations and statistical patterns across visual, verbal, or 
graphic data. To conduct content analysis, researchers use a set of categories or codes in order to 
investigate what items are present in a text, how frequently a topic is being covered, possible biases 
regarding the topic, and changes in the representation of a topic over time (see Bell, 2001). I use 
this approach in this chapter in order to investigate the ways in which men and women are 
represented in news media images, from a quantitative perspective. However, content analysis 
alone cannot help analyze a text. Cameron and Panovic (2014, p.6) underline the fact that content 
analysis is not discourse analysis. Indeed, if we conduct content analysis alone, we see solely what 
the text is about, without necessarily exploring how the writer framed his or her discourse and 
what his or her linguistic and visual choices mean (values, attitudes, concerns). Indeed, Bell (2001, 
p.13) states that content analysis alone “is seldom able to support statements about the 
significance, effects or interpreted meaning of a domain of representation”. Therefore, it is useful 
to use content analysis – a descriptive approach – when investigating news media discourse in 
order to discover what a series of texts addresses. However, for the purpose of this chapter, it is 
more relevant to conduct such an analysis in combination with an interpretive and critical 
approach.  
 In the second step, I take a more interpretive and critical look at how images are 
constructed using the framework of social semiotics (e.g. van Leeuwen, 2005). In this interpretive 
and critical phase, I investigate whether women and men are similarly represented (i.e. 
qualitatively) in news images about digital media. I especially focus my analysis on the visual 
resources that perform some sort of semiotic work, or metafunction (cf. Jewitt & Oyama, 2001, 
p.140). Therefore, in the second phase of my analysis, I follow Halliday & Hasan (1985) and Kress 
& van Leeuwen (2006) by addressing the three metafunctions of (visual) language 
(representational, interactional, and compositional). I also focus on the “carriers of connotation” 
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developed by Barthes (1977) and used in Machin’s framework (2007). I then analyze the 
relationship between image and headline while drawing on Caple’s (2013, p.143) approach to 
photojournalism. 
 
Analysis: The gendered meanings of news media images 
	
Step 1: Visual content analysis 
In order to investigate whether women and men are equally represented (i.e. quantitatively) in 
news media images about digital communication, I selected the following variables: “gender”, 
“facial expression”, “clothing”, and “age group”. I coded the variable “gender” to reveal the 
percentage of females and males in news images, and analyzed the distribution of specifically 
gendered physical “types” in terms of “facial expression”, “age group”, and “clothing”, the most 
relevant visual items for the purpose of my study. First, the results of the “gender” variable tell us 
whether there is an overrepresentation/underrepresentation of male or female images. Second, 
the other three remaining variables (facial expression, clothing, and age group) shed light on any 
physical characteristics that are overrepresented in either male or female images. 
	 The “gender” variable can be coded using four possible values. Female-only and Male-only 
images portray one or more same-sex people, Both includes images where both men and women 
are present, and N/A (not applicable) is a value for images where the gender of the person depicted 
is difficult to determine (e.g. image of a hand or image where a person’s head is cropped off). 
“Facial expressions” are defined as Positive, Negative, Indifferent, or N/A and are determined by the 
shape of the mouth, lips, and eyes. An image was coded as positive if the facial expression in the 
image contains a subtle or exaggerated smile, as negative if the person depicted is frowning or if 
their hand gestures display dismay, as indifferent if the person’s facial expression is neither positive 
nor negative, and as N/A if the image does not show a person’s face or if a person’s facial 
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expression is difficult to read. To exemplify this coding process, I provide examples below of 
positive, negative, and indifferent facial expressions in images.  
 
 





   
   
 
Figure 4.2: Example of “positive” value. Image from The Telegraph, UK, 19 May 2016 (Image source: Tetra 
Images/Alamy).  





   
   
 
 
          
   
 
Figure 4.4: Example of “negative” value. Image from The Mirror, UK, 29 April 2016 (Image source: Getty 
Image).  
Figure 4.5: Example of “negative” value. Image from Der Bund, Germany, 1 March 2016 (Image source: 
iStock).  
	 124	
          
   
 
           
 
 
As regards the variable of “clothing”, the choice of the specific values Business suit and Swimsuit was 
inspired by previous studies which analyzed the way that men and women were commonly 
dressed in media images (e.g. Goffman, 1979; Goodin et al., 2011). I chose the variables business 
suit and swimsuit because of certain gender stereotypers prevalent in the media; the business suit 
exemplifies the seriousness and professionalism frequently associated with men and the swimsuit 
Figure 4.6: Example of “indifferent” value. Image from 20 Minuten, Switzerland, 30 October 2014 (Image 
source: Keystone/Martin Ruetschi).  
Figure 4.7: Example of “indifferent” value. Image from The Washington Post, US, 26 March 2016 (Image 
source: Chris Ratcliff/Bloomerg).  
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the frivolousness and vanity associated with women, as Goffman (1979, p.viii-ix) argues. The 
value, Casual, specifies other types of clothing which are less obviously gendered, for example, 
jeans and t-shirts. For the purposes of this study, I did not find it necessary to split the Casual value 
into multiple categories. The value, N/A was assigned to images that did not depict any clothing 
whatsoever (e.g. an image of a hand or a close-up of a face). Below are three images that exemplify 
the variables business suit, swimsuit, and casual.  
 
                               
                                     




                                   
Figure 4.9: Example of “swimsuit” value. Image from Tages Anzeiger, Switzerland, 29 July 2014 (Image source: 
Dave Collier/Flickr).  
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Next, I divided the “age group” variable into the following values: children (1-12), teens (13-18), 
young adults (19-40), and older (40+). I give rather wide age ranges for each of these values since it 
is impossible to determine the exact age of the represented participants, but associating them with 
a wider age group is relatively feasible. That being said, I am aware that some images represent 
people “in between” age groups. Therefore, when I had any serious doubt about the age group of 
a represented participant (e.g. whether child or teen; whether teen or young adult; whether young 
adult or older), I coded such images as N/A. Therefore, the value N/A was assigned to images 
where the age group was not clear-cut or was difficult to distinguish (e.g. an image portraying 
someone from behind).  If an image portrayed more than one age group (e.g. children and parents) 
the variable “age group” would be assigned the value, Mix. To illustrate my coding of age groups, 
I offer below four examples that depict each group.  
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Figure 4.11: Example of “children” value. Image from The Telegraph, UK, 10 June 2017 (Image source: Per 
Breiehagen).  
 
                                 
 
                                              
Figure 4.12: Example of “teens” value. Image from El Pais, Spain, 21 May 2017 (Image source: Reuters).  
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Figure 4.13: Example of “young adults” value. Image from Beobachter, Switzerland, 24 March 2016 (Image source: 
Raisa Kanareva/123RF).  
 
                                      
 
                                                     









In Table 4.1 below I offer an overview of the content analysis. [20] 
 
Variable Value Number of 
occurrences 
% of total 214 
images 
% of F and M 
based on number 
of occurrences 
Gender Female only 113 53 - 
 Male only 61 29 - 
 Both 33 15 - 
 N/A 7 3 - 
Facial expression Positive 52 24 56 (F) 10 (M) 
 Negative 15 7 73 (F) 20 (M) 
 Indifferent 93 43 - 
 Mix 3 1 - 
 N/A 51 24 - 
Clothing Casual 183 86 - 
 Business clothes 9 4 89 (M) 22 (both) 
 Swimsuit/underwear 4 2 100 (F) 
 N/A 18 8 - 
Age group Children (1-12) 25 15 52 (F) 44 (M) 
 Teens (13-18) 58 23 63 (F) 22 (M) 
 Young adults (19-40) 80 37 59 (F) 24 (M) 
 Older (40+) 20 9 0 (F) 80 (M) 
 Mix 13 6 - 
 N/A 18 8 - 
 
Table 4.1: Visual content analysis  
 
 
Whereas previous studies have demonstrated and discussed the underrepresentation of women in 
news images (e.g. Collins, 2011; Jia et al., 2016; Shor et al., 2015), my dataset shows the exact 
opposite: a disproportionate representation of women. More than half of the images (53%) are of 
women/girls only whereas 29% picture men/boys only. At first glance, one might think that the 
overrepresentation of women and girls in these news images is a positive development. Indeed, 
women have been underrepresented in the news for too long, and here they are finally being 
“seen”. Not only are they seen, they are also visually present with technology, a domain 
persistently considered “male”. Jia et al. (2016) discuss the general underrepresentation of women 
in a majority of news topics besides fashion, and the fact that women are more often seen (in 
images) than heard (in written text). My analysis points to another news topic where females are 
apparently more often seen: digital media, which is also what Thurlow et al. (2019) and Thurlow 
(2017) noticed. But why are women more often portrayed with digital devices such as 
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smartphones, laptops, and tablets when women do no use/own digital devices more than men? 
Indeed, if we refer to the ownership and use of mobile devices in the Western world (where the 
majority of news articles come from) the gender gap is closing (cf. Pew Research Center, 2016, 
2017). But in some domains such as the tech industry and gaming, there is still a gender gap with 
less female participation than male, and thus an overrepresentation of men (cf. Leach & Turner, 
2015; Marwick, 2018; Wynarczyk & Ranga, 2017). As such, the apparent overrepresentation of 
female actors does not quite align with “reality”.  
	 To explain this overrepresentation of female users in these new media images, we might 
simply say that images representing young women attract readers’ attention more easily. Women 
become objects that are exposed to the gaze of men, the “ideal” spectators according to Berger 
(1972). However, on closer inspection, this overrepresentation of female users as well as the ways 
in which they are represented actually strengthens popular representations and ideologies (e.g. in 
advertisements) that tend to portray young girls as the primary users of phones (cf. Vickery, 2014). 
For example, in her study, Vickery investigates the commoditization of talk, which has gendered 
cell phones as largely the domain of teen girls, as a feminine object. Girls are also commonly seen 
as the primary users of phones due to marketing reasons. Indeed, mobile phone companies 
advertise their products to attract female users, and thus resort to gendered stereotypes (e.g. in 
mobile phones’ features and accessories) (cf. Shade, 2007). Although mobile phones are not 
intrinsically gendered, they are gendered as feminine objects in order to match gender scripts, 
which is what the news media images from this chapter reveal. Moreover, the overrepresentation 
of female users in the current analysis reinforces certain gender and language stereotypes, and 
more specifically the ideology of “communication”, the idea that women are better interpersonal 
communicators (cf. Cameron, 2003). In a similar vein, women have been traditionally described as 
too chatty and gossipy when it comes to their relationship with phones (e.g. Green & Singleton, 
2007; Ling et al., 2014). Consequently, at first glance, the news media images here convey an 
essentialist view of women’s abilities, where communication skills are perceived as inherently 
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feminine. Some scholars (e.g. Brown, 1980; Kapidzic & Herring, 2001; Tannen, 1990) have noted 
that gender differences in discursive styles should be seen as “communicative strategies”; the 
linguistic choices men and women make serve particular purposes and goals, and are also context-
dependent. However, as I discussed in Chapter 1, Cameron (2010) offers a critique of even such a 
view while emphasizing the fact that language is bound to historical and socio-cultural factors, and 
that it is thus subject to much variation, even between women themselves (see also Wodak, 2015 
on a similar intersectional approach). Therefore, gender differences in digital communicative 
practices should not be seen as inherent to women (or men), as the news media’s visual 
representations tend to suggest. Thus, women are not overrepresented in these images in order to 
flip traditional gender roles, but rather to reinforce them. 
	 I now turn to the details of the content analysis and reveal how these gendered patterns 
emerge in more subtle ways in the images, and how they demonstrate an essentialist view of 
gender and technology. For one, women/girls are more often portrayed with either positive or 
negative facial expression than men/boys (see Figure 4.15 below). Out of all of the occurrences of 
positive facial expressions, women/girls make up 56% of the images whereas men/boys only 10%. 
Regarding negative facial expressions, women/girls make up 73% of the images compared to 
men/boys with 20%. Again, the idea that women are naturally more expressive and emotional 
expresses an essentialist view that enacts “an understanding of gender differences as innate and 
rooted in biological and psychological underpinnings” (Marwick, 2014, p.63). However, as it is 
well understood in gender studies, gender is a social construct. Gender is something we “do” or 
perform, but not something we “are” (e.g. Butler, 1990). For instance, children are socialized by 
their parents/caregivers, teachers, media institutions, and society in general to adopt the “correct” 
gender behavior: either a “female” or a “male” behavior. Consequently, there is a pressure for 
children to conform to appropriate gender categories; and through the media’s perpetuation of 
fixed and normalized gendered representations, gender socialization continues. As images such as 
Figures 4.15 (depiction of a woman with a negative expression) and 4.16 (depiction of a women 
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with a positive expression) expose, the media implicitly tells boys that they should not express their 
feelings the same way girls do, or that they should not “cry like a girl”. Such behavior would be 
considered unacceptable since it would go against perceived gender-appropriate behavior. With 
regards to technology, the news media shows women and girls that it is appropriate for them to 
use digital media while being exaggeratedly expressive and emotional, because these are 
supposedly inherent female characteristics. 
 
   
  
 
     
 
	
Figure 4.15: The 
Figure 4.16: Die Welt, Germany, 23 February 2017
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As for clothing, although most of the people depicted in the images are wearing “casual” clothes, it 
is interesting (but not surprising) to note that all of the images where people are wearing a swimsuit 
or underwear are of women/girls (see example below in Figure 4.17), and that there is not a single 
female-only image in my dataset depicting a woman in business clothing (89% are ‘male-only’ 
images and 22% are ‘mix’). Although I must emphasize the fact that there are very few images 
displaying business clothing (n=9) and swimsuit/underwear (n=4), the statistics align with previous 
studies (e.g. Goffman, 1979; Goodin, 2011; Ringrose, 2011) which investigated the sexualized 
nature of images of women in the media, and studies (Lazar, 2000) which explored the 
stereotypical depictions of men as business professionals/breadwinners and women as housewives. 
While it may seem encouraging to find very few images portraying women/girls in scanty clothes, 




    
              
 
 
In the same vein, my analysis also reveals another statistic: of all of the images portraying people 
taking a selfie, 10 are female-only and 2 are “mix”; thus, there is no male-only image portraying a 
man/boy or several men/boys taking a selfie, which is also what Thurlow et al. (2019) noticed. 
Figure 4.17: The Mirror, UK, 23 June 2016
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Although there are only 12 “selfie” images in my dataset, my results align with previous studies. 
Research suggests that women are more active than men when it comes to taking and posting 
selfies (e.g. Dhir et al., 2016; Qiu et al., 2015) and that women/girls like to present themselves as 
attractive online, which can “parallel, and possibly intensify, gender norms offline” (Manago et al., 
2008, p.446). This aligns with the popular conception that women are/should be more concerned 
about their body and appearance than men. Although research shows that women tend to post 
more selfies than men, men certainly do take selfies as well (cf. Döring et al., 2016). Nevertheless, 
the fact that there are only images of women/girls taking selfies in my analysis is revealing of the 
fact that females are under more scrutiny than males, as Dhir et al. (2016) suggest. Here, the news 
media portraying these images perpetuates a kind of voyeurism and highlights the objectification 
of women, as I explore in more detail in the following section regarding “age”. In sum, Figure 4.17 
above highlights the notion that women/girls’ digital practices are centered on their bodies and 
self-image. These kinds of representations are evidently problematic as they distort the relationship 
that women have with digital media and, as Thurlow (2017, p.17) suggests, they highlight women’s 
vulnerability and irresponsibility.  
	 Investigating the relationship between the age and the gender of the people depicted in 
news images about digital media is also quite revealing of gender stereotypes. In the “children” 
category, we find only a very slight overrepresentation of girls. However, in the “teen” and “young 
adult” categories, the gender gap is much wider; there are significantly more images of 
women/girls (63% in the teen category and 59% in the young adult category) than men/boys 
(respectively 22% and 24%). Furthermore, this tendency seems to shift when images are of older 
people; 80% of these images portray males only (see Figure 4.18 below), and 20% depict both 
genders. This relationship between age and gender aligns with previous research on gender roles 
in TV ads (e.g. Furnham & Paltzer, 2010), which examined the age of the main characters in the 
commercials analyzed. Researchers noticed that females are more often portrayed as young, and 
men are more often shown as middle-aged and older. This tendency to portray younger women 
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and older men on TV, in ads, or in the news media resonates with an idea that Berger (1972) 
developed regarding gender roles in movies. Berger (1972) claims: “Women are depicted in quite a 
different way to men – not because the feminine is different from the masculine – but because the 
‘ideal’ spectator is always assumed to be male and the image of the woman is designed to flatter 
him” (p.64). In order to please the male gaze, women need to be attractive, and youth is an aspect 
of the female body that is considered appealing. In turn, this can explain why young women are 
more often displayed in different media. The images from my dataset show a strong connection 
between the age of the people depicted and their roles and personalities. Indeed, the younger 
women look childish and vacuous with their exaggerated facial expressions (i.e. they ‘are’), and the 
middle-aged men represented in the dataset are often portrayed as serious professionals (i.e. they 
‘act’). This is something we see in Figure 4.18 below, which does not just represent any man; it 
depicts Steve Jobs (the former CEO and co-founder of Apple) who is the very incarnation of a 
successful, professional middle-aged man. It is also a reminder that women are underrepresented 
in the IT world and Silicon Valley. They apparently do not belong to that world. Therefore, the 
images from my dataset cast women and men in their traditional gender roles when it comes to 
their digital practices.  
           
    
        
           
Figure 4.18: LA Times, US, 
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 Ultimately, my visual content analysis highlights the overrepresentation of women and girls 
in news images about digital media, as well as the gendered distribution of specific types. These 
visual patterns resonate with deep-seated and long-standing Western ideals (cf. Clack, 1999). As 
such, a dualistic reasoning divides different aspects of reality into categories such as mind/body, 
which has ultimately led to an association between mind/male and body/female. Thus, as Clack 
(1999, p. 7) contends, “Reason is understood as a masculine attribute most closely associated with 
the male, and nature is understood as a feminine attribute most closely associated with the 
female”. As Jia et al. (2016, p.2) argue in their large-scale analysis of news images, women are 
often linked to “bodies and the private sphere” and men are associated with “mind and the public 
sphere”. Similarly, in my data, the images also align with this worldview. Men are more often 
represented as older/more mature/serious people, in a working/business/IT environment, and 
women are more often portrayed as younger/childish, in scanty clothes, with exaggerated facial 
expressions, and concerned with their body. Following Hall (1997, p.228), the news media tries to 
“fix” and naturalize one perspective over all others. With gender representations, the media tries 
to fix biological differences with seemingly natural gender roles. Gender differences appear natural 
and innate – which is the goal of the media’s use of stereotypes – they are “beyond history, 
permanent and fixed” (Hall, 1997, p.245). Moreover, as Cameron (2006, p.144) states, “when 
difference is naturalized, inequality is institutionalized”. The news media plays an undeniable role 
in sustaining relations of power; in the case of gender relations, a masculine or patriarchal ideology 
is favored. These ideologies are ones that are deeply rooted in our culture and make it hard to 
effectuate change with regards to the “digital gender divide”. 
 Now that I have established (in numerical terms) the skewed gendered distribution of 
images in my dataset, I will turn to a more interpretive and critical perspective on these images 
and reveal why they are problematic. 
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Step 2: Social semiotic analysis  
The second step of my analysis utilizes a more interpretive/critical perspective, and aims to 
explore whether women and men are similarly represented (i.e. qualitatively) in news images about 
digital communication.  
 
1. Visual analysis  
For the current visual analysis, I have selected two images (Figure 4.19 and Figure 4.20 below) that 
are similar in terms of representational, interactional, and compositional meaning, in order to 
compare and analyze them in detail. I selected Figure 4.19 because it is a “typical” depiction of 
women’s digital media practices. Figure 4.20 is rather an “atypical” depiction of men’s digital 
media practices, as I argue in my analysis. However, I chose this particular image in order to draw 
comparisons with a similar “female” image. On the surface, both of these images look quite 
similar: both represented participants are sitting at a table in rather plain settings, and both are 
laughing alone with their phone. Both images are stock images (from Getty Images and Alamy) 
which depict universal “types” in bare settings and symbolize an idea rather than telling a story. 
This aligns with Machin’s (2004, p. 316) description of Getty Images:  
“attractive models are highly posed and are set in non-descript locations to make them usable across the 
world. They do not represent actual places or events and they do not document or bear witness, but 
they symbolically represent marketable concepts such as ‘contentment’ and ‘freedom’” 
 
In addition to following Kress and van Leeuwen’s (2006) grammar of visual design, I draw on 
Machin’s (2007) multimodal framework and Barthes’s (1977) analysis of carriers of connotation in 
order to analyze the three metafunctions of these two images. I explore how both images transmit 
certain “meanings” while focusing on how semiotic signs “represent ideas beyond [their] own 
system of signs” (cf. representational metafunction), how they create relationships between 
participants (cf. interpersonal metafunction), and how they form a coherent whole (cf. 
compositional metafunction) (Machin, 2007, p. 17). Through this analysis, the differences between 
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Figure 4.19: Die Welt, Germany, 22 September 2017
Figure 4.20: The Telegraph, UK, 2 March 2017. Original image caption: Just chatting on the phone with a friend can 
banish loneliness (Image source: Alamy). 
	 139	
Analysis of Figure 4.19 
 
In this image, an attractive, young, White, blonde woman wearing a colorful flowery shirt is sitting 
indoors in a decontextualized setting, and holding a red cup of coffee/tea and a phone. She is 
looking at her phone with an exaggerated smile. This is what this generic stock photograph 
denotes (i.e. what it literally represents/shows). But here, I would like to focus on the image’s 
connotations; how do semiotic resources (e.g. objects, colors, participants, setting) transmit 
meaning and what kind of meaning do they convey? In other words, what kind of “cultural 
discourse(s)” does this image express? I suggest that this image communicates a specific discourse 
of femininity, of what it is to be a woman, and more specifically, a woman using digital media. 
	 The main participant is a woman who is categorized through stereotyped physical 
characteristics that cast her as a beautiful, attractive woman. This is not surprising since stock 
photography often resorts to attractive models that should be “generic”; their commonness or 
universality should erase individual features and highlight stereotypes (Machin, 2004, p.323). 
Previous research on White female stereotypes argues that they are usually stereotyped as 
attractive and blonde, alongside other characteristics such as being shallow and egotistical (i.e. 
mainly interested in their physical appearance and materialistic) (e.g. Conley, 2013; Niemann et 
al. 1994). In this image, the woman’s behavior suggests the same idea of shallowness: she is 
engaged in a kind of trivial action (i.e. holding a cup of coffee/tea and a phone, smiling, and 
staring at her phone). According to Machin (2007), who himself draws on Halliday (1985), this 
woman is engaged in a “behavioral” process as opposed to a “material” process; that is, she is 
acting “without material outcome” (Machin, 2007, p.124). In other words, this woman is not an 
active agent; she simply appears and reacts. Nevertheless, her appearance is meaningful; here 
“agency is communicated symbolically through posture, clothing, use of products rather than by 
what [she] actually [does] in the world" (Machin, 2007, p.125). 
	 Objects and clothing are thus meaningful; they indicate that this woman is a particular 
“type”. As Machin, (2004, p.322) claims, “[p]rops are used to connote not only the setting but also 
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the identities of the actors and the nature of activities, but in terms of  ‘types’ rather than 
individual identities”. The cup of coffee/tea that she is holding may represent a privileged, 
materialistic, sophisticated cosmopolitan lifestyle (cf. Machin, 2007, p.32). This cup is red, which is 
the color of love, warmth, happiness, sensuality, romance, and femininity. The fact that the color 
is a high-saturated red makes it even more salient, emphasizes the above characteristics related to 
femininity, and creates an energetic mood. Moreover, the woman is wearing a shirt with flowers in 
different vibrant/high-saturated colors. Flowers symbolize nature and beauty; here they 
underscore the woman’s femininity since nature and women have traditionally been associated 
together (e.g. English Romanticism in literature, and Dualism in philosophy). Therefore, both the 
red cup and the woman’s clothes emphasize the participant’s identity as a sophisticated feminine 
person. Finally, the woman is holding another object: a mobile phone, traditionally seen as a 
symbol of mobility, modernity, and freedom. The mobile phone is a recurrent prop in stock 
photography and can symbolize different ideas depending on the context. For instance, Machin 
(2004, p.324) discusses representations of women with phones/laptops, props that connote 
“positions of power in business and the corporate city-scape”. However, here, the mobile phone 
does not carry the same connotations. As explained above, young women and girls have 
traditionally been portrayed as the primary users of the phone (Vickery, 2014). They are indeed 
the ones who are considered better communicators, and as being chatty and gossipy (cf. Cameron, 
2003; Green & Singleton, 2007; Ling et al., 2014). Figure 4.19 employs these essentialist 
associations to create a normalized depiction of women using digital media for unserious, playful, 
and gossipy reasons. The phone is thus perceived more as a toy than a tool, and is seen as 
reinforcing traditional gender roles. Although the phone is not intrinsically gendered (cf. Marwick, 
2014, p.66), I suggest that the phone is used within the gendered (i.e. patriarchal) framework of the 
(stock) photo industry and the news media industry. In turn, the mobile phone reinforces a 
gendered script (feminine in this case) that is created through the semiotic resources involved (e.g. 
participants, objects, setting). 
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	 The setting of the image is another crucial “carrier of meaning” and tells as much of a 
story. In this sense, there is no discernable setting/background, which is also typical of stock 
photography (cf. Machin, 2004). The woman looks like she is sitting in an interior space (perhaps 
at home or at a café), next to what we would assume to be a window (due to the reflection). Since 
there is no visible background and the image is a close-up of the woman’s face and upper body, 
the viewer is led to focus his/her attention on what he/she can see and on the connotations of the 
few visible/salient objects. This decontextualized image limits the woman to her appearance and 
what her appearance and behavior reveal. Indeed, it is as though she is not given a chance to 
speak and tell her whole story, which would be the case if we were shown more detail. Therefore, 
this “conceptual” image (cf. Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006) does not tell a specific story, it rather 
symbolizes an idea – the idea of what it is to be a woman, a woman using technology.  
	 In sum, all the semiotic resources in this image (i.e. objects, colors, clothing, participant, 
setting) create an identity for this woman; they tell us who she is, what “type” (cf. Machin, 2004) 
she is. More precisely, they limit her to a very specific role. The woman does not come across as 
anything more than a beautiful cosmopolitan woman. From a semiotic point of view, she is 
constrained in a “traditional” role. The semiotic resources in this image connote that the woman is 
a particular “type”: modern, cosmopolitan, and feminine/beautiful. More precisely, this image 
fetishes the feminine and the beautiful; indeed, its portrayal of the woman stays within the narrow 
boundaries of beauty and femininity, without giving her the opportunity to look more powerful 
and dignified. The woman could actually be using her phone for any reason, but here, the props 
convey these particular features, and in turn, the technology acquires narrowing non-empowering 
characteristics. Such characteristics echo popular associations that people make between the 
mobile phone and women’s emotional and social uses of the phone. It is perhaps due to these 
essentialist associations that are so deeply ingrained in our minds and culture that it seems natural 
to portray women this way. The caption of the image in Figure 4.19 sums this up perfectly with its 
brief “Juhuu!” (Woohoo!), which is an interjection used to express sudden excitement and joy. The 
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fact that the woman’s emotions are encapsulated by a caption which is not even a word, but a 
simplistic exclamation, further demonstrates the reductionist manner in which women are 
portrayed by the media.  
	 As a final comment regarding the social semiotic analysis of Figure 4.19, I would like to 
draw a comparison between certain visual representations of women with digital technologies and 
another frequent phenomenon in stock photography: the representation of women laughing alone 
with salads (cf. Grossman, 2014, see also Zimmerman, 2011). Whether women are depicted 
smiling/laughing alone staring at their phone or laughing alone with a salad (cf. Figure 4.21 
below), they are depicted in very narrow terms. The salad, as a cultural narrative, symbolizes 
healthy diet and weight loss, and more specifically women’s obsession with their weight, body, and 
appearance. This interest in appearance is not an inherently female characteristic; indeed, women 
and girls are socialized in a way that shows them and teaches them that they should be concerned 
about their bodies in order to look thin and beautiful. As a result, women and girls are socialized 
to eat light and healthy meals such as salads (cf. Rolls et al., 1991) in order to be “true” women. 
Unlike portraying women’s dietary habits, the images on the right-hand side of Figure 4.21 
stereotypically portray what their digital practices look like, that is, centered on exaggerated 
emotional and expressive exchanges (recall the caption of Figure 4.19 and its “Woohoo!”). In both 
cases (with their phone and with their salad), these women look as if they are enjoying themselves – 
perhaps a little too much. [21] Both kinds of illustrations point to the same patterns of behavior 
that are encouraged in women. In other words, these patterns of behaviors are transposed onto 
common understandings of what a woman is or what being feminine means (i.e. concerned about 
their appearance, expressive, emotional). On the contrary, the same patterns of behavior are 
discouraged in men: indeed they are not seen eating salads or using digital media the same way 
both of these women are. Women and girls are thus limited by such visual representations, which 
only serve to make them look vacuous. It is precisely the “vacuousness” of women in news media 
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images portraying women’s digital media practices that my focus group participants discuss in the 
















Figure 4.21: Montage of images representing women laughing alone with salad (left) and women laughing alone 
with phone (right) 
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Analysis of Figure 4.20 
In Figure 4.20, a handsome young White man wearing a cap and a sweater is sitting at a table in a 
decontextualized blank setting. He is holding a phone next to his ear while laughing. On the table 
are a laptop, a decorative plant, a cup, and glasses. Here, I argue that each semiotic resource (e.g. 
objects, colors, poses, clothing, setting) is being used to connote a discourse of what it is to be a 
modern man, and more specifically, a man using new technology. As in Figure 4.19, the main 
participant is engaged in a kind of trivial activity: the man is holding his phone and is seemingly 
having a conversation on the phone while smiling. This “behavioral process” is also typical of 
stock photography. Following Machin (2007, p.127), this man is less an actor than a carrier of 
meaning where what he is is more important than what he does. What “type” does he represent? 
What do objects, clothing and setting reveal about his identity? As in Figure 4.19, the image 
displays a cup of coffee, which may also symbolize a cosmopolitan lifestyle. However, here, the 
cup is less salient: it is light grey and is thus blends in with everything else since the whole picture 
and other objects (e.g. laptop, cap, sweater) have the same color and tone. These light and greyish 
tones create a specific mood: cold, peaceful, distant, and staged. Regarding the objects, the laptop 
may indicate that the man is well-off, independent, and mobile. His clothing (cap and sweater) 
suggests that he is relaxed and laid back, and not in a formal situation. The glasses on the table 
may signify intellectual life and work. The decorative plant on the table indicates interior 
decorating taste – a characteristic usually associated with women. Finally, as in Figure 4.19, the 
phone he is holding expresses modernity, mobility, and freedom. The man in Figure 4.20 seems to 
be using his phone for social and casual reasons as well (as the image caption suggests); therefore, 
this portrayal goes against the essentialist view that associates women’s supposedly inherent social 
skills and their use of the phone for social and emotional reasons. This man may be using his 
phone for social or emotional use; yet, this is not a restrictive or narrowing characteristic for him. 
Indeed, in my data, this kind of depiction that “flips the script” (cf. Aiello & Woodhouse, 2016) or 
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that goes against traditional gender conceptions and clichés is unusual with regards to the visual 
representations of men and digital media. 
 Here, the blank and decontextualized setting also reveals a “flipping of the script”. 
Referring to Machin & Thornborrow’s (2003) study of images in Cosmopolitan magazine, Machin 
(2007, p.34) notes: “women are often shown in large, airy, interior spaces, saturated with light”. 
Here, it is the man who is depicted in a stereotypically female place that resembles a page of a 
home interior magazine. As Machin (2007, p.34) remarks about those interior spaces, 
participants (the man in this case) “may engage only in trivial activities, but visually it is 
connoted that they do so in exciting, sophisticated settings”. Therefore, this man is portrayed in 
a “typical female” setting – a “typical male” setting would be an outdoor setting or a work office 
for instance. Moreover, the man looks like he is depicted in a fantasy world due to the low 
modality of the image (i.e. decontextualized stylized setting/background). In this fantasy world, 
we can see a modern man depicted in a more “feminine” role who is “flipping the script” in 
some ways. He has sophisticated and modern tastes, and seems to be social and 
expressive/emotional. Still, there are hints of an intellectual life. This man seems to be an ideal 
man; he is modern/progressive – he goes against stereotypical depictions of men and 
technology – but he still looks smart and very masculine (i.e. the facial hair highlights his 
masculinity). Aiello and Woodhouse (2016, p.362) refer to this design resource as 
“juxtaposition”: “visual comparisons between clashing, though familiar attributes or between 
contrasting attributes and actions, settings, or moods”. Here, the man’s masculine and typical 
traits stand in contrast with the more “feminine” décor, setting, and behavior. Nevertheless, this 
fantastical world is also a reminder that it is removed from reality. 
 In sum, Figure 4.20 transports the viewer to an enchanted world where we get to meet an 
ideal young handsome and modern man. Though he might be at home enjoying a break on his 
phone with a cup of coffee, the props still connote that he is a particular “type” (cf. Machin, 2004): 
smart, social, cosmopolitan, and modern, which are characteristics that contrast with the 
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traditional limiting descriptive features of women who would be portrayed in a lifestyle magazine. 
Indeed, he is portrayed as a “hipster” due to his high level of interest in technology, his casual 
clothes, and his studied nonchalance. Because of hegemonic definitions of patriarchy anchored in 
our minds and culture, we take it for granted that “masculine” carries more power than 
“feminine” (cf. Derrida, 1972). Therefore, as this man is depicted in a different and less 
“masculine” environment, he is still perceived as stylish and progressive. He does not have to 
prove anything since “masculine” is dominant anyway. In my data, men are mostly portrayed in 
“typical masculine” ways (e.g. wearing business suits, looking older, mature, professional, and 
serious or without exaggerated smiles), but can also be portrayed this way, as flipping the script in 
some ways (although not totally). Women, on the contrary, seem to be cast in very narrow and 
traditional visual frames. 
 
2. Image-text relationship 
In a multimodal analysis, it is essential to take into account different semiotic modes – especially in 
an analysis of news discourse. Here, for illustrative purposes, I only discuss the relationship 
between the image and the headline and show how the news media takes an essentialist position 
on gender and technology. To analyze the text-image relationship, I draw on Caple’s (2013, p.143) 
approach to photojournalism; she herself draws on Royce (2002) and Halliday and Hasan (1985) 
to discuss the types of semantic ties between words and images in news stories. Below are two 
images (Figures 4.22 and 4.23) that I selected because they are in some way “typical” of the ways 
in which women’s and men’s digital media practices are represented. Figure 4.22 portrays the 
negative facial expression associated with women in my dataset, and Figure 4.23 illustrates the 



















In Figure 4.22, the headline is the following: Pourquoi il ne faut surtout pas finir ses textos par un point 
(Why one should never end text messages with a period). The relationship between text and image 
can be analyzed following Halliday (1985) and his functional categories (represented participants, 
process, circumstances, and attributes), which Royce (2002, pp.193-194) calls: identification, activity, 
Figure 4.22: Le Figaro, France, 10 December 2015. Original image caption: Mettre un point à la fin d’un 
texto peut suffire à vous rendre profondément antipathique aux yeux de vos interlocuteurs (Adding a period at the end 
of a text message suffices to make you deeply unpleasant in the eyes of your interlocutors) (Image source: 
Getty Image).  
Figure 4.23 The New York Times, US 6 July 2017. Original image caption: The World Economic Forum in 
Davos, Switzerland, in January. Spooked by surveillance and wary of being exposed by hackers, executives are switching to 
apps that allow them to send encrypted and self-destructing texts (Image source: European Press Photo Agency) 
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circumstances, and attributes. Below (Table 4.2) is an analysis of the relationship between the image 
and the headline, following Caple (2013) and Royce (2002). 
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Analysis of image-text relationship (Figure 4.22) 
 
As Thurlow et al. (2019, p.11) note, there is an “ occasionally oxymoronic relation between the 
visual and verbal content of news stories.” This would seem to be the case with Figure 4.22 and 
the headline that accompanies it, which appear completely unrelated. With regards to identification, 
there is no written mention of a woman. The headline does not refer to any human being. Yet, 
visual and verbal elements can have an indirect relationship. As Caple (2013, p.144) explains, “co-
extension” is a type of cohesive relationship between image and text that refers to “a meaning 
relation between items from the same general field of meaning; typically realized by synonymy, 
antonymy, hyponoymy, meronymy”. Here, the phone depicted in the image is not referenced in 
the headline; however, the headline mentions textos (text messages), which are usually typed on 
phones. As a result, this is an instance of a “co-extensive” tie (i.e. meronymy or part-whole 
relationship) between the image and the text; the text message is a part of the phone. Regarding 
activity, the main thing that the woman is doing is staring at her phone. However, in the headline, 
there is also mention of another type of activity: finir ses textos par un point (ending a text message 
with a period). There is thus no direct or indirect connection between these two activities. In a 
similar vein, there is no cohesive tie between the image and the text concerning circumstances. 
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Indeed, the image shows no background at all; it is thus impossible to locate the scene precisely. 
Finally, with regards to attributes, the participants’ characteristics/qualities (cf. Royce, 2002, p.194), 
there is no relationship between image and text. We might speculate and imagine that the woman 
in the image is reading a text that ends with a period, which is the cause of her annoyed facial 
expression. The image seems to depict the consequence of the act of sending a text ending with a 
period; however, we can only speculate because we cannot see what is on the woman’s phone, and 
the irritated expression easily noticeable on the woman’s face is not referenced in the headline.  
 In sum, the only “co-extensive” tie one can make between the image and the headline 
concerns the phone and the reference to text messages. The headline is about a specific type of 
digital media practice (i.e. why we should not end our text messages with periods); it is thus a 
rather trivial piece of news. The fact that journalists chose this specific image with an expressive 
and emotional woman to accompany the headline and body text is meaningful; it highlights deeply 
rooted ideologies. The image serves to make some stereotypical gender references to women and 
their extreme feelings and emotions, and their ability to express them openly. It also aligns with 
previous research showing that women are more often seen in unserious news such as news stories 
about fashion (Jia et al., 2016). Moreover, the association between the headline about a specific 
type of digital media practice and the image portraying a woman echoes popular beliefs about the 
feminine characteristics of mobile communication. As I already mentioned, women are indeed 
often seen as the primary users of mobile phones and are often described as good communicators 
and talkers. Nevertheless, these recurrent types of associations as well as the analysis of the image-
text relationship point to problematic ideologies that narrow down women’s roles and potential. 
This “gender disconnect” ” (Thurlow et al., 2019, p.11) between the visual depictions of women 
and the verbal content of news articles not only emphasizes the misrepresentation of women and 
their digital practices, but also a “problematic blurring of the kinds of editorial ‘realities’ that are 
widely expected in the news”, the “realities” being the actual news coverage and the choice and 
use of such images (Thurlow et al., 2019, p.19).  
	 150	
















































Analysis of image-text relationship (Figure 4.23) 
 
Regarding identification, Figure 4.23 depicts a businessman using his phone while surrounded by 
other business people, and the headline makes reference to “elites” and “watchdogs”. Although 
there is no obvious connection between the people and things identified in both image and 
headline, there is a ‘”co-extensive” tie (i.e. intersemiotic hyponymy) between “elites”, “watchdogs” 
and the people (i.e. men) represented in the picture. Intersemiotic hyponymy refers to a class-
subclass relationship (cf. Royce, 2002, p. 194). Here, “elites” and “watchdogs” are part of the same 
class of important governmental/business people, and the people represented in the image (i.e. 
businessmen) are a subclass of elites/watchdogs. There is thus an indirect connection between the 
identified participants in both image and text. However, the headline does not mention the activities 
portrayed in the image, and the only activity mentioned in the headline, “switch to texting”, is not 
visually represented in the image either. Finally, the circumstances and attributes of both image and 
headline do not connect at all. Indeed, there is no written allusion to any kind of annual meeting 
in the headline, and the watchdogs’ “fear” is not visually present in the picture. In sum, after 
reading the headline and seeing the image, the only co-extensive tie one can make is between the 
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participants, “elites” and “watchdogs,” and the main businessman and other businessmen visually 
portrayed in the image. The audience is thus led to make associations between those participants, 
which may unconsciously strengthen certain gender and media ideologies. Indeed, the world of 
elites and watchdogs mentioned in the headline is one that is mostly led by men (e.g. governmental 
agencies, global business, IT industry, etc.), and Figure 4.23 presents a male-oriented reality. 
Although the image alone and the headline do not tell us what kind of meeting is taking place, the 
image caption mentions the WEF (World Economic Forum), which is an event that attracts an 
uneven proportion of males and females (Schmitt, 2016). The WEF might be considered the 
epitome of the male-dominated political, economic and global business elite. Therefore, the choice 
of this image representing men to accompany the headline makes sense if one takes into account 
the overrepresentation of men in the global business industry. However, this is not to say that 
doing so is right. Not only does such an image emphasize the popular associations between one 
gender (i.e. male) and the business and political elite in an essentialist way, it also reflects the reality 
of women’s place in the tech industry and global business (cf. Marwick, 2018; Nogueira Couto 
Pereira, 2017; Wynarczyk & Ranga, 2017), which is what the image representing Steve Jobs 
(Figure 4.15) emphasizes.  
 
Discussion: The problematic gendering of digital communication 
 
As a final illustration of my argument, I would like to offer the following image from The Guardian 
which apparently “flips the script” and depicts a woman using her phone wearing business attire. 





   
   
 
 
In this image, there are five people: four men on the left, and one woman on the right. Although 
the woman is indeed present and is wearing business attire, she is still underrepresented. She might 
well be using technology for serious professional reasons, but compositionally speaking, this image 
does not produce a favorable impression of her; she is still disadvantaged. The meaning of this 
image stresses a much wider world of opportunities for men, particularly career-wise. This woman 
appears to be included; however, on closer inspection one notices that this is merely a feeling of 
inclusivity. 
 The cultural discourses that circulate in the press are powerful tools for the socialization of 
young girls and women; indeed, they suggest what digital media is/should be for women/girls. 
Although what I presented in this chapter might not come as a surprise – we are indeed familiar 
with the ways in which women and girls are stereotypically depicted in the media – my goal was to 
go beyond those well-known and well-established stereotypes. My analysis showed that women are 
overrepresented in news media images about digital communication, which also aligns with what 
Thurlow et al. (2019) demonstrated. I showed that women are usually represented completely 
differently from men. Unlike the active role that women frequently play in society with regard to 
digital media (e.g. the #MeToo movement), the press depicts the relationship between women and 
Figure 4.24: The Guardian, UK, 4 November 2016. Original image caption: New group… (Image source: Getty 
Image) 
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digital media in limiting, essentialist, and sexist terms. As my content analysis reveals, women are 
the ones who are more frequently depicted with exaggerated facial expressions, with scanty 
clothes, interested in their appearance, and young. In turn, they usually come across as unserious, 
vacuous, childish, and as objects believed to please the gaze of the male spectator. Unlike women, 
men are more often represented as older and more mature, serious or without exaggerated facial 
expression, and more regularly portrayed in a working/business/IT environment. These gendered 
patterns that I analyzed in the content analysis were then critically observed in my social semiotic 
analysis, where I exposed what it means to be a woman or a man using digital media, either in 
uncommon ways that intend to “flip the script” or in more usual ways that reinforce traditional 
gender roles. From salads to phones, women are still visually depicted in unflattering and 
narrowing terms, with a focus on the same recurrent essentialist characteristics. Unfortunately, the 
fact that the news media images from this study are narrowing for female users can have an impact 
on how women view technology. As Thurlow et al. (2019) argue, “this overrepresentation clearly 
warps the picture and potentially perpetuates a sense of young women as problematic or at risk, 
and/or of communication being woman’s work” (Thurlow et al., 2019, p.14). Thus, the 
overrepresentation of women in addition to the limiting and sexist ways in which they are 
represented emphasizes the problematic gendering of digital communication by the news media 
(and by stock photography).  
 My goal in this chapter was to contribute to gender and media studies, while following 
contemporary scholars who view the relationship between gender and digital media as a dynamic, 
fluid, and context-dependent relationship (cf. Marwick, 2014). As I showed from my dataset of 167 
newspaper stories about digital communication, the news media’s visual representation of women 
and digital media is rather one-dimensional and limiting for women. Images here tend to follow an 
essentialist ideology that considers women’s conversational, social and emotional skills, as well as 
their interest in beauty and appearance, as inherent to them. The news media industry (in 
selecting the specific images that form my dataset) and the photo industry (in creating such images) 
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construct gendered identities in relation to what they consider “normed” categories. They 
create/construct a reality but do not reflect one, which is problematic because such visual 
representations socialize men and women into these kinds of behaviors. In my analysis, the 
participants who look young, are interested in their appearance, and are overly expressive and 
emotional while using technology are mainly women because these kinds of behaviors are mapped 
to common ideas of what it is to be a woman. This is what being a woman using technology 
is/looks like. In exposing such issues, I follow contemporary gender scholars who “focus on 
behavior that is encouraged, discouraged, rewarded, or prohibited and how it maps to ideal 
understandings of “men”, “women”, “feminine”, and “masculine”” (Marwick, 2014, p.63). As a 
result, I have showed that women/girls’ digital practices that are encouraged visually are confining 
and disempowering for women, and that it is the case with news stories from different languages 
and countries, with little variation. However, in practice – that is, not in the media – digital media 
practices depend on a wide range of factors that are not necessarily gender-related. Although there 
is still hope that digital media will help to liberate and empower women – through digital feminist 
activism for instance (cf. Keller et al., 2018; Mendes et al., 2018) – the images from this study 
disclose a very narrow vision of what women do/should do with technology and indicate that the 
news media is out of touch with what is actually occurring in the world while taking a very 































“Wired women” speak back to news media discourse: 




Setting the scene: Speaking out, speaking back 
 
In October 2017, the #MeToo movement began as a response to the pervasiveness of sexual 
harassment and assault in the workplace – particularly in the film industry. After the first 
accusations against the Hollywood producer Harvey Weinstein, women began employing the 
hashtag #MeToo to share their own personal stories of harassment and to condemn the 
misconduct of other powerful men. Within a week, the movement had spread all over the world. 
In the case of the #MeToo movement (or the French equivalent #BalanceTonPorc), new media 
(i.e. Twitter) offer a platform for women to be agents and actors of change and to fight back 
against the abuses of a male-dominated society. Although digital media platforms can be 
intimidating for women – women might be criticized for their feminist activism – such platforms 
“are also making women’s and girls’ voices and participation visible in ways that can generate the 
type of ripple effect” of the #MeToo movement (Mendes et al., 2018, p.244). By raising 
awareness and by bringing women and girls together, digital media may be a promising tool 
that will offer them the opportunity and power to effect societal changes, as other studies have 
demonstrated (e.g. Dixon, 2014; Keller et al., 2018; Thrift, 2014).  
 While the #MeToo movement serves as an example of women “speaking out” about a 
	 159	
specific social issue, my goal in this chapter is to explore the ways in which women “speak back” 
to the power-players who perpetuate this social issue (i.e. the journalists who shape news 
discourse). As bell hooks notes: 
It is that act of speech, of “talking back”, that is no mere gesture of empty words, that is the 
expression of our movement from object to subject –the liberated voice (hooks, 1989) 
 
 
Instances of “talking back” are acts of courage and strength that serve to empower the 
underpriviledged, as bell hooks’ quote above illustrates. Speaking back allows silent, subjugated 
“objects” to become free “subjects” with a voice. As defined by hooks (1989) in her experience, 
speaking back means “daring to disagree” or “having an opinion” (p.5), which is the meaning I 
want to emphasize in this chapter as I explore how young women “speak back” to dominant 
discourses in the press. More specifically, I explore the ways in which a group of women’s 
naturalized assumptions about gender (and digital media) come about, and what ideological 
repercussions these women’s discourse has.  
 Furthermore, this chapter on “speaking back” to problematic discourses also represents 
a methodological contribution to the field of digital discourse studies. Indeed, I consider 
“speaking back” a critical cultural method/intervention. My methodological intervention is to 
allow young people to speak for themselves (i.e. to give them a voice) as well as to raise critical 
awareness about a relevant social issue. In this sense, I am following Thurlow’s (2007, p. 288) 
lead when he points out that news media commentary “often bears little resemblance to actual 
practice” and that young people are almost never given a voice in the news media. I also follow 
Vickery (2017, p.xii), whose recent analysis is “punctuated by the voices and lived experiences of 
young people who rarely figure in public discourses about teens, technology, and risk”. Like 
Vickery, I want to give a voice to young people, and to young women in particular. The need to 
give women a voice and to critically explore gender and power relations is particularly relevant 
today, in an era where notions such as “sexism” and “patriarchy’” are considered outdated and 
irrelevant, and where the focus is often placed on the celebration of women’s empowerment (cf. 
Lazar, 2014). This perception is at the core of the “postfeminist” sensibility. As McRobbie 
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(2004) argues: 
“postfeminism actively draws on and invokes feminism as that which can be taken into account in order 
to suggest that equality is achieved, in order to install a whole repertoire of new meanings which 
emphasize that it is no longer needed, a spent force” (McRobbie, 2004 p.4) 
 
Although we must take into account the fact that women have achieved a lot with regards to their 
position in the workplace, school, and the media (Lazar & Kramarae, 2011), gender 
discrimination and stereotypes are far from being “passé”, as I demonstrated in my analysis of 
news media imagery in the previous chapter. Consequently, it is necessary to challenge naturalized 
gender ideologies and hegemonic definitions of masculinity that keep men and women from 
seeking the same opportunities.  
 In order to hear what women themselves have to say and to challenge gender assumptions, 
scholars (e.g. Kitzinger, 2000; Weatherall, 2012) have argued in favor of using conversation 
analysis (CA) in feminist research. Kitzinger (2000, p.169) notes that “feminism has always been 
deeply concerned with recovering women’s own meanings and understandings about the world.” 
This is why she argues that CA could be useful in representing feminist concerns. Indeed, CA’s 
goal is to accurately capture people’s voices and meanings (Kitzinger, 2000; Schegloff, 1997) 
through its focus on “micro” elements and through a detailed and systematic analysis of “talk-in-
interaction”. Although CA “purists” (cf. Cameron, 2001, p.88) do not investigate social, historical, 
and cultural factors beyond the data that they gather, others do take these factors into account in 
their analyses (e.g. the feminist perspective of Zimmerman & West, 1975). Yet, by focusing on the 
detailed analysis of turn-taking, CA may fail to “acknowledge the sociological and ideological 
assumptions contained within any research process” (Baxter, 2003, p.53), which, I argue, is a 
crucial aspect of discourse studies. Indeed, as I specified in Chapter 1 of this thesis, there has been 
a recent move towards more ethnographic and user-centered research, especially in digital 
discourse studies. As a consequence, media scholars have been focusing on issues related to the 
“social meanings” of communication in order to shed light on language and media ideologies, as 
recent edited volumes suggest (e.g. Burgess et al., 2018; Georgakopoulou & Spilioti, 2015; Sargent 
& Tagg, 2014; Thurlow & Mroczek, 2011). Thus, for the purposes of this chapter, I believe that a 
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more critical approach is called for, one that CA fails to address. 
 In contrast to CA, critical discourse analysis (CDA) advocates a critical and emancipatory 
agenda. For example, feminist critical discourse analysis (FCDA) is a form of activism that aims to 
contest received ideologies and that promotes social justice and change (Lazar, 2014). More 
precisely, FCDA is an approach that “is concerned with the analysis of inequality and the way that 
discursive means are used to maintain the status quo” (Mills & Mullany, 2011, p.80). This chapter 
follows the critical agenda of FCDA as it seeks to explore how young female users of digital media 
discursively position themselves in regard to issues concerning gender and digital media. The need 
to raise awareness on matters related to gender and power is all the more important since one does 
not always notice relations of power at work and often takes them for granted, which is something 
Jennifer (28, HR assistant) from FG 2 remarked after closely analyzing the ways in which women 
were visually depicted using digital media:  
 
Extract 5.1 
Jennifer  “on remarque pas, c’est que quand t’analyses le truc que tu te rends   
  compte que y’a un soucis”   
 
  you don’t notice it, it’s only when you analyze it that you realize  
 that there is a problem 
 
Jennifer’s sudden revelation concerning power asymmetries at work shows that we are surrounded 
by similar naturalized assumptions on a daily basis, and that critical work is needed in order to 
raise awareness and change the status quo. Similar to FCDA but going a step further, feminist 
post-structuralist discourse analysis (FPDA) takes a critical stance regarding gender inequality, but 
focuses rather on the exploration of “the complex and often ambiguous ways in which 
girls/women are simultaneously positioned as relatively powerless within certain discourses, but as 
relatively powerful within alternative and competing discourses” (Baxter, 2003, p.99), which is the 
approach I take in this chapter as I explore the ways in which young female digital media users 
“speak back” to news media discourse, from a feminist perspective.  
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 Unlike (feminist) critical discourse analysis which explicitly seeks emancipation and social 
change, FPDA’s main goal is not to change and transform, “although transformation may be a by-
product of such analysis” (Sauntson, 2012, p.39). Rather, FPDA focuses on “the multiplicity of 
gendered subjectivities” and on “how gendered identities may shift and change, even across the 
same text or stretch of interaction” (Sauntson, 2012, p.39). This chapter thus follows the goals of 
feminist post-structuralist discourse analysis and so-called “third wave” feminism (Mills, 2012) in 
that it takes into account the heterogeneous nature of women as opposed to a universal perspective 
that views all women as victims of patriarchal oppression. Moreover, FPDA understands gender in 
terms of social constructivist terms instead of essentialist terms, and as such, aligns with a post-
structuralist tradition that recognizes that social meanings are never fixed but are rather constantly 
negotiated in discourse. A feminist post-structuralist discourse analytical approach is particularly 
relevant in this chapter because  
It involves highlighting key discourses on gender as they are negotiated and performed within specific, 
localised contexts. It also involves making sense of the ways in which these discourses position female 
speakers (in particular) as relatively powerful, powerless, or a combination of both. It acknowledges the 
complexities, ambiguities and differences in the experiences of particular female speakers, as well as 
focusing on the possibilities for resistance and reinterpretation of social practices. (Baxter, 2003, p.66) 
Following Baxter (2003), my goal is to take a bottom-up approach to discourse while exploring 
context-dependent gender issues and to avoid making generalizations about women and gender. 
Moreover, I do not wish to focus on the victimization and oppression of women; rather, I aim to 
investigate the ways in which women are at times positioned as powerful and at other times as 
powerless, within different discourses, and how they show resistance to dominant discourses. 
Though women and girls are often “silenced” by dominant discourses propagated in the news 
media, they are not uniformly powerless, as I will contend in my analysis. Although some of the 
same ideas circulate among the participants, they cannot be reduced to one single meaning, but 
rather multiple meanings and identities as female speakers co-construct different and competing 
identities for themselves through language and discourse. Therefore, meaning is never fixed (see 
Derrida, 1976; Foucault, 1972) which is what I am arguing in my analysis of the discourse of 
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young females users of digital media as they “speak back” to the news media’s “regime of truth” 
regarding gender and digital media.   
 Although media discourse about digital media tends to construct a reductionist “regime of 
truth” regarding the ways women and girls use – or are supposed to use – digital media (cf. 
Chapter 4), feminist strategies and activism concerning (digital) media is on the rise (see Harp et. 
al, 2018). Before delving into feminist media scholarship, it is important to define what I mean by 
“feminism”. In this thesis, I understand “feminism” as “a form of attention, a lens that brings into 
focus particular questions” (Fox Keller, 1985, p.6). More specifically, I follow Bucholtz’s (2014, 
p.23) definition of “feminism” as “a diverse and sometimes conflicting set of theoretical, 
methodological, and political perspectives that have in common a commitment to understanding 
and challenging social inequalities related to gender and sexuality”. Although feminist scholarship 
generally seeks to end social inequalities with regards to gender, I do not follow “second-wave” or 
“modernist feminism” (cf. Mills, 2012) which considers gender to be the main factor shaping women 
and femaleness, which agrees with the universalization of women, and which mainly seeks to resist 
patriarchal domination while gearing towards emancipation. As bell hooks (1989, p.22) puts it, 
“feminism, as liberation struggle, must exist apart from and as part of the larger struggle to 
eradicate domination in all its forms”. In other words, feminist research should acknowledge the 
multiple facets of a woman’s identity, and view gender as interconnected with other identity 
markers such as sex(uality), class, race, age, and culture (e.g. Baxter, 2003; Butler, 1990; hooks, 
1989; Lazar, 2014). Such a perspective views a woman’s identity as heterogeneous, and aligns with 
the concept of  “intersectionality” (Crenshaw, 1989). In this chapter, I thus follow a contemporary 
definition of feminism that addresses the “multiplicity of women’s identities” (Baxter, 2003, p.5), 
which is crucial in order to understand that “gender oppression is neither materially experienced 
nor discursively enacted in the same way for women everywhere” (Lazar, 2014, p.189). 
Furthermore, I specifically focus on one key concern of feminist scholars: media discourse, and the 
ways in which the media negotiates and defines gender (roles). As such, I follow the tradition of 
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feminist media scholarship (see more in Chapter 1), an “umbrella concept encompassing multiple 
practices that theorize about the status of women and the nature of gender in mediated messages 
and practices” (Bachmann et al., 2018, p.3). While Chapter 4 explored the news media’s definition 
and construction of gender, this chapter focuses rather on the news media’s messages and the way 
their audience receives them.  
 Over the past 50 years, feminist media scholarship has evolved to encompass a wide range 
of perspectives and foci, from research focusing on representation, traditional gender roles, 
emancipation and liberation, to a focus on intersectionality and the heterogeneous nature of 
women, as well as an understanding of gender as a social construction (see Bachmann et al., 2018). 
It is with second-wave feminist media studies that scholars started to focus on women’s representation 
in the media and the gender ideologies that shaped these representations (e.g. Goffman, 1979; 
Tuchman, 1978). Second-wave feminist studies were mainly quantitative in nature and explored 
the underrepresentation/absence of women in the media as well as stereotypical depictions of 
women as sexual objects, mothers, and victims, which supposedly prevented women from 
obtaining the same rights as men. In sum, according to Steiner (2014, p.361), early second-wave 
studies assumed that “depictions of women (and girls) result from, reflect, and reproduce dominant 
ideologies”. However, in the 1980s and 1990s, third-wave feminist media scholarship began 
addressing an important issue that early studies had failed to consider: the plural and diverse 
nature of women’s identities. As a result, the latest feminist media research takes into account the 
concept of “intersectionality” (cf. Crenshaw, 1989) which recognizes that other identity markers 
besides for gender, such as race, sexuality, ethnicity, and class, are important in shaping women’s 
lives and experiences (e.g. Fisher, 2018; Lopez, 2018). As contemporary feminist media scholars 
move away from a focus on patriarchal and hegemonic media messages and the desire to grant 
women certain rights (Bachmann et al., 2018), they turn to “more complex models of 
spectatorship” (Steiner, 2014, p.367) and have started investigating the active role that women take 
in order to make themselves heard. More recently, feminist media scholarship has explored the 
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possibility of promoting social change and empowering women through political activism via 
social media platforms (e.g. Chen et al., 2018; Dixon, 2014; Keller et al., 2018; Mendes et al., 
2018; Thrift, 2014 ). As I argued in the beginning of this introduction, recent feminist media 
studies have investigated women who “speak out” and how this can challenge the status quo. With 
this in mind, I follow other feminist media scholars (e.g. Bachmann & Loke, 2018; Byerly, 2016; 
Cerqueira et al., 2016) who attempt to understand and challenge the current politics of gender and 
the media. Thus, in this chapter, I allow young female users of digital media to use their own 
voices to “speak back” to problematic gendered discourses. Then, I critically examine what they 
have to say in response to the news media’s visual representations of “themselves”. In line with 
critical discourse analysis and feminist post-structuralist discourse analysis, I address the following 
research questions: 
1) What discursive strategies do “wired women” use to respond to the news media’s gendered 
representations of women and digital media? 
2) How do they (re)produce and/or challenge gender ideologies? 
In other words, I wish to examine how women position themselves vis-à-vis certain discourses (i.e. 





In order to demonstrate how women “speak back”, I used the empirical evidence from my news 
discourse analysis as a stimulus in four focus groups conducted with young female users of digital 
media. In this way, I examine the complex intersection of top-down cultural discourses and 
bottom-up social meanings and/or practices. My goal is to gain insight into how young women in 
the different groups perceive an issue (i.e. the news media’s linguistic and visual discourses 
regarding digital communication technologies). In the previous chapter, I examined how news 
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media discourse about digital media constructs a particular “regime of truth” about the ways 
women and girls use – or “should” use – digital media. For instance, I analyzed a large database of 
international newspaper reports, outlining the most commonly found gendered stereotypes both 
linguistically and visually. I remarked that a majority of news media images focus on young 
women (teen girls and 18-30 year-old women) with digital devices (as opposed to men with digital 
devices) and that these women are depicted in very narrow visual terms. As a result, I wanted to 
see what young women themselves (as actual users) think about the news media’s visual 
representations of them.  
 I set the following “screens” (Krueger and Casey, 2015, p.88) for each group: Participants 
had to be women (screen 1), between the ages of 18 and 30 (screen 2), and had to own and use a 
smartphone (screen 3). Moreover, it was important that the participants in each group knew each 
other so that they would feel comfortable sharing their opinion in front of their group members. 
Indeed, “some mixes of participants do not work well because of limited understanding of other 
lifestyles and situations” (Krueger and Casey, 2015, p.81). It was therefore crucial to find the right 
balance between enough variation within the group (e.g. different occupations and levels of 
education) and homogeneity.  
 Since I expected participants to feel passionately about the topic being discussed, I set the 
size of the focus groups at between 4 and 6 people so that participants would have ample 
opportunity to share their thoughts and opinions. The ideal size of focus groups typically depends 
on a range of factors (e.g. purpose of study, topic, participants’ level of expertise, etc.). However, if 
participants “are likely to have strong feelings about the topic, then the group size should be 
restricted to five or six people” (Krueger and Casey, 2015, p.82). To recruit participants, I used the 
“snowball sample”. I first asked a 24-year-old woman (Jane – not her real name) and a 28 year-old 
woman (Sophie – not her real name) (who both own and use a smartphone) if they knew other 
women who would meet the “screens” I had set. The logic of the snowball sample “is that people 
know people like themselves” (Krueger and Casey, 2015, p.84). Since the initial contact was made 
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with two potential participants (Jane and Sophie), I conducted the focus groups in a convenient 
location for them and the people they found. This is why I met them in the French-speaking part 
of Switzerland, where they are all from. The duration of each focus group was about 1 hour. The 
focus groups were conducted in French, which is my preferred language. As a communication 
researcher based in Switzerland who speaks French fluently, I felt the need to deepen my 
knowledge about a specific French-speaking community in Switzerland. Also, no similar study has 
been conducted in French, which is one of the national languages of Switzerland and one of the 
languages of the SNF-funded project of which this thesis is a part.  
 For your reference, I display Table 1.4 (cf. Chapter 1) below with the names (pseudonyms) 
of the participants of each focus group, their age and profession, as well as the location, date, and 




Focus group 1 (FG 1)  
       
Focus group 2 (FG 2) 
 
Location: Martigny, Valais, Switzerland 




Location: Lausanne, Vaud, Switzerland 
Date: 28 May 2018 
Duration: 57:15 
 
1. Julie, 24, a marketing assistant 
2. Cindy, 24, a social worker 
3. Melanie, 24, an insurance agent 
4. Anna, 25, a physical therapist 
5. Tania, 24, a beautician 
 
Focus group 3 (FG 3)  
 
1. Jennifer, 28, an HR assistant 
2. Sophie, 28, a university assistant  
3. Sandra, 28, a management consultant 
4. Tiffany, 28, a management consultant 
 
 
Focus group 4 (FG 4)                                                 
 
Location: Vernayaz, Valais, Switzerland 




Location: Martigny, Valais, Switzerland 
Date: 1 June 2018 
Duration: 58:10 
 
1. Charlotte, 19, a student 
2. Veronica, 19, a student 
3. Samantha, 18, an apprentice employee 
4. Julie, 22, a commercial employee 
5. Adelina, 23, a teacher 
 
 
1. Pauline, 30, a makeup artist 
2. Ines, 30, a social worker 
3. Aline, 30, a social worker 
4. Janice, 30, a graphic designer 
 
 
Table 1.4: List of participants in each focus group 
      
          
My analytical process is inspired by the classical approach to focus group analysis (cf. Krueger & 
Casey, 2015): (1) cutting and sorting participants’ quotes, (2) examining recurrent themes (3) 
interpreting. After listening to the recordings of the four focus groups, I began by loosely 
transcribing the data (see Appendix I for the transcription conventions that I followed). This 
allowed me to go through the recorded data and sort participants’ quotes into recurrent themes. In 
my analysis, I closely explore the concept of “stance” (Du Bois, 2007), “a uniquely productive way 
of conceptualizing the processes of indexicalization that are the link between individual 
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performance and social meaning” (Jaffe, 2009, p.4). I closely analyze multiple transcripts from the 
four focus groups that exemplify the ways in which different discourses connect and compete, 
following the feminist post-structuralist approach that explores the intertextualization of discourses. I 
show that while women are portrayed in reductionist ways by dominant social discourses in the 
news media (cf. Chapter 4), they are not necessarily all powerless and victimized at all times. 
Rather, the female participants of the focus groups position themselves – as they speak back to 
news media discourse – in various ways, at times as powerful, and at other times as powerless. This 
also shows how they, as speakers, index different social identities through stances.  
 As I specified in Chapter 1, the questions that I asked served as triggers that sparked 
conversations and debates between the participants. Those questions not only concerned the 
representations of women and men using digital media in news media imagery, but also more 
general media ideologies as they discussed issues related to digital addiction and children’s digital 
media use. For the purposes of this chapter, I only discuss their answers to questions 4 through 8, 
which specifically and exclusively concern gender ideologies (see the complete questionnaire in 
Appendix C). I am especially interested in the way the participants speak back to the news media’s 
visual representation of women (and men) using digital media, which is why my analysis focuses on 
questions 6 and 7. Question 6 concerns the participants’ reaction to images representing women, 
and question 7 to images representing men. As a starting point, I selected four typical news media 
images of men and women using digital media. The examples I chose are not necessarily 
representative of all of the images from the dataset, but they are typical examples of the ways in 
which the news media represents men and women using digital media. Below are the images that 


















Analysis: Gendered social meanings 
Theme 1: Challenging gender ideologies  
First, I explore the participants’ opinions regarding men and women’s use of digital media before 
they saw the images, and argue whether or not these are the same as their responses to the news 
media’s images. I show that the participants challenge received ideologies and attempt to negotiate 
their meanings about gender and digital media by discussing their “actual” use of digital media. In 







From FG 1(24-25 year-old women) 
Trigger question: Do you think women and men use digital media the same way? 
 
1 Jane (24) Alors lui en tous cas, ‘fin (0.2) et même j’ai l’impression que les gars c’est beaucoup les 
2    euh (0.3) ben c’est les ‘fin lui ouais, les jeux = 
3 Melanie (24) = le sport 
4 Jane  et les groupes nous c’est c’qu’on disait  
5 Melanie  mmh 
6 Jane  sur WhatsApp si tu compares d’autres groupes, de conversations de filles et leurs 
7   groupes, eux ils s’envoient toute la journée des conneries  
8 Tania (24) ouais ben moi j’suis dans le groupe des gars de Vernay maintenant [j’ai tout le temps  
9   des messages 
10 Jane  [ben justement? eux ils parlent tout le temps tandis que nous on parle genre on s’voit  
11   ci on s’voit là on s’voit = 
12 Tania  = pis y’en a trois qui répondent sur sept 
13 Jane  pis les photos c’est plus nous que eux  
14 Tania  ((laughs)) 
15 Jane  genre moi, Frederic au bout de dix photos il (2.0) 
16 Anna  alors moi j’suis Frederic par rapport à ça 
17 Tania  moi aussi  
18 Anna (25) [casser les bonbons] 
19 Tania  [par contre Lucas] lui toute la journée il prend des photos, pis des fois on f’sait à  
20   l’époque quand on faisait des balades? ben il restait dix minutes au même endroit il  
21   essayait de prendre une photo d’la du même truc mais dans un angle différent et  
22   franchement ça prenait une blinde 
23 Jane  (il a vingt ans) 
24 Tania  une blinde 
25 Melanie  un plinde? 
26 Anna  une blinde 
27 Jane  donc en fait là on a pas un point (0.2) genre moi j’trouve que, lui il est plus pour les  
28   jeux (1.1) et quand il geek, il geek pas en fait il est sur WhatsApp? et il écoute d’la 
29   musique (0.3) mais tu vois genre il geek jamais sur instagram 
 
 
1 Jane (24)  well for him anyway, well (0.2) I even have a feeling that for guys it’s more 
2    uh (0.3) well it’s yeah gaming= 
3 Melanie (24) =sports 
4 Jane  and as far as groups that’s what we said  
5 Melanie  mmh 
6 Jane  on WhatsApp if you compare other girls’ conversation groups and their  
7   groups, they send each other bullshit all day long 
8 Tania (24) well now I’m in a group with guys from Vernayaz and [I always get 
9    messages 
10 Jane  [exactly? They’re constantly talking while us we say like we see each other here we see each other there  
11   we see= 
12 Tania  =and three out of seven reply 
13 Jane  and pictures it’s more us than them 
14 Tania  ((laughs)) 
15 Jane  like me, Frederic after 10 minutes he (2.0) 
16 Anna (25) well I’m Frederic as far as that goes 
17 Tania  me too  
18 Anna  [annoying] 
19 Tania  [on the other hand Lucas] takes pictures all day long, and sometimes when we used to take   
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20   walks in the past well he used to stay in the same spot for 10 minutes  
21   he would try to take a photo of the same thing but from different angles 
22   and frankly it would take une blinde (expression that means ‘a while’) 
23 Jane  (he’s twenty) 
24 Tania  une bline 
25 Melanie  une plinde 
26 Anna  une blinde 
27 Jane  okay so we don’t actually have a point (0.2) like I think that he is more fond of  
28   games and when he geeks out, actually he doesn’t geek out he’s on WhatsApp? and he listens to  




Throughout Extract 5.2, the participants are seen negotiating a gendering of digital media. Here, 
digital media practices are not necessarily gendered, but are rather individualized by the 
participants. Jane (24, marketing assistant) (line 1) starts by generalizing about men’s use of digital 
media by referring to a common belief: men tend to play more online games than women. 
However, at the end of the extract (lines 27-29) we understand that such a generalization about 
men’s digital media use was made because she was thinking about her boyfriend, Frederic’s, 
interest in gaming – it is understood that Frederic spends “too much” time playing games from 
Jane’s descriptions elsewhere in the conversation. Then, Jane tries to generalize again while 
referring to WhatsApp groups (lines 6-7). She says that men “send each other bullshit all day long” 
(line 7). In order to support Jane’s claim, Tania (24, beautician) provides a personal example 
where she explains that now that she is part of a group with her male friends, she constantly gets 
messages (lines 8-9). On line 13, Jane again generalizes about men and women’s use of the built-in 
camera to take pictures when she says that regarding “photos it’s more us than them”. While she 
clearly creates a separation between us (women) and them (men) in her assumption, she then 
supports her claim with a personal example: her boyfriend Frederic’s rare use of the photo app. 
Therefore, in the beginning of the discussion, there is a connection between universal claims about 
men and women’s use of digital media and personal supportive examples. However, on lines 16-
17, Tania and Anna (25, physical therapist) contradict Jane’s claim that women tend to take more 
pictures than men. Anna says “Well I’m Frederic as far as that goes” (line 16), and Tania aligns 
with her friend when saying “me too” (line 17). Furthermore, Tania gives the example of her 
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boyfriend Lucas who actually takes more pictures than her (line 19). Although research has 
explored the gendering of digital media, for instance the fact that men play more online games 
than women (Hartmann & Klimmt, 2006) or that women tend to take more selfies than men (Dhir 
et al., 2016), it is important to understand that gender is a mediated experience that is constructed 
in discourse (Dow, 2006). The meaning of gender is constantly negotiated and renegotiated in 
discursive practices, which is what happens with the disalignment from line 16 on, when Anna says 
“I’m Frederic as far as that goes”. Here, she takes a specific stance and takes on the role of a man; 
she “is” a man. She discursively rejects the essentialist perspective of gender when it comes to 
digital media practices, and positions herself as similar to a man. Line 16 is particularly revealing 
because it shows a turning point in this specific discursive example where meanings compete and 
where the participants start to realize that differences in digital media practices are not solely due 
to gender. Indeed, Jane recognizes on line 27 that they are not able to agree on a common 
universal argument regarding men and women’s digital media use. In fact, as Fairclough (2003, 
p.46) argues, the “universalization of a particular” is what makes/creates hegemony and 
background assumptions, a process that I explained in more detail in the previous chapter. The 
news media tends to universalize gender stereotypes and as a consequence, to naturalize them. In 
Extract 5.2, Jane’s persistence in coming up with universal claims is not successful; her argument is 
contradicted by Anna and Tania’s personal examples, which show that all men and all women are 
not all alike when it comes to digital media use, and which goes against the media’s shaping of a 
single “preferred” meaning (cf. Hall, 1997). Gender differences in digital communicative practices 
should not be seen as inherent to women or men, and gender should not be seen as the only 
variable influencing communicative differences. In fact, a little further in the conversation (cf. 
Extract 5.3 below), Melanie (24, insurance agent) (line 1-2) actually suggests that differences 





From FG 1(24-25 year-old women) 
Trigger question: Do you think women and men use digital media the same way? 
 
1 Melanie (24) Mais après tu penses pas que c’est pas une question de genre [mais qu’c’est une   
2   question de personnalité    
3 Jane (24) [ouais  
4 Anna (25) [ouais j’pense] 
5 Cindy (24) [ouais] 
6 Jane  [ouais j’pense] (     ) 
7 Melanie  que tu peux pas catégoriser les genres 
8 Jane  ouais 
9   (1.0) 
10 Jane  [non c’est vrai comme là on a dit on a toutes des cas différents là 
11 Melanie  [ptêtre pas pour ça mais après pour d’autres choses 
12 Anna  ben ouais 
13 Jane  °toi tu dis quoi? (0.2) t’es en train d’te comparer avec = 
14 Tania (24) =il a un téléphone avec internet? 
15 Anna  ((laughs)) 
16 Cindy  j’crois pas que ce soit une référence, à tout ça 
17 Jane  ((laughs))  
18 Cindy  Non mais j- j’pense que c’est clair que au niveau des genres y’aura (0.3) ptêtre euh  
19   (0.2) ils f’ront pas du shopping, euh ils utiliseront pas la même chose (0.1) que, que la  
20   tendance des femmes, mais après en terme d’utilisation? j’pense pas que ce soit au  
21   niveau des genres plus que ce soit au niveau de l’intérêt [ou d’la personnalité]=  
22 Melanie  [le personnel ouais la personnalité quoi] 
23 Cindy  =Flo il utilise [pas quoi]= 
24 Anna  [complètement]  
25 Cindy  =moi j’utilise beaucoup plus que lui à côté de lui (0.3) pis je- dans son réseau  
26   y’a beaucoup de gens qui utilisent pas  
27 Melanie  ouais 
28 Cindy  donc j’pense que  
29 Jane  c’est l’réseau non c’est vrai c’est ta manière d’être  
30 Cindy  c’est la personnalité des gens pis leurs leurs valeurs j’en sais  
 
 
1 Melanie (24) but then don’t you think that it’s not a question of gender [but that it’s a question  
2   of personality 
3 Jane (24)  [yeah 
4 Anna (25) [yeah I think so] 
5 Cindy (24) [yeah] 
6 Jane  [yeah I think so] (     ) 
7 Melanie  that you can’t categorize people  
8 Jane  ouais 
9   (1.0) 
10 Jane  [no it’s true like we just said we all have different examples here 
11 Melanie  [maybe not for that but with other things 
12 Anna  well yeah 
13 Jane  °what are you saying? (0.2) are you comparing yourself with= 
14 Tania (24) =does he have a telephone with the internet? 
15 Anna  ((laughs)) 
16 Cindy  I don’t think he’s the best example for all of that 
17 Jane  ((laughs)) 
18 Cindy  no but I think that as far as gender there will be (0.3) maybe uh  
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19   (0.2) they might not go shopping, uh they won’t use the same things (0.1) that that 
20    women tend to, but then when it comes to use? I don’t think it’s about  
21   gender but rather about interest [or personality]= 
22 Melanie  [the personal yeah personality] 
23 Cindy  =Flo he [doesn’t use it] 
24 Anna  [totally] 
25 Cindy  =I use it much more compared to him (0.3) and I- in his network 
26    there are a lot of people who don’t use it  
27 Melanie  yeah 
28 Cindy  so I think 
29 Jane  it’s the network no it’s true it’s who you are 
30 Cindy  it’s people’s personality and their values I don’t know 
 
 
After Melanie makes her claim, other participants such as Jane (24, marketing assistant) and Cindy 
(24, social worker) back her up. After arguing about men and women’s digital media use and 
universal differences, and telling personal stories and anecdotes, the participants realize that there 
are other important factors such as “personality” (lines 2, 22, and 30), “who you are” (line 29), 
“values” (line 30), and “interest” (line 21) that account for differences between people, and that 
gender is not necessarily the only factor. The intersectional (cf. Crenshaw, 1989) characteristic of 
digital media use and differences is actually a recurrent theme in the four focus groups, as the 




From FG 2(28 year-old women) 
Trigger question: Do you think women and men use digital media the same way? 
 
Jennifer (28) j’pense que ça dépend des gens en fait 
  y’a des gars qui sont plus accros que d’autres 
 
  I think it depends on the person actually 












From FG 4(30 year-old women) 
Trigger question: Do you think women and men use digital media the same way? 
 
Pauline (30) entre chaque individu c’est différent 
   





The participants’ answers show that differences concerning digital media use are more related to 
the person and their particularities and not to their gender. In sum, my participants’ perspective 
on men and women’s digital media practices before seeing the news media images reveals their 
understanding of intersectionality and of the fact that “men” and “women” cannot be placed into 
universal categories, as in the post-structuralist view. Their discourse contradicts and challenges 
the news media’ tendency to shape their audience’s perspective around hegemonic definitions of 
masculinities. In fact, their discourse contradicts the uniformly reductionist and essentialist picture 
that the news media paints (cf. Chapter 4). Furthermore, the female speakers position themselves 
as “equal” to men as far as their digital media practices are concerned; these women’s identities as 
digital media users are not denigrated when compared to men’s, and neither are their digital 
media practices. This is particularly important to note since after viewing the news media images, 
the female participants take a different position and view themselves as inferior/disempowered. 
When I asked the participants to tell me what digital devices they owned and for what purposes 
they used them (cf. ice-breaker question in Appendix C) their answers showed that their actual 
usage was varied, from leisure-purposes to work-purposes. For example, Anna (25, physical 
therapist) from FG 1 uses her laptop to pay her bills, to buy things, and to look things up about 
treatments for work. She also owns a smartphone that she uses for WhatsApp, Instagram, Skype, 
and the Harry Potter game. Sandra (28 management consultant), from FG 2 uses her iPhone for 
WhatsApp, LinkdIn, and personal emails, and she uses her laptop to pay her bills and book plane 
tickets. Adelina (23, teacher) from FG 3 uses her smartphone to play games, communicate, use 
social media, get information, read the newspaper, and she uses her laptop for work and to watch 
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movies. Finally, Ines (30, social worker) from FG 4 owns a smartphone that she uses for social 
media, a computer that she uses mostly to pay her bills, and a smartwatch for sports. All in all, the 
young women’s use of digital media varies widely and is certainly not limited to “laughing alone 
with a smartphone” (cf. Chapter 4).   
 
Theme 2: (Dis)empowering women through (dis)association  
Despite the fact that the women in my focus groups favorably compared their digital media use 
with that of men’s, after viewing the news media images depicting women’s digital media 
practices, my participants discursively positioned themselves as powerless and inferior. They did so 
by (dis)associating themselves from the news media’s visualized gender stereotypes and received 
notions of what a woman (using digital media) is/should be like. The women’s (dis)associating 
happened as they tried to negotiate and challenge hegemonic masculinity. In order to demonstrate 
the discourse of (dis)association at work, I explore the various rhetorical tactics the young women 
employ, such as stancetaking, shifting of personal pronouns, and the notion of “enregistered voice” 
(Agha, 2005).  
 The first rhetorical tactic I explore concerns the ways in which the young female 
participants use stances to discuss the images portraying women using digital media as 
exaggerated, staged, and cliché, and as such as unnatural and unrelatable, which I argue is a 
means of disassociating from the images. Extract 5.6 below came immediately after I showed the 
participants images portraying women and girls with digital devices (cf. question 6 in Appendix C). 











From FG 1 (24-25 year-old women) 
Trigger question: What are these women doing? How are they represented? 
 
1 Melanie (24) Oh mais les clichés 
2 Anna (25)  ((laughs)) 
3 Melanie  tu pleures tu fais la cretchanne 
4 Anna  en même temps tu vois un mec qui qui (    ) ça fait (0.2) [ah! elle m’a écrit! 
5 Jane (24) [la dernière on a fait la même chose 
6 Tania (24) hein? 
7 Jane  en bas t’as vu on a fait la même chose 
8 Tania  ah oui on a fait la même photo 
9 Jane  avec le chapeau aussi 
10 Tania  mais on était pas toute seule 
11 Jane  ((laughs)) 
12 Tania  on était deux 
13 Cindy (24) t’as t’as pour comparer le le type de photos pour les hommes qui ai mises 
14 Moderator oui pour la prochai- ouais la prochaine question ouais 
15 Tania  va pas trop vite (1.0) brûle pas les étapes 
16 Anna  mais c’est juste c’est une bonne question 
17 Tania  ((laughs)) 
18 Moderator alors qu’est-ce qu’elles font ‘fin elles font quoi ces ces femmes là 
19 Tania  elles font les idiotes 
20 Someone ((laughs)) 
21 Jane  c’est pas forcément les idiotes mais c’est l’cliché du selfie moi j’trouve=  
22 Tania  =non mais y’a pas que le selfie si tu r’gardes [la photo] 
23 Melanie       [celle qui pleurniche] 
24   (2.5) 
25 Tania  le groupe de filles avec les emoticônes au d’ssus d’la tête euh 
26 Anna  ah non ça c’est too much 
27   (1.0) 
28 Jane  ↑ bon surtout ↓ moi j’trouve c’est euh 
29 Tania  elles sont couchées par terre en plus? 
30 Jane  c’est surjoué en tout cas 
31 Tania  oui 
32 Jane  j’sais pas si les mecs c’est pareil 
33 Anna  de toute façon 
34 Tania  moi j’ai jamais pleuré comme ça d’ma- personnellement [mais, avec un mouchoir 
35    sous l’œil] 
36 Jane  [oui et pis tu] 
37 Cindy  après y’a un côté j’sais pas mais (0.5) la femme c’est plus à l’image de c’qui est plus  
38   émotif ou plus euh (0.2) [j’sais pas (     ) comme ça= 
39 Anna  [exubérant 
40 Cindy   =oui mais pas qu’au sens négatif alors voilà oui peut-être que si on veut voir le 
41    négatif on l’voit mais l’côté vivant l’côté euh euh les hommes on pourrait voir pareil 
42    finalement sauf qu’un gars en colère mais, j’sais pas après au niveau euh (0.5) moi ça  
43   me choque pas plus que ça parce- c’est normal qu’une pub (0.4) ou une photo pour  
44   être accrocheuse elle doit exagérer [si c’est 
45 Jane  [ouais 
46 Cindy  on n’aime pas avoir tout le temps des photos (0.3) euh qui représentent que le naturel  




1 Melanie (24) oh the clichés 
2 Anna (25) ((laughs)) 
3 Melanie   you whine you act ditzy 
4 Anna  and you can see a guy who who (    ) it looks like (0.2) [ah! She texted me! 
5 Jane (24)  [the last one we did the same thing  
6 Tania (24) uh? 
7 Jane  on the bottom did you see we did the same thing 
8 Tania  oh yeah we took the same picture 
9 Jane  with the hat as well 
10 Tania  but we were not alone 
11 Jane  ((laughs)) 
12 Tania  there were two of us 
13 Cindy (24) do you do you have the type of photos of men to compare 
14 Moderator yes for the next for the next question yeah 
15 Tania  don’t go too fast (1.0) don’t jump the gun 
16 Anna  but you’re right it’s a good question 
17 Tania  ((laughs)) 
18 Moderator so what are they doing well what are these women doing? 
19 Tania  they are acting stupid  
20 Someone  ((laughs)) 
21 Jane  they don’t necessarily look stupid but it’s more about selfie stereotypes I think= 
22 Tania  =no but it’s not only about the selfie if you look at [the picture] 
23 Melanie                   [the one who’s whining] 
24   (2.5) 
25 Tania  the group of girls with the emoticons on top of their heads uh 
26 Anna  oh no this is too much 
27   (1.0) 
28 Jane  ↑ well mostly ↓ I think this is uh 
29 Tania  they are also laying on the floor? 
30 Jane  it’s overacted in any case  
31 Tania  yes 
32 Jane  I don’t know if it’s the same with guys 
33 Anna  anyway 
34 Tania  I’ve never cried like that in my- personally [but, with 
35   a tissue under the eye] 
36 Jane  [and and you] 
37 Cindy  but then there’s a side of things I don’t know but (0.5) women are more associated with what’s more  
38   emotional or more uh (0.2) [I don’t know (    ) like that= 
39 Anna  [cheerful 
40 Cindy  =yes but not only from a negative perspective so yes maybe if you want to see what’s negative you can  
41   see it but the lively side uh uh with men you could see the same thing except with an angry man, 
42    I don’t know then when it comes to uh (0.5) for me I don’t find it  
43   shocking because I find it normal that an ad or a  
44   photo in order to be attractive it needs to exaggerate [if it’s 
45 Jane  [yeah 
46 Cindy  you don’t always want to see photos (0.3) um that represent the real  
47   because then 
 
 
Extract 5.6 demonstrates how the participants’ stancetaking is indexical of higher-order social 
meanings; in this case, it shows their disassociation from the news media images. In their 
discourse, the young women evaluate news media images as exaggerated and thus unrelatable; 
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in doing so, they position themselves in a particular way with regards to the object of discussion 
and the other speakers. When Jane (24, marketing assistant) says that the images are surjoué 
“overacted” (line 30) she positions herself subjectively (through the use of the “double” first 
person pronoun moi je) via an evaluative stance (i.e. surjoué “overacted”) and an epistemic stance 
(i.e. je pense “I think”). Here, the epistemic stance constructed with the mental predicate pense 
(“think”) serves to show a certain commitment and to strengthen the argument, especially with 
the words surtout “mostly” and en tout cas “in any case” which strongly support Jane’s statement. 
Jane thus strongly implies that the images are exaggerated and not representative of who 
women really are and of their digital media use. In other words, she is saying that these images 
are not representative of reality, and as such she creates a distance between herself and the 
images and disassociates with them.  
 Moreover, when Tania (24, beautician) claims “I’ve never cried like that” (line 34), she 
takes an epistemic categorical/extreme position through the use of “never” which emphasizes a 
clear separation between the woman depicted in the image and herself. In the same vein, Tania 
rejects common associations between women and extreme feelings and emotions and positions 
herself in the margins of such universal and essentialist beliefs. In other words, Tania rejects the 
essentialist view which enacts “an understanding of gender differences as innate and rooted in 
biological and psychological underpinnings” (Marwick, 2014, p.63). Here, Tania challenges and 
renegotiates news media discourse which shows women and girls that it is normal for them to 
use digital media while being exaggeratedly expressive and emotional, because these are 
supposedly inherent female characteristics. She does so while disassociating herself from the 
images and implying that crying is not an inherent female feature.  
 The exaggerated quality of the images is further discussed on line 29, when Tania says 
“they are laying on the floor to top that off”, implying that as if being stereotypically and 
exaggeratedly portrayed was not enough, these women had to be depicted laying on the floor in 
ridiculous, disempowering, and submissive positions. Tania’s observation is a reminder that little 
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has changed with regards to the way women pose in photographs. Indeed, more than forty years 
ago, Goffman (1979) explored women’s poses in advertisement and noticed “the ritualization of 
subordination” through their unnatural poses, which is also something Bell and Milic (2002, 
p.205) argued later in their study when they remarked that women were more often depicted 
“in spatially lower positions or recumbent on floors [emphasis mine] or bed”. Moreover, the 
same idea of exaggeration is demonstrated on line 26 when Anna (25, physical therapist) states 
ah non ça c’est too much. The fact that she uses the English words too much in her French evaluation 
is revealing. This particular use of English does not fill a gap and is thus “unnecessary” in that 
she could well have used the French equivalent “trop” in order to convey her thoughts. In fact, 
in FG 3, Julie (22, commercial employee) describes the ways in which women are depicted and 
claims: ouais c’est trop extrême pour les femmes j’trouve (yeah it’s too extreme for women I think), which 
shows that it is possible to convey the same meaning in French. This particular use of English is 
an instance of “core-borrowing” (cf. Myers-Scotton, 2006) where speakers resort to a loanword 
despite the fact that the word already exists in their language. Even though the use of too much in 
this case seems to be unnecessary, the use of English adds a stylistic function of precision to the 
statement (Galinsky, 1967). Anna’s use of ah non in order to show rejection and disagreement 
combined with too much clearly creates a distance between the visual representations and herself. 
All in all, the women’s evaluative and epistemic stances clearly demonstrate how the 
participants disassociate with the images.  
 In contrast, Cindy (24, social worker) is the only participant who does not completely 
agree with her friends. In terms of epistemic stance, she takes the role of the less knowledgable 
one, whereas the others take the role of the more knowledgable. For instance, Cindy says “I 
don’t know” three times (lines 37, 38, and 42), which is a way for her to distance herself from 
her opinion and position herself as less serious, unsure, and powerless in order to “save her face” 
(Brown & Levinson, 1987; Goffman, 1955) and not offend the others. Cindy’s uncertainty is 
further evidenced on line 40 when she says “yes but”, presenting herself as not totally against the 
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others’ opinion. Because Cindy is the only one with a different opinion, her epistemic stance 
demonstrates her wish to be accepted by the others while detaching herself from her belief. 
Cindy’s disagreement with her friends concerns her reaction to the common association 
between women and exaggerated expressions. Although she agrees that the images are 
exaggerated, the visual representations do not shock her. Indeed, she claims: “I don’t find it 
shocking because I find it normal that an ad or a photo in order to be attractive it needs to 
exaggerate (…) you don’t always want to see photos, um, that represent the real” (lines 42-47). 
By saying this, Cindy views the images as commodities and not as representations of reality; 
such images need to attract viewers/readers and sell. Therefore, she does not evaluate the 
images based on a truth scale (cf. Machin, 2007). In fact, here we see intertextuality (cf. Bakhtin, 
1981; Kristeva, 1980) at work, and how Cindy’s interpretation of the visual text is shaped by a 
neoliberal discourse. The interconnection between different texts shapes her understanding of 
the images, which is different from her friends’ understanding. Cindy also shows awareness of 
the politics that govern these types of images (e.g. ads, news media images); she is aware that 
exaggeration is needed in order to sell (lines 43-44), which influences her unsurprised reaction. 
While Cindy’s friends discursively position women using digital media as powerless in the news 
media’s images, Cindy focuses on the positive aspect of depicting women as “lively” (line 41) 
and thus positions them as more powerful, following a post-feminist discourse (Lazar, 2014) that 
celebrates women’s empowerment and liveliness. In any case, it is the essentialist characteristic 
commonly associated with women (emotional and expressive) that are criticized by most of the 
participants but praised by Cindy. Most of the participants disassociate from the images that are 
“too much”, exaggerated, stereotypical, and which position women as powerless and ridiculous. 
They seem to be affected and bothered by the ways in which women using digital devices are 
ridiculed in the news media’s depictions, and such a reaction is also evidenced in other focus 
groups. For instance, Jennifer (28, HR assistant) from FG 2 claims ça m’énerve “it annoys me” 
after seeing the ways in which women are depicted, and Janice (30 graphic designer) from FG 4 
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says c’est un peu frustrant “it’s a little frustrating”. On the other hand, Cindy associates with these 
news media’s visual representations and focuses on the positive emotions displayed; she 
nonetheless distances herself from her opinion in order to save face. Cindy is not so much 
bothered by the ways in which women are depicted using digital media because her perspective 
is different and shows the intertextualization of other discourses such as post-feminism and 
neoliberalism. Cindy knows that images do not necessarily represent reality, which is why the 
representations do not bother her. However, across the four focus groups – and as Extract 5.5 
demonstrates – young female participants tend to discursively challenge gender ideologies and 
disassociate (i.e. distance, detach, disconnect) with the news media’s images while using evaluative 
stances of exaggeration and positioning themselves as knowledgeable. Still, as Extract 5.6 
displays, visual texts are subject to multiple and subjective interpretations that show how social 
meanings compete and are negotiated, and how participants position themselves differently, at 
times as powerful, and at other times as powerless.  
 The next rhetorical tactics that emphasize the participants’ distancing with the images is 
how the speakers position themselves through their use of personal pronouns and enregistered voices 
(Agha, 2005). I contend that the speakers’ shifting between pronouns and their switching between 
different social voices are forms of stancetaking towards disassociation. Here, I do not focus on one 
longer specific extract, but I comment on multiple short descriptive extracts which have been 
removed from their surrounding textual context. All the extracts that are listed below come from 
the four focus groups and are descriptions of the images representing women and digital devices. 
The translations I provide in English are here for comprehensibility but cannot always capture the 






Extract 5.7  
 
From FG 1 (24-25 year-old women) 
Trigger question: What are these women doing? How are they represented? 
 
Melanie (24) oh les clichés  
  tu pleures tu fais la cretchane 
 
  oh the clichés  





From FG 2 (28 year-old women) 
Trigger question: What are these men doing? How are they represented? 
 
Tiffany (28) en fait nous on passe pour des bobettes 
 
  in fact we look like airheads  
   
Extract 5.9  
 
From FG 3 (18-23 year-old women) 
Trigger question: What are these women doing? How are they represented? 
 
Veronica (19) la pleurnicheuse, la olé olé 
 
  the whimpering, the funky 
 
Extract 5.10  
 
From FG 3 (18-23 year-old women) 
Trigger question: What are these men doing? How are they represented? 
 
Veronica (19) là il est naturel il est il est content nous on s’dit tant mieux il a  un bon un bon coup d’fil et pis  
  c’est tout, tandis que la nana elle est obligée de faire (elle change sa voix et imite une fille   
  ‘stupide’ rigoler) comme ça 
 
  here he looks natural he’s he’s happy and we’re like good for him he just had a nice phone call and that’s it,  




From FG 4 (30 year-old women) 
Trigger question: What are these men doing? How are they represented? 
 
Pauline (30)  ouais eux ça leur donne un ptit air intelligent et pis euh, concentré pis nous ça donne, ça   
  nous donne un ptit air toc et 
 
  yeah for them it gives them a smart look and uh, focused and for us it give, it gives us a    
  cuckoo/wacky look and 
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There is a tendency across the four focus groups to not only describe the women portrayed in the 
images negatively, but also to describe them using colloquialisms (underlined in the extracts) and 
words that come from the old “franco-provençal” language spoken in the canton of Valais, which 
is popularly referred to as “patois” (in bold in the extracts). [23] The extracts above exemplify 
what Agha (2005, p.39) calls enregistered voices, “the class of social voices linked to registers”. When 
the female participants take up these social voices to describe the women portrayed in the images, 
they emphasize their belonging to a social group. These forms of stancetaking are acts of identity, 
and the choice to shift to patois is meaningful (see Labov, 1966 and Bell 1984 for the relevance of 
style shifting). Using the examples above, I demonstrate how the participants’ speech (with a 
special focus on style shifting and pronoun shifiting) shows different degrees of identification with 
the images.  
 In extract 5.7, Melanie (24, insurance agent) diassociates herself from the women portrayed 
in the images by using a derogatory patois word and using the impersonal tu “you” to support her 
argument. Melanie is clearly annoyed by the clichéd representation of women as being either very 
emotional or acting dumb. She says: “oh the clichés”, “you whine you act ditzy”. Here, I am 
especially interested in her use of the patois word cretchane, which originated from the word 
“crétin” (stupid) (see Crétin, 1924). Melanie switches to patois in her statement, and as such, she 
positions herself, her audience, and the object of discussion through this particular social voice. 
More precisely, her use of the word cretchane – a word in patois that only other people from the 
canton of Valais would know – is a way for her to connect with her audience and for her audience 
to identify with her and her argument. Moreover, the use of the word cretchane bestows an insulting 
and inferior status upon the women in the images. However, through her use of the impersonal 
second-person pronoun tu “you”, this act of identity is not only applicable to the women in the 
images, but is universalized and generalized to her audience and to any woman. Here, the personal 
pronoun tu is not a deictic and does not refer to anyone in particular. In fact, research  (e.g. 
Kitagawa and Lehrer, 1990; Laberge and Sankoff, 1979; Myers and Lamprapoulou, 2012) has 
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shown that the use of the impersonal second person pronoun (e.g. in French and in English) can be 
used to make a general statement and present a fact as a shared perception among the audience. 
In this particular case, Melanie’s use of the impersonal pronoun is a sort of epistemic stance that 
she uses to support her argument and include her audience. As such, Melanie positions the women 
in the images as well as any other woman (including herself and her female addressees) as 
powerless and victimized, through her use of the patois word cretchane and her use of the 
impersonal pronoun tu.  
 The powerlessness of the women portrayed is also revealed when Melanie says “you act 
[my emphasis] ditzy” and not “you are [my emphahsis] ditzy”. This shows that according to her, 
what is cliché is not the idea that women are dumb, but the idea that women act ditzy/dumb. Being 
ditzy is not an essential characteristic of women, as the news media’s images make it seem (cf. 
Chapter 4). The people who took the photos, staged them, and edited them have the power to 
shape meaning the way they want. In turn, the ones who are powerless are the women depicted, 
and Melanie shows it through her word cretchane, which confers on the women (any woman) an 
inferior status. Therefore, Melanie disidentifies with the images through her use of an offensive 
word to characterize the women depicted, but at the same time she identifies with them through 
her general and inclusive use of tu. This shows the complex and ambiguous process of 
disassociation the female participants experience, and how they challenge and renegotiate their 
gendered identities.  
 Similarly, in Extract 5.8, Tiffany (28, management consultant) employs the patois word 
bobette – which is the feminine form of bobet, a simpleton or airhead (see Bobet, 1924) – and 
through her use of the personal pronoun on (used here like “we”), she directly includes herself, her 
addressees and all women in her description of what women using digital media look like. By 
saying that women portrayed look like simpletons, Tiffany positions herself and her audience 
(through the use of on) as victimized and powerless. Furthermore, by claiming on passe pour, which 
literally means “we pass for”, she implies that they, as women, are made to look as if they are 
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stupid, when in reality they are not. If someone passe pour an airhead, it means that s/he does not 
actually possess that quality. Likewise, Pauline (30, makeup artist) in Extract 5.11 uses the personal 
pronoun nous “we” to include herself and her female addressees in her description of women who 
have a wacky look, and as in Extract 5.7, she does not use the verb “to be” to characterize the 
women depicted and themselves but rather says “it gives us a wacky look”. In other words, the way 
women are visually represented makes them (and every woman) look wacky; thus, women are 
passive objects denigrated by their portrayal. In both Extracts 5.8 and 5.11, it is the “powerful” 
people in the (stock) photo industry and news media industry who shape and create this particular 
meaning and gives women such a reductionist, powerless, and inferior identity. Tiffany and 
Pauline merely put words to these processes and remind us that the way women are visually 
depicted in images representing women and digital media is not essentialist but rather discursively 
produced (cf. Butler, 1990; Marwick, 2014). Although the participants imply that such 
representations are social constructions, they include themselves in their own negative descriptions 
through their use of on and nous which shows that they directly identify with the women depicted 
while positioning themselves and their friends as powerless and victimized.  
 Unlike the identification and inclusion process that results from the use of tu, on, and nous as 
detailed above, Veronica (19, student) (in Extract 5.9 and 5.10) is the one who disidentifies the 
most with the images. In Extract 5.9, Veronica does not use any personal pronoun nor any verb; 
she uses only the feminine definite article la and the colloquial nouns pleurnicheuse “whiner” and olé 
olé “careless/unserious”. Here, Veronica merely evaluates each image and individualizes them 
instead of universalizing them by including all women. After seeing the images portraying men, 
Veronica (in Extract 5.10) mimics a “dumb girl” laugh for comedic effect. Through paralinguistic 
cues (i.e. fake high-pitched laugh), she creates a sort of “alignment with voices indexed by speech 
and thus with social types of persons, real or imagined, whose voices [she] take[s] them to be” 
(Agha, 2005, p.38). In fact, Veronica is not making fun of “dumb girls” or the way dumb girls 
would laugh; rather, her “enregistered voice” is a way for her to condemn the way women using 
	 189	
digital media are visually depicted. She says “whereas the chick is obliged to do (hahaha) like that” 
(tandis que la nana elle est obligée de faire (hahaha) comme ça). In both French and English, the use of 
“obliged” (obligé) is quite strong; here Veronica implies that the woman portrayed does not have a 
choice, she is forced to act the way she is, in a stupid way. This idea of “being forced to” is similar 
to what I revealed above regarding the passivity of women who “pass for”; it stresses the fact that 
women “undergo” instead of acting. However, Veronica does not necessarily include all women in 
her comment; her use of “she” is directed to the woman depicted in the image. Therefore, she 
takes a different position from the other participants and distances herself further from the images. 
She does not include herself in the description of women as powerless. She takes a more powerful 
position by distancing herself; this is a way for her to say “this is not me, this is not us”.  
 In this section on discourse of (dis)association, I have shown how the participants 
discursively (dis)associate with the images, positioning themselves and the women in the images at 
times as powerless, and at other times as powerful (e.g. Cindy’s comments about “lively” women), 
and showing different degrees of identification with the images. Importantly, although the 
participants unconsciously position themselves as powerless as women, in doing so they also 
condemn the fact that women are denigrated by reductionist portrayals and thus challenge the 
news media discourse. The female speakers thus embody two competing identities; they are 
powerless as digital media users, and powerful as women who condemn and challenge the status 
quo and who demonstrate critical awareness. 
 
Theme 3: Empowering men  
Whether the staged and exaggerated quality of the images upsets the participants or not, the 
women across the four focus groups mostly agree on the fact that the images of women are 
“cliché”. However, as I will show, they do not describe the images of men in the same way. As we 
observed in Extract 5.6 above, the word cliché comes up twice in the focus group (lines 1 and 21) –
the word cliché also appears in the other focus groups when the participants first see the portrayal 
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of women with digital devices. In Extract 5.6 above, everything seems to be cliché in these 
portrayals of women using digital media: the woman taking a selfie (line 21), the woman crying 
(line 34), and the use of emojis (line 25). These are stereotypes about female digital media users 
that the participants imply are untrue through their use of the word cliché. The participants 
criticize the stereotypical portrayal of women and girls in general, and specifically the stereotypical 
portrayal of women and girls’ digital media practices. In both cases, women and girls are made to 
look unserious and ridiculous. The use of the word cliché to describe the news media’s images of 
women and girls using digital media is particularly revealing when one considers the participants’ 
reaction to the images portraying men using digital media. Indeed, in none of the focus groups did 
the female participants describe the visual representations of men with digital devices as 
“stereotypical”, “cliché” or “exaggerated”, although the images I showed them were quite 
stereotypical in their emphasis on men’s “professional” identities. Such a stereotypical connection 
between work/public sphere and men is not surprising and has been studied elsewhere (e.g. Lazar, 
2000). Although the participants do not use the words “stereotype” (stereotype) or “cliché” (cliché) 
when describing images of men, they nonetheless imply that the images are through their 
emphasis of work-related characteristics. For instance, right before I was about to show the 
participants the images of men and digital devices, Jennifer (28, HR assistant) from FG 2 said:  
 
Extract 5.12 
Jennifer (28)  je vois déjà l’truc genre le gars en costard sur son téléphone 
   I can already imagine the thing, like, a guy in a suit on his phone 
 
Then, when I showed the women of the four focus groups the images, they also indirectly 
categorized men in stereotypical ways, while omitting and ignoring the words “cliché” or 
“stereotype”. This erasure (Irvine and Gal, 2000) of such words underscores the naturalization of 





From FG 1 (24-25 year-old women) 
Trigger question: What are these men doing? How are they represented? 
 
Tania (24)  ouais bon d’accord c’est les hommes [intelligents] 
Melanie (24)        [pire sérieux] pire professionnel 
 
Tania (24)  yeah right okay it’s [intelligent] men 





From FG 2 (28 year-old women) 
Trigger question: What are these men doing? How are they represented? 
 
Sophie (28)  genre là c’est professionnel professionnel professionnel et le     
   premier il est ptêtre sur skype 
 
Sophie (28)  like here it’s professional, professional, professional and the first one 




From FG 4 (30 year-old women) 
Trigger question: What are these men doing? How are they represented? 
 
Aline (30)      ouais ça fait plus sérieux quand même (0.2) ça fait plus travail, technique euh,   
   moins d’émotions (0.3) y’a pas d’émoticônes 
Janice (30)  technologie 
 
 
Aline (30)  yeah it looks more serious (0.2) it’s more work, technical uh, 
   less emotions (0.3) there’s no emoticons 
Janice (30)  technology 
 
 
The descriptive adjectives and nouns (e.g. “suit” in Extract 5.12, “intelligent” in Extract 5.13, 
“professional” in Extract 5.14, “technical” and “technology” in Extract 5.15) used to evaluate the 
news media images emphasize the outdated but prevalent perception that men are more 
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professional than women, that they are indeed the breadwinners of their families whereas women 
belong to the private sphere with housework and children. Consequently, it is (working) men who 
exemplify qualities such as seriousness and intelligence as the extracts above demonstrate. 
Although we have witnessed major advances in regards to women’s opportunities to pursue a 
career, they are still marginalized in certain fields such as sciences and IT, and discriminated 
against in the workplace (see Lazar 2014; Marwick, 2018). The evaluative stances that Tania (24, 
beautician) and Melanie (25, insurance agent) in Extract 5.13 and Sophie (28, university assistant) 
in Extract 5.14 offer in their descriptions of the news media’s images are imbued with unconscious 
gender ideologies; it seems altogether natural – although annoying as the cynical “yeah right okay” 
in Extract 5.13 suggests – for these women to see images of serious and professional men, which is 
perhaps why they do not describe the images as stereotypical. As a result, the female speakers 
above take up and reproduce the news media’s patriarchal discourse, which calls to mind 
Derrida’s (1978) philosophy of ‘phallocentrism’, where binary oppositions such as men/women 
and superior/inferior are naturalized. More specifically, it is through the erasure of a linguistic 
feature that gender ideologies materialize in discourse. And as Lazar (2014, p.186) suggests, when 
gender ideologies are naturalized, it is hard to see relations of power at work. However, on closer 
inspection, one notices that the participants accept the news media’s gender ideologies about men 
and digital media by not describing them as stereotypical; as a consequence, they recreate relations 
of power where the masculine is dominant and empowered, and thus identify themselves as 
powerless/disempowered as women.  
 Next, through the participants’ descriptions of men and women’s digital media practices in 
the news media’s images, the participants recreate unequal relations of power between men and 
women in another way. The participants imply that women use digital media for unimportant or 
superficial matters, as the participants of FG 2 do in the following Extract 5.16 where I asked them 
if the “untypical” image of the man “flipping the script” (cf. Aiello & Woodhouse, 2016) was 










Extract 5.16   
From FG 2 (28 year-old women) 
Trigger question: What are these men doing? How are they represented? 
 
1 Jennifer (28) non pas du tout pas du tout 
2 Tiffany (28) pis là ça a l’air naturel alors que= 
3 Jennifer  ouais 
4 Tiffany  =avant c’était très [exagéré] 
5 Sophie (28)   [exaggéré ouais] 
6 Sophie  là euh disons qu’il communique (1.0) on sait [pas parce qu’il a pas parlé depuis trois  
7   mois à un pote] 
8 Jennifer  [il a un téléphone là c’est la vraie utilisation du téléphone] 
9 Sophie  ouais, alors que nous on communique pour euh pour mettre des cœurs pis se raconter  
10   des peines de cœur ‘fin voilà en fait (0.3) donc euh lui il raconte un truc sérieux ‘fin  
11   (0.2) important ou j’en sais rien (1.2) même pas il parle à un ami qu’il a pas vu  
12   pendant longtemps mais nous on se on s’apitoie sur notre sort 
13 Jennifer  ouais c’est ça  
14 Sophie  on est juste ridicules tu vois 
15 Jennifer  ouais 
16 Sophie  ben ouais 
17 Jennifer  c’est nul 
18   (2.0) 
19 Sophie  ça t’énerve 
20 Jennifer  ouais ça m’énerve 
21 Sandra (28) ah ouais 
22 Jennifer  non mais et pis que les médias ils arrivent encore à faire ça ‘fin 
23 Everyone mmh 




1 Jennifer (28) no not at all not at all 
2 Tiffany (28) and here it looks natural whereas= 
3 Jennifer  yeah 
4 Tiffany  =before it was very much [exaggerated] 
5 Sophie (28)   [exaggerated yeah]  
6 Sophie  here let’s say he’s communicating (1.0) we don’t know [because he hasn’t talked to a  
7   friend in 3 months] 
8 Jennifer  [he has a phone there it’s the real use of a phone] 
9 Sophie  yeah whereas us we communicate for uh to add hearts and tell each other  
10   heartbreaks there you go (0.3) okay so he’s saying something serious  
11   (0.2) important or I don’t know (1.2) not even he’s talking to a friend he hasn’t seen  
12   in a while whereas us we feel sorry for ourselves  
13 Jennifer  yeah right yeah 
14 Sophie  we just look ridiculous 
15 Jennifer  yeah 
16 Sophie  yeah right 
17 Jennifer  it sucks 
18   (2.0) 
19 Sophie  it’s annoying you 
20 Jennifer  yeah it annoys me 
21 Sandra (28) ah yeah 
22 Jennifer  no but and the fact that the media can do that  
23 Everyone  mmmm 




Here again, Tiffany (28, management consultant) (line 2) emphasizes the perceived dichotomy 
between men’s and women’s use of digital media as natural and real for men, and exaggerated and 
fake for women. But more importantly, Jennifer (28, HR assistant) (line 8) highlights the 
“affordances” (Gibson, 1986) of digital media when she claims that the man’s use of the phone is 
“the real [my emphasis] use of the phone”. The concept of “affordance” is tightly connected to 
media ideologies (Gershon, 2010) as it concerns the influence of the “materiality” of a technology 
and what that technology allows and does not allow. Here, Jennifer focuses on one function that 
the smartphone enables: to make phone calls. Thus, she sees the smartphone as a telephone first, 
which is why she considers the phone call the “real” use of a (smart)phone. Consequently, there is 
a contrast that is implied between the man’s use of the phone (i.e. the phone call, which is the 
“real” use), and women’s use of their phones in the news media’s images where the focus is on 
other affordances (e.g. reading/writing texts, taking selfies). Because the women represented in the 
images are using their smartphones while showing exaggerated emotions and looking ridiculous, it 
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is implied through Jennifer’s statement that women are doing something wrong or unexpected, 
whereas men are doing the right thing. Moreover, by claiming that the image portrays the “real” 
use of a phone, Jennifer implies that such a use is “better” than other uses (i.e. women’s uses). This 
value judgment/assumption is connected to another assumption: the belief that there actually 
exists such a thing as a better/worse or real/unreal use of a (smart)phone. Because she assumes 
that the man’s use of the phone is the “real” use – as opposed to an unreal use by a woman – she 
discursively empowers male digital media users, and disempowers female digital media users, 
because “in virtually all cultures whatever is defined as manly, is more highly valued than 
whatever is thought of as womanly” (Harding, 1986, p. 18). Jennifer also presents an 
understanding of the mobile phone/smartphone that reinforces traditional gender roles (Lemish & 
Cohen, 2005), where men use their phone for instrumental/public reasons, and women for 
emotional/personal reasons. The dichotomy between instrumental/public and 
emotional/personal is then transposed onto a similar dichotomous relationship between 
real/better and unreal/bad, which is what Jennifer implies. Sophie (28, university assistant) 
actually takes Jennifer’s argument a step further and illustrates women’s emotional (i.e. incorrect) 
use of technology with an example on line 9, when she says “whereas us we communicate to uh to 
put hearts everywhere and tell each other heartbreaks”. Such usage is ridiculous (see line 14) and 
superfluous and contrasts with men’s “real” and instrumental use. As such, the participants’ media 
and gender ideologies reflect Tannen’s (1990) understanding of men and women’s communicative 
styles; women use “rapport-talk” (i.e. they seek community, intimacy, relationships) while men use 
“report-talk” (i.e. they seek action, negotiation, status). Although Tannen (1990) does not argue 
that one style is better than the other, the participants here imply that men’s use of technology is 
better because they are not portrayed in ridiculous and exaggerated ways. Women, on the 
contrary, “tell each other hearthbreaks” (line 10) and “feel sorry for themselves” (line 12). 
Therefore, men are discursively empowered while women – including the participants who use the 
pronouns on and nous (i.e. “we”) on lines 9, 12, and 14 – are discursively rendered more powerless. 
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Although they identify with the images of women using digital media and are directly affected by 
them, they condemn them with comments such as “it sucks” (line 17), “it annoys me” (line 20), and 
“it’s 2018 dammit” (line 24). The female speakers thus reveal two competing identities; they are 
powerless as digital media users, yet powerful as women who condemn the status quo through 
their critical awareness.  
 The following Extract 5.17 also took place after I asked the participants if the “atypical” 
image of the man using his phone and smiling was similar to the women’s images. When I showed 
the participants of FG 1 the “atypical” image, they described the man’s use of technology in such a 
way that highlights hegemonic definition of masculinity.  
 
Extract 5.17  
From FG 1 
Trigger question: What are these men doing? How are they represented? 
 
1 Tania (24) j’pense que ça représente pas la même chose c’est vrai que ça fait beaucoup plus 
2    professionnel ca fait vraiment le gars qui va monter sa start up (0.2) il vend ses  
3   poubelles écologiques et pis euh: voilà il est (0.2) en haut [ça fait un peu euh] 
4 Melanie (24) [mais tu restes] tu restes quand même dans l’cliché de la société qu’c’est l’homme qui  
5   travaille [et c’est la femme qui s’amuse 
6 Tania  et [c’est la femme qui s’amuse ouais 
7 Melanie  ou alors qui est 
8 Anna (25) là dans ces photos [après moi] 
9 Melanie  [après oui] 
10 Anna  moi j’sortirais plus, on voit qu’le, c’est plutôt le 
11 Tania  les publicitaires sont des hommes 
12 Anna  (     ) entre guillemets nous les femmes ont est plus émotives (2.0) on reste plus dans 
13    l’émotivité parce que tu vois l’autre il est au téléphone, [mais tu vois juste qu’il est au 
14    téléphone] 
15 Jane (24) [il pleure pas lui] 
16 Anna  [mais y’a rien qui laisse transparaître tu vois 
17 Jane  [ptêtre qu’il est en train de rompre avec l’autre t’sais 
18 Anna  ptêtre ben ouais mais c’est con mais on sait pas d’quoi il parle 
 
1 Tania  I don’t think it represents the same thing it’s true that it looks much more 
2   professional  it really looks like the guy who’s gonna create his startup (0.2) he sells his  
3   eco-friendly trah cans and that’s it he is (0.2) above it [looks like uh] 
4 Melanie  [but you stay] you still stay within society’s cliché that it’s the man who works  
5   [and it’s the woman who has fun 
6 Tania  and [it’s the woman who has fun yeah 
7 Melanie  or who is 
8 Anna  here in these pictures [then I] 
9 Melanie  [then yeah] 
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10 Anna  I’d rather say we see that it’s rather the  
11 Tania  advertisers are men 
12 Anna  (     ) us women we’re more emotional (2.0) we are more concerned with 
13    emotions because you see the other he’s on the phone, [but you can only see that he’s on 
14    the phone] 
15 Jane  [he’s not crying] 
16 Anna  [but there’s nothing that shows through 
17 Jane  [maybe he’s breaking up with the other one you know 
18 Anna  maybe yeah but it sucks but you don’t know what he’s talking about 
 
 
Here, the participants emphasize the dichotomy between men’s use of technology as active and 
work-related, and women’s use as passive and play-related. Tania’s (24, beautician) first impression 
of the image is that “it’s much more professional it’s really like the guy who’s gonna create his 
startup (.) he sells his eco-friendly trash cans and that’s it” (lines 1-3). Tania’s interpretation 
regarding the young man creating a startup and selling eco-friendly trash cans mirrors the 
discrimination currently happening in Silicon Valley and startup companies, for instance, where a 
majority of wealthy young male entrepreneurs are hired because of their race and gender 
(Marwick, 2018). In the same vein, Janice (30, graphic designer) from FG 4 expresses the same 
thought about men and women’s role with regards technology: 
 
Extract 5.18 
Janice (30) les patrons de euh, de grosses boîtes comme Google Apple tout ça c’est c’est c’est que des   
  hommes  
   
  the bosses of uh, of big companies like Google Apple all of that it’s it’s it’s only  
  men 
 
 
In these examples, the participants clearly highlight the differences between men’s use of 
technology (active, useful) and women’s use of technology (passive and useless). Moreover, in 
Extract 5.17 above, Melanie’s (24, insurance agent) critical stance towards society (lines 4-5) as 
well as Tania’s (24, beautician) claim that “advertisers are men” (line 11) demonstrate their 
awareness of gender stereotypes and of who they think perpetuates them. Therefore, one notices in 
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Extract 5.17 how the female speakers negotiate different identities in their discourse. As female 
digital media users, they are again positioned as powerless, but as individuals aware of gender 
stereotypes and of the masculine hegemony that dictates the whole process of photo taking and 
editing, they become more powerful as they challenge gender ideologies. However, although some 
of the participants show awareness of patriarchal hegemony and gender stereotypes, others still 
reproduce the same gender ideologies, especially regarding the essential characteristic of women 
being more emotional, such as Anna’s (25, physical therapist) claim on line 12: “us women we’re 
more emotional”, whereas in the image of the man she claims that “there is nothing that shows 
through” (line 16). Likewise, in FG 4, Ines (30, social worker) says “women are more expressive” 
(les femmes sont plus expressives) after seeing the images depicting women. The idea that women are 
naturally more expressive and emotional conveys an essentialist view that enacts “an 
understanding of gender differences as innate and rooted in biological and psychological 
underpinnings” (Marwick, 2014, p.63). This demonstrates that both the news media (through the 
images) and Anna and Ines themselves have been socialized to follow the “appropriate” gender 
codes that are taught from an early age. For example, boys are taught that they should not “cry 
like a girl”. Such behavior is considered unacceptable since it would go against perceived gender-
appropriate behavior. As I argued in the previous chapter, the news media shows women and girls 
that it is appropriate for them to use digital media while being exaggeratedly expressive and 
emotional, because these are supposedly inherent female characteristics, which is something that 
the female participants of the focus groups also take up, especially in FG 4 where the participants’ 
first reaction after seeing the images shows the naturalization of gender ideologies: 
 
Extract 5.19  
 
From FG 4 
Trigger question: What are these women doing? How are they represented? 
 
1 Moderator elles sont bien représentées ces femmes? Qu’est-ce que 
2 Janice (30) euh oui moi j’pense que c’est assez représentatif dans l’sens ou dans 
3   n’importe quelle euh situation de vie euh (2.0) dans n’importe quelle  
4   situation de vie t’as sou- t’as de toute manière le natel à proximité qu’ce  
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5   t’es contente t’appelles, t’es contente t’as une bonne nouvelle t’appelles  
6   quelqu’un? T’es triste t’appelles quelqu’un? 
 
1 Moderator are these women well represented? What is 
2 Janice (30) uh yes I think it’s rather well representative in the sense of in 
3   any uh life situation uh (2.0) in any  
4   life situation you of- you have your phone next to you anyway 
5   you’re happy you call, you’re happy you have a good news you call 
6   someone? You’re sad you call someone?  
 
Unlike the participants of the other focus groups who showed surprise and frustration right away, 
Janice does not think about gender and the way women are represented first. Because it is not 
surprising to see women with exaggerated expressions and emotions, she rather focuses on why 
people (not women in particular) use their phone. Therefore, her first reaction shows that she has 
internalized gender ideologies about women’s digital practices. The media shows its audience what 
women and girls’ digital media practices are/should be like, and here Janice takes up the media’s 
“preferred meaning” by not questioning it.  
 In sum, the female speakers simultaneously position themselves as powerless and powerful 
within competing discourses. Although at times they challenge and resist gender ideologies 
through their awareness of the role of patriarchal hegemony in the reproduction of gender 
stereotypes, they also reproduce certain taken-for-granted gender ideologies and take up a 
powerless position as digital media users.   
 
Discussion: (Dis)empowered “wired women” 
 
In this chapter, I explored the discursive strategies that young “wired women” use to respond to 
the news media’s gendered representations of “themselves”. More precisely, I exposed if and how 
they take up and/or challenge the news media’s ideologies about gender and digital media. I also 
argued why a feminist post-structuralist perspective is particularly useful for the purpose of my 
analysis as I examined how women position themselves vis-à-vis certain discourses as 
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simultaneously powerful and powerless. As Baxter (2003, p.10) contends, “[a] feminist post-
structuralist perspective on discourse suggests that females always adopt multiple subject positions, 
and that it is far too reductive to constitute women in general, or indeed any individual woman, 
simply as victims of male oppression”. In this chapter, I demonstrated that the young female 
participants discursively position themselves as powerful (as women) when they challenge the news 
media’s representations and show awareness of patriarchal hegemony and gender stereotypes, and 
that they simultaneously position themselves as powerless (as digital media users) through their 
language and discourse, when they empower men as digital media users, and when they identify 
with the women depicted in the images. They thus show competing identities. Although the same 
ideas circulate among age groups, each group is rather heterogeneous as women show various 
identities. Therefore, bottom-up social meanings (from the focus groups) and top-down cultural 
discourses (from the news media) are not alike and the relationship between both is rather 
complex. Like Hall’s (1997) “circuit of culture”, the relationship between both highlights a social 
constructionist view of meaning produced and created in exchanges, where meaning is constantly 
reworked and shaped through different relationships.  
 The mass media has the power to frame what is thought to be of public concern, as media 
scholars have discussed. Hall’s (1997) concept of “preferred meaning” and McCombs & Shaw’s 
(1972) notion of “agenda setting” both encapsulate the role of the media in shaping public 
opinion. Hall (1997) explores the ways in which meanings are exchanged in a “circuit of culture” 
while examining the relationship between a text’s production and reception. According to this 
approach, meaning is constantly reworked and shaped through different relationships, in a 
dialogic way. The context of the production and reception of a text are vital to its interpretation; 
yet, the role of the media in the construction of gendered meanings is essential. According to a 
social constructionist perspective, the media produces texts in certain contexts, and the audience 
decodes those texts drawing on their personal knowledge and culture. As a result, the “social 
processes involved in encoding the meanings of media texts are not the same as those involved in 
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decoding them” (Talbot, 2007, p.7). When the media uses language (sounds, gestures, images) to 
represent ideas or concepts, it creates meaning. However, a text does not have meaning in and of 
itself; meaning is “the product of negotiation between readers and texts” (Bell and Garrett, 1998, 
p. 2). Hence, the meaning of a text is not universal but depends on different factors that influence 
interpretation. Also, one needs to be aware of a text’s polysemic quality, the fact that a text carries 
more than one meaning. As Hall suggests (1997, p.228), a text does not have one true meaning, 
but several “potential” ones.  Therefore, media producers do not have all the power in creating 
the meaning of a text; when analyzing media representations, one needs to be aware of the 
complexity of the meaning-making of a text. Audiences resort to their own systems of 
representation to decode such texts. They make associations between people, objects, ideas etc. 
using a mental map and a specific language that enable them to make sense of the world (i.e. to 
represent the world) (Hall, 1997, p.17). Thus, representation is at the heart of the “circuit of 
culture”; we interpret messages by creating links between things in our head (e.g. between 
‘woman’ and ‘home’), and then we use language (images, words, etc.) to represent the concepts in 
our thoughts. Although readers/viewers of media texts give meaning to things using their systems 
of representation, “interpretation is not infinitely open” (Carter, 2012, p. 374). Media messages are 
shaped according to dominant and hegemonic ideologies in society, which direct the audience to a 
“preferred meaning” (Hall, 1997, p.228). In this way, the media exercises power in privileging one 
meaning over other possible ones, and the audience decodes this “alongside the ideological lines 
cued up in the text (and often also found in their own lives)” (Thornham et al., 2009, p.10). In this 
chapter, I have shown that the participants of the focus groups (i.e. the news media’s audience) 
take up the media’s “preferred meaning” on several occasions, showing that they have internalized 
certain ideologies such as hegemonic definitions of masculinity and have reproduced social power 
and inequality. However, they simultaneously show how, as media consumers, they can challenge 
and reject certain ideas that the media try to depict as common knowledge, ideas that often bear 
the imprint of public anxieties and “moral panic” discourses. Through the data I analyzed in this 
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chapter, I demonstrated how the participants challenge the news media’s discourse by 
disassociating themselves from the images and showing awareness of patriarchal hegemony. Their 
actual use of digital media (e.g. for work) further contradicts cultural discourses that are 
problematically reductionist.  
 While the media is a powerful tool that many see as a mirror of reality, it is important to 
note that the media does not always accurately reflect reality and people’s behavior. In this chapter, 
I gave a voice to young female users of digital media and showed that there is more to their 
relationship with digital media than what the news media conveys. Thus, these women “speaking 
back” represents a methodological contribution to the field of digital discourse studies where other 
new media scholars (e.g. Thurlow, 2007; Vickery, 2017) have noted how rarely young people are 
given a voice in public discourses. And because “women, through monopolies of words, talk, and 
media are denied identities as full speaking subjects and denied full and equal participation in 
family, community, and political life” (Rakow & Wackwitz, 2004, p.95), it is crucial to let them 
speak for themselves and listen to what they have to say in order to see the full picture, not simply 








Making sense of digital media: The everyday 




Setting the scene: From moral panic to media ideologies 
	
“Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it 
induces regular effects of power. Each society has its régime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: that is, 
the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which 
enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned, the 
techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are 
charged with saying what counts as true.” (Foucault, 1980, p.131) 
 
According to Foucault, knowledge and truth are linked to power; truth is discursively constructed 
and is “made” true in alignment with the rules of the specific socio-historical context in which it is 
presented. When discussing Foucault’s concepts of power, Hall (1997, p.50) argues that power 
relationships are not necessarily unidirectional; rather “we are all, to some degree, caught up in 
[their] circulation – oppressors and oppressed”. It is this circulation of certain meanings and 
“regimes of truth” that I would like to explore in this chapter, and how “what counts as true” 
circulates across groups and across domains. The news media, as a powerful organization, not only 
can decide “what counts as true,” through the selection and amplification of what they consider 
important and newsworthy, they can also shape public opinion. In turn, their audience can either 
accept the news media’s “truth”, or reject it. While news media discourse shapes people’s 
understanding of a variety of social concerns of which digital media use and practices are a part, 
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people do not always passively accept what they see and hear. As the “circuit of culture” (cf. Hall, 
1997) demonstrates, media texts influence their audiences, but, in turn, audiences re-influence the 
media. As such, meanings are constantly exchanged through different entities and (re)negotiated. 
The audience plays an important role in the interpretation of media messages and in the 
construction or challenging of ideologies. The media can attempt to influence viewers and readers, 
but it cannot determine how the readers/viewers will decode a text. Furthermore, even though a 
text may have a significant impact on one reader, it may not have the same impact on another; the 
audience is heterogeneous and a variety of personal and social characteristics have the potential to 
influence the way one decodes media texts. Indeed, readers and viewers select the meaning that is 
most relevant to their beliefs and social allegiances (Abel, 2012, p.404). Although they are given a 
preferred hegemonic meaning, readers have the potential to negotiate, modify and reject 
dominant views according to their own experiences, which demonstrates that a text has multiple 
meaning potentials, something I explore in this chapter. The circulation of discourses shows that 
meanings are never fixed and can change over time as a result of the socio-cultural context in 
which a text is produced. However, the power of the media in trying to fix certain (hegemonic) 
meanings is important. The fact that people’s beliefs are shaped by the media is important because 
people’s ideological systems in turn influence their practices, such as the way they use and talk 
about digital media. Thurlow (2018) proposes a framework for exploring the interplay between 
micro-level communicative practices and macro-level social processes, a perspective prominent in 
the third wave of digital communication research, which is more critical and focuses on ideologies 
alongside other socio-cultural concerns (Georgakopoulou & Spilioti, 2015). As such, the latest 
research in digital discourse studies (e.g. Thurlow & Mroczek, 2011; Georgakopoulou & Spilioti, 
2015; Thurlow, 2018) is more socially oriented and allows scholars to shed light on issues related 
to the “social meanings” of digital communication and to better understand ideologies related to 
digital communication. Examples of such research include studies on discourses of risk in the 
media, specifically those concerning young people’s digital media practices. Such scholarly work 
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(e.g. Jones & Schieffelin, 2009; Spilioti, 2015; Thurlow, 2006, 2017; Vickery, 2017) particularly 
highlights the discourse of “moral panic”, which the press employs unilaterally to frame young 
people’s digital media practices as dangerous and destructive. Indeed, when it comes to discussing 
young people’s digital skills, the press tends to take a technologically deterministic position that 
portrays young people as incompetent and vulnerable in the face of the threat that new 
technologies pose. As a result, in today’s mediasphere, it has become commonplace to read 
alarmist headlines such as “Have smartphones destroyed a generation?” (Twenge, 2017) and see 
images depicting young people’s digital media practices in negative and reductionist ways (see 
Thurlow et al., 2019). The concept of “moral panic” was first introduced in Stanley Cohen’s Folk 
devils and moral panics in 1972. In his classic work, Cohen focuses on the power of mass media in the 
construction of specific meanings and of moral panics through the labeling of “deviant” people. A 
key aspect of Cohen’s definition of moral panic was its view of the audience as passive believers of 
whatever the media says. However, scholars such as McRobbie & Thornton (1995), Crichter 
(2008), and Buckingham & Jensen (2012) have explored the limitations of (early) moral panic 
theories. For instance, they critique its monolithic perspective and problematic focus on 
hegemony, society, and the role of the state and élites in the understanding of moral panic. 
Importantly, critiques of early moral panic theories suggest taking “a more nuanced [emphasis 
added] analysis of the politics of moral panics” (Buckingham & Jensen, 2012, p.423) by 
considering the complex, diverse, and contested nature of moral panics with regards to the role of 
the media and of the audience. In order to investigate the ‘polylithic’ aspect of moral panics and 
the many voices that emerge from a moral panic analysis, scholars have suggested various 
theoretical solutions. Buckingham & Jensen (2012) propose taking into account “social 
constructivism”, a perspective that focuses less on the exaggeratedly negative and alarmist 
portrayals of social issues, and more on their “framing” by “[taking] into account the different 
ways in which problems are defined in different social and cultural settings”. Another useful 
theoretical concept proposed by Buckingham & Jensen (2012) is that of “new cultural history”, 
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which considers the importance of socio-cultural and historical factors in the understanding of 
popular debates. Although there have been many criticisms of moral panic theory, Critcher (2008, 
p.1138) notes that “Moral panic is better understood as an ideal type: a means of beginning an 
analysis, not the entire analysis in itself. And for that no better tool has yet been devised”. 
Nevertheless, Critcher suggests adding another dimension to moral panic theory by considering 
the importance of “discourse” and “risk” in the analysis of moral panics. It is thus Critcher’s (2008, 
p. 1140) understanding of moral panics “as extreme forms of risk discourses integral to the process 
of moral regulation” that I take in this chapter and this thesis. As Critcher (2008) and Buckingham 
& Jensen (2012) suggest, by taking into consideration “discourse”, one also explores debates about 
‘wider’ concerns regarding social order and social change.  
 In this chapter, I investigate one specific kind of moral panic discourse which circulates 
among the media and its audience. I examine discourses concerning media ideologies, and more 
precisely, ideologies about digital media. Below are two quotes (one from a prominent new media 
scholar, and the other from a focus group participant) that help to show the connection between 
lay and scholarly ideologies, and how “media ideologies” (Gershon, 2010c) are constructed.  
“A topic some eBook advocates dismiss as nostalgia is the physical side of reading: holding books in 
your hands, navigating with your fingers through pages, browsing through shelves of volumes and 
stumbling upon one you had forgotten about. Are we back to longing for buggies and typewriters? Or 
by going exclusively digital, would we lose some physical anchors that have been essential to the 
reading process for almost two millennia?” (Baron, 2015, xiv) 
 
“Au moins c’était un truc en papier” (Jennifer, 28, HR assistant, FG2) 
At least it was something made of paper 
 
As Thurlow (2006) has already remarked, scholarly commentary about digital language and 
communication is rather heterogeneous. Indeed, Thurlow’s account of scholarly discussions 
regarding the effects of digital communication on people’s language and relationships reveals 
diverse ideologies ranging from the very negative to the very positive. Thus, Thurlow reminds 
readers that scholars’ work bears the imprint of their ideologies. The same, of course, could be said 
about laypeople’s comments on digital media. Both of the above quotes (one from a scholar and 
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one from a layperson) make mention of a media ideology which is shaped by nostalgia for a past 
medium. Indeed, Naomi Baron (2015) and Jennifer make use of the concept of nostalgia in order to 
understand and describe people’s perceptions of different media. Specifically, it is “the longing for 
what is assumed to be lost in the continuing process of digitisation that accounts for contemporary 
media culture’s widespread romanticising and fetishising of analogue media” (Schrey, 2014, p. 28). 
Niemeyer’s (2014) collection of studies about media and nostalgia offers an excellent review of a 
contemporary trend exemplified by both Naomi Baron’s (2015) and Jennifer’s comments: the fact 
that “media do not only produce nostalgic narratives, but that they can be, in themselves, the 
creative projection spaces for nostalgia, as well as acting as the symptoms or triggers of nostalgia” 
(Niemeyer, 2014, p.11). Indeed, digital media can trigger nostalgia for past media which are no 
longer in use. In both quotes, digital media triggers nostalgia for the material structure of print 
books. Thus, these quotes illustrate how the material structure of digital media can affect people’s 
beliefs about new technology and digital practices. As Gershon (2010c) notes, media ideologies 
“focus on how people understand both the communicative possibilities and the material limitations 
of a specific channel, and how they conceive of channels in general” (p. 283), which is a crucial 
aspect of this chapter. Two aspects of media ideologies that are especially important for my 
analysis in this chapter are materiality and remediation. According to Gershon (2010c), materiality is a 
key aspect of media ideologies and one of the main features that sets language ideologies apart 
from media ideologies. Materiality is concerned with the focus on the material aspect of a specific 
medium of communication, which shapes people’s beliefs about and uses of that medium. 
Remediation is another key property in the understanding of media ideologies, and was first 
established by Bolter & Grusin (1999) who saw it as a continual relationship between older and 
newer media. People’s ideologies about older media shape their ideologies about newer media; 
therefore, remediation affects people’s beliefs about and uses of a particular medium. In this 
chapter, I also demonstrate through specific examples how both materiality and remediation 
shape people’s media ideologies.  
	 209	
 In keeping with the above theoretical background, this chapter addresses the following two 
research questions: 
1) How does news media discourse shape people’s understanding of and beliefs about digital 
media? 
2)  How do moral panics and media ideologies circulate in everyday conversation? 
Ultimately, the data which I collected from my focus group participants sheds light on the ways in 
which people negotiate meaning concerning digital media use and practices. By focusing on three 
themes, I show that the participants do not always agree on the principles that guide digital media 
use. More precisely, by arguing what constitutes (im)proper use of digital media, actual users show 




In order to examine the complex intersection between top-down cultural discourses and bottom-
up social meanings and practices, I use my focus group data (see Chapter 5 for a more detailed 
overview of the focus group data collection process). As a reminder, each focus group was 
composed of 4 to 5 participants, and lasted for about an hour. As I specified in Chapter 1, the 
questions that I asked them as “triggers” concerned the representations of women and men using 
digital media in news media imagery (cf. Chapter 4) and other more general media ideologies as 
they discussed issues related to digital addiction and children’s digital media use (cf. Chapter 3). 
For the purpose of this chapter, I only discuss their answers to questions 1 to 3, which specifically 
concern media ideologies (see the complete questionnaire in Appendix C). Also, I do not explore 
their answers from a “gender” perspective; the goal of this chapter is rather to focus on media 
ideologies.  
 My analysis largely follows the tradition of critical discourse analysis (e.g. Fairclough, 2003; 
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van Dijk, 2001; Wodak, 2004) in order to examine participants’ ideologies about digital media use 
and practices. As such, my chapter is organized around three themes that circulate across 
participants and across groups, and that show the news media’s shaping of people’s beliefs about 
digital media. The first theme concerns the participants’ acceptance of the news media’s moral 
panic discourses. The second theme concerns their negotiation of the meaning of digital media in 
relation to older media such as books or face-to-face interaction. The third theme consists of how 
they negotiate privacy and surveillance concerns. Each theme corresponds to three concerns that the 
participants expressed regarding digital media use and practices, some of which participants 
disagree on, and others where they show general agreement. Even though each concern is not 
necessarily addressed in all four of my focus groups, I selected these three concerns because they 
illustrate important discursive issues among different participants and across groups, and as such 
they reveal the participants’ diverse media ideologies. In each thematic section I support my 
argument with various extracts taken from the four focus groups.  
 
Analysis: Moral panics in everyday talk 
	
Theme 1: Taking up the news media’s “moral panic” discourse 
In this first section, I would like to explore the ways in which the participants “speak back” to news 
media discourse about children’s digital media use and practices since some of the questions asked 
in my focus groups specifically concerned children’s use of digital media and the news media’s 
visual and linguistic representations of this demographic (for a more detailed explanation of why I 
focused on “children” in this thesis, see Chapter 3). Therefore, this chapter serves as a means to 
investigate the relationship between cultural discourses and social meanings, and a way of seeing 
whether people take up the news media’s ideologies and/or challenge them. As I demonstrate in 
this chapter, the participants of the focus groups mostly agree with the press and its discourse of 
“moral panic”. In order to demonstrate my argument, I take a close look at various extracts, all of 
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which took place after I showed the participants two news media images of young children using a 
digital device alone and asked them what they thought of these images (cf. question 3a in 






       
 
In three focus groups, the participants refer to other texts and voices to support their argument. 
Intertextuality (cf. Fairclough, 2003) is particularly relevant here because it shows how the 
Figure 6.1: News media image of a young boy using a smartphone. (Article source: Le Temps, Switzerland, 2 
February 2018. Original image caption: Les spécialistes voient l’apparition de symptômes de dépendance et de perte de 
contrôle chez des enfants de plus en plus jeunes (Specialists have noticed the appearance of symptoms of addiction and 
loss of control in children earlier than ever before) (Image caption: Getty Image) 
Figure 6.2: News media image of a young girl using a tablet. (Article source: The Telegraph, UK, 10 
June 2017). Original image caption: Ofcom reports that 80 per cent of 11-15 year olds have smartphones and spend 
more than half the time they are online chatting and sharing pictures on Instagram, Facebook and Snapchat (Image source: 
Per Breiehagen) 
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participants incorporate other voices to legitimate their arguments, which I claim has important 
ideological consequences. The following two extracts exemplify the ways in which different voices 
intermingle and how they are attributed.  
 
Extract 6.1  
FG 4 (30 year-old women) 
Trigger question: What do you think about these images that accompany two news stories? What do you think these kids are doing? 
 
1 Janice (30) ben y’a eu un article très intéressant dans Mise au Point dimanche passé faut que tu  
2   l’regardes du coup 
3 Pauline (30) ouais 
4 Aline (30) ouais  
5 Ines (30)  ouais j’ai vu aussi 
6 Janice  sur les effets euh (0.3) justement dramatiques sur les enfants ou ils montraient un ptit  
7   garçon qui avait des traits qui avait des traits presque autistiques (0.2) les parents ils les  
8   a- ils l’avaient mis depuis bébé devant des écrans (0.5) et (0.2) au niveau  
9   développement du langage comme  ça ça avait eu des effets dramatiques sur le sur le  
10   ptit garcon (0.5) donc c’est assez impressionnant, moi ben justement en ayant David  
11   je j’fais quand meme super attention 
 
 
1 Janice (30) well there was a very interesting article in Mise au Point last Sunday you need to watch 
2   it then 
3 Pauline (30) yeah 
4 Aline (30) yeah 
5 Ines (30)  I saw it too 
6 Janice  on the dramatic effects uh on children where they showed a little boy 
7   who showed features that were almost autistic, parents had put 
8   him in front of screens since he was a baby, and as for language development 
9   like that it had dramatic effects on the little boy, so it’s quite 
10   striking, because with David  






FG 2 (28 year-old women) 
Trigger question: What do you think about these images that accompany two news stories? What do you think these kids are doing? 
 
1 Tiffany (28) mais mais par rapport à ça j’avais vu une émission que ben effectivement c’est  
2   hyper stimulant (.) mais ça peut engendrer des retards de croissance parce que ben  
 
1 Tiffany (28) related to that I saw a TV program that it’s actually over 
2   stimulating but it can cause developmental delays because 
 
 
In Extract 6.2, Tiffany (28, HR assistant) refers to “a TV program” that she saw, and in Extract 
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6.1, Janice (30, graphic designer) refers to the Mise au Point TV show that she saw (perhaps the 
same show that Tiffany mentions). We see here evidence that the participants are taking up news 
stories. In both cases, the voices are attributed – they are more precise in Janice’s case. Here, the 
women do not claim authorship of deleterious comments such as “dramatic effects” (line 6) and 
“autistic characteristics” (line 7) in Extract 6.1, and “developmental delay” (line 2) in Extract 6.2. 
Indeed, the way the participants choose to frame and contextualize the issue is particularly 
relevant. As Fairclough (2003, p.53) argues, “when the voice of another is incorporated into a text, 
there are always choices about how to ‘frame’ it”. In Extract 6.1, Janice decides to focus on a 
negative framing of young children’s digital media use. She references “dramatic effects” twice 
(lines 6 and 9), and one of the effects she chooses to mention is autistic-like behavior (line 7). As I 
stated in Chapter 3 about news media discourse on children’s digital media use, the popular 
framing of autism in the media and in society in general is transposed here onto the consequences 
of digital overexposure, which in turn reinforces the sentiment of fear and panic. As a result, 
Janice, who is the mother of David, a 3 and half year-old boy (who was 2 at the time of the focus 
group interview), takes extra measures and tries to “be really careful” (line 11) with her own child. 
The media’s message has had a real effect on her and on how she views digital media and the 
relationship between children and digital media; it has scared her. Unfortunately, such a framing 
of children’s digital media use and practices only serves to feed people’s fear and panic regarding 
children’s digital media consumption and prevents them from devising a reasonable approach to 
the risks and opportunities inherent in digital media. Moreover, the media’s focus on health issues 
(and Janice’s focus as a consequence) is problematic because the press often references extreme 
cases and individual stories which can mislead parents without offering sound advice to parents 
(e.g. Bickham et al, 2016, p.196). Similarly, in Extract 6.2, Tiffany also chooses to frame her 
argument around health concerns, specifically “developmental delays” (line 2). As with comparing 
the consequences of digital overexposure to autism, Tiffany implies that children who are 
overexposed to screens might not develop normally. Both Janice and Tiffany refer to other voices 
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of authority. As a result, they are implying that they are not making up the information; they saw 
it on TV and it must be true. There is a tendency to believe what the media says and take such 
information as facts, even if the media’s portrayal of digital media use and practices is often 
constructed in an overly dramatic way, which is often seen as more important than reporting truth 
and facts (e.g. Thurlow, 2014). As Kohring & Matthes (2007, p.238) suggest, “news media can be 
regarded by most people as the crucial source of information about social and political life”. In the 
examples above we see the circulation of messages through different “media”. Indeed, when the 
participants first saw the newspaper article that I showed them (the “trigger”), they thought 
about/referenced another “medium” (TV). The role of the media in constructing/shaping 
people’s media ideologies is important, even if people do challenge certain meanings. As I 
mentioned earlier, Hall (1997) introduced a useful model in this regard, where he explores the 
ways in which meanings are exchanged in a “circuit of culture” while examining the relationship 
between a text’s production and reception. According to his approach, meaning is constantly 
reworked and shaped through different relationships, in a dialogic way. Audiences resort to their 
own systems of representation to decode texts. They make associations between people, objects, 
and ideas using a mental map and a specific language which enable them to make sense of the 
world (i.e. to represent the world) (Hall, 1997, p.17). Thus, representation is at the heart of the 
“circuit of culture”; we interpret messages by creating links between things in our mind (e.g. 
between “digital media” and “children”), and then we use language (images, words, etc.) to 
represent the concepts in our thoughts. Another example of the circulation of messages through 
the mediasphere and audience (cultural discourses and social meanings) is the following extract 










FG 3 (18-23 year-old women) 
Trigger question: What do you think about these images that accompany two news stories? What do you think these kids are doing? 
 
1 Adelina (23) mais c’est terrible parce que à cause de ça en fait y’a toute une  nouveauté, l’autisme  
2   numérique (0.3) en fait qui qui qui tout d’un coup emerge, tout d’un coup on s’rend 
3    compte en deuxième enfantine t’as des enfants qui savent pas en fait c’que (0.2) ils ils 
4   sont moins en fait euh en contact avec les choses simples, et ils savent pas dire  
5   qu’un ptit pain c’est un ptit pain, en deuxième enfantine, parce que tout ce qu’ils  
6   voient c’est des images et des dessins 
 
 
1 Adelina (23) but it’s terrible, because of that there a new phenomenon, digital autism 
2   that is emerging all of a sudden, all of a sudden you  
3   realize that in kindergarden there are kids who don’t know well they they 
4   are less well uh in contact with simple things, and they don’t know how to say  
5   that a roll is a roll, in kindergarden, because all that they  
6   see are images and cartoons 
 
Adelina (23, teacher) assumes through her use of y’a (there is) (line 1) that “digital autism” is a 
phenomenon that exists. By not attributing her claim about autism to any other voice, Adelina 
“reduces difference” (Fairclough, 2003), which is the definition of assumptions since statements are 
taken-for-granted. In fact, Adelina’s reference to autism probably came from the news media 
(newspapers or TV programs such as Mise au Point), which other participants referenced. This 
goes to show the effect that the news media can have on people’s beliefs. In Adelina’s statement, 
autism becomes the agent (the doer of the action) when she says that digital autism is a “new 
phenomenon” and that it is “emerging all of a sudden” (lines 1-2). Such a framing emphasizes the 
speed of the process; it is as if it were something we did not see coming but is now a real threat. By 
assuming that digital autism exists without attributing her claim to other sources, and by choosing 
specific words such as “new phenomenon” and “all of a sudden”, Adelina’s point has a stronger 
impact and creates a sentiment of fear and panic. The three extracts above are good illustrations 
of the circulation of meanings across different media and across people. In this case, the discourse 
of moral panic in regards to children’s digital media use and practices, and technological 
determinism circulate across media and people. The focus on health consequences in the extracts 
above is all the more significant when one recalls what prompted their answers. My question was 
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not related to health issues (question 3b was related to health issues and came later in the 
interview). Rather, it was seeing the images of children alone with digital devices that triggered 
their dystopian discourse. As a final illustration of the ways in which discourses of moral panic 
circulate among the audience, I would like to briefly comment on the following extract from FG 4: 
 
Extract 6.4 
FG 4 (30 year-old women) 
Trigger question: What do you think about these images that accompany two news stories? What do you think these kids are doing? 
 
1 Pauline (30) c’est pas c’est pas un couteau c’est pas un fusil mais c’est tout autant dangereux pour  
2   eux ‘fin c’est 
 
1 Pauline (30) it’s not a knife it’s not a gun but it’s just as dangerous for them 
2   well it’s 
 
 
In this extract, Pauline (30, makeup artist) compares digital devices to weapons such as a “knife” 
and a “gun”, both of which are deadly weapons. This is an example of technological determinism 
at its finest, where the technology itself (the material device), is seen as directly causing harm.  
 In this first section, I showed how moral panic discourses and media ideologies circulate 
among the news media and its audience and how meanings circulate in a “circuit of culture”. In 
this case, news media discourses are taken up in people’s talk about digital media. In the following 
section, I turn to another way that participants negotiate meanings and concerns about digital 
media.  
 
Theme 2: Negotiating digital media in relation to older media 
Across the focus groups, I noticed that the participants negotiated the meaning of digital sociality 
in ways that are both critical and supportive of digital media. In order to demonstrate media 
ideologies at work, I examine several extracts that illustrate the media ideology concepts of 
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“materiality” and “remediation” (cf. Gershon, 2010c) as the participants discuss smartphones in 
relation to books, and in relation to face-to-face interaction – both are “old” media. In essence, I 
shed light on the social meanings of digital media use and practices with special attention paid to 
the importance of the medium in communication, and on the participants’ redefinition of what 
counts as “mediated” communication. First, I would like to examine the participants’ discussion of 
the differences between books and smartphones, which is a topic that surfaced on various 
occasions. Here, I rely on Naomi Baron (2015) who surveyed young American’s ideologies about 
digital and print books as they discussed why they preferred reading on screens or in physical 
books. Baron analyzed the interviewees’ arguments, which were tightly connected to the 
affordances (i.e. the characteristics and properties) of each medium. Extract 6.5 below occurred 
after I showed the participants a newspaper headline and image concerning digital addiction (cf. 
question 2 in Appendix C). 
 
Extract 6.5 
FG 1 (24-25 year-old women) 
Trigger question: What do you think about news articles which claim that people spend too much time on their phone and that this can have 
a negative impact on their health and social life? What’s your opinion on that in relation to your own practices? 
 
1 Melanie (24) Tu r’gardes tu prends [l’train y’a plus personne] qui s’parle 
2 Jane (24)          [oui mais après] 
3 Jane  Attendez ouais on va essayer de pas parler tous en même temps  
4   C’est moi qui vous ai coupé là donc euh (0.2) Parce que, genre les gens? on critique  
5   un peu nous on est genre, oui dans l -matin moi aussi j’suis comme ça mais les  
6   gens qui lisent c’est pareil, ils sont dans leurs bouquins alors pourquoi on critique  
7   le fait d’être sur son iPhone alors qu’être sur son bouquin c’est pareil, tu [t’plonges  




1 Melanie (24) you see you take [the train there’s nobody] talking to each other 
2 Jane (24)          [yeah but then] 
3 Jane  wait yeah let’s try not to talk at the same time 
4   I cut you off so uh, because, like people, we criticize a little  
5   we’re like yeah in the morning I’m also like that  
6   but people who read it’s the same thing, they are in their books so why are we criticizing 
7   the fact of being on your iPhone whereas reading a book is similar, you 




Here, Melanie (24, insurance agent) (line 1) introduces the topic of (a)sociality. In a technological 
deterministic way, she implies that people do not talk face-to-face anymore because they are 
always on their phones, something she sees on the train. Her claim is not surprising and media 
scholars have extensively investigated such media ideologies in their analyses of discourses of 
“moral panic” with regards to digital media (e.g. Tagliamonte & Denis 2008; Spilioti, 2015; 
Squires, 2010; Thurlow, 2006, 2014). In contrast, Jane (24, marketing assistant) (lines 3-8) takes a 
different stance and disagrees with her friend, especially with regards to the assumption that digital 
media use results in antisocial behavior. She points out that reading on the train could be viewed 
just as asocial as being on a smartphone. In both cases, she states that “you immerse yourself in a 
story” (lines 7-8). Jane’s media ideologies contrast with Melanie’s and the news media’s ideologies 
which focus on asociality and technological determinism with the belief that the technology itself 
(i.e. the phone) is responsible for destroying social relationships. Here, Jane does not take into 
account the affordances (properties) of each object (i.e. smartphone and book). She simply 
considers books and smartphones to be on the same level since they are both objects that one uses 
individually. However, both objects have different affordances and are therefore not totally equal. 
For instance, as Baron (2015, p.19) explains, digital books and print books allow for different 
experiences as a result of their materiality (e.g. touch and smell with the organic nature of print 
books) and because of the ways in which our brains behave while we are using each object (e.g. we 
tend to be more distracted when using a digital device). Although a digital device and a physical 
book have different affordances, Jane argues that being (or reading) on a phone does not make 
people more asocial than when they are reading a physical book. In both cases, people do not talk 
to the people around them. In fact, what they do on their phone can even make them more social 
since they can communicate and interact with other people online. For instance, when it comes to 
reading online, Baron (2015, p.xiv) gives the example of the social experiences of online reading 
groups, which is not possible with physical books. This is one way that my participants appeared to 
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negotiate digital sociality; in this case, the argument made is that digital devices do not necessarily 
make users more asocial than other individual activities such as reading books.  
 In the next extract (which also occurred after the participants saw the headline and image 
regarding digital addiction), the participants’ concern is not necessarily about antisocial behavior, 
but about the values associated with reading a physical book.  
 
Extract 6.6 
FG 2 (28 year-old women) 
Trigger question: What do you think about news articles which claim that people spend too much time on their phone and that this can have 
a negative impact on their health and social life? What’s your opinion on that in relation to your own practices? 
 
1 Sophie (28)  mais on regarde les gens autour de nous, donc ils ont déjà leur écouteurs  
2    mais personne ne lit un livre, tout l’monde est sur sont natel  [vraiment] 
3 Tiffany (28)             [hmmhem] 
4 Jennifer (28)  moi j’lis un livre le matin ((laughs)) 
5 Sophie   [ouais maintenant ouais c’est vrai] 
6 Sophie   franchement c’est très [rare] 
7 Jennifer     [j’suis la seule] 
8 Sophie   c’est très rare 
9 Jennifer   oui non c’est vrai 
10 Sophie   et d’ailleurs j’me rappelle que une fois (0.2) quand j’avais un livre qui me  
11    plaisait (0.2) ça m’arrive pas souvent, euh, et que j’lisais on était deux filles  
12    face l’une à l’autre et on lisait nos livres, et le gars à côté ah ben c’est drôle ça  
13    on voit jamais des gens qui lisent dans l’train 
14 Tiffany   ouais 
15 Sophie   tu vois à quel point c’est [inhabituel] 
16 Jennifer             [c’est vrai] 
17 Jennifer   c’est vraiment de triste, après j’pense que avant ça veut pas dire que  
18    avant ben tout l’monde r’gardait les journaux 
19 Sophie   non 
20 Jennifer   mais au moins c’était un truc papier 
 
 
1 Sophie (28)  but we look around us, they already have their headphones on but 
2    nobody’s reading a book, everybody’s on their phone, [really] 
3 Tiffany (28)       [hmmm] 
4 Jennifer (28)  I read a book in the morning [((laughs))] 
5 Sophie           [yeah now yeah it’s true] 
6 Sophie   frankly it’s very [rare] 
7 Jennifer          [I’m the only one] 
8 Sophie   it’s very rare 
9 Jennifer   yeah it’s true 
10 Sophie   and I remember once when there was a book that I liked 
11    it doesn’t happen very often uh and I was reading there were two of us sitting across from  
12    each other we were reading our books and the guy next to us oh it’s funny you never see 
13    people reading on the train 
14 Tiffany   yeah 
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15 Sophie   you see how much [unusual it is] 
16 Jennifer    [it’s true] 
17 Jennifer   it’s really sad but then I think that before it doesn’t mean that before well that everyone was  
18    reading newspapers 
19 Sophie   no 
20 Jennifer   but at least it was something made of paper 
 
Here, I would like to take a moment to examine Sophie’s (28, university assistant) first statement 
(lines 1-2) in comparison with Jane’s (24, marketing assistant) argument from the previous extract. 
Sophie assumes that wearing headphones is antisocial bahavior (line 1) and that the fact that 
“everybody is on their phone” is also antisocial. As a reminder, Jane’s point in the previous extract 
was that reading a book can also be an antisocial activity. However, here Sophie (28, university 
assistant) and her friend Jennifer (28, HR assistant) go on to praise books. On line 4, Jennifer is 
proud to tell everyone “I read a book in the morning” (note the use of the double pronoun moi 
(me) and je (I) in French to emphasize what she does in contrast to what others do). The fact that 
Jennifer reads books in the morning is all the more special when one takes into account the next 
couple of lines about the apparent rarity of such activity nowadays (lines 6-8). To emphasize the 
idea, Sophie recounts a personal anecdote that happened on the train once (lines 10-13). While she 
was reading a book on the train, a man sitting next to her said “Oh it’s funny you never see people 
read on the train” (lines 12-13). Jennifer comments in a nostalgic way on the fact that reading 
books has become rare and says, “it’s really sad” (line 17). Although Jennifer admits, “it doesn’t 
mean that before everyone used to read newspapers” (line 18), Sandra (28, management 
consultant) claims, “at least it was something made of paper” (line 20). Therefore, the participants 
here seem to be nostalgic for a time when reading physical books was more commonplace. The 
participants appear to be longing for a time where the “physical anchors that have been essential 
to the reading process for almost two millennia” (Baron, 2015, p.xiv) were still in existence but 
which are slowly disappearing. In a similar vein, Schrey (2014, p.28), discusses “analogue 
nostalgia” or the “fetishising of analogue media”, a contemporary trend found in both lay and 
scholarly ideologies. Ultimately, the participants in my focus group perpetuate “the myth of the 
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disappearing medium” (Ballatore & Natale, 2016) regarding the printed word, a narrative that 
highlights anxieties about the supposed death of the book, which they see as a vehicle of values, 
civilization, and culture. Therefore, the focus group participants implicitly assume that reading a 
physical book is “better” or “superior” to reading on a digital device, particularly because of the 
physical and material affordances of print books. The “natural” and “organic” nature of the print 
book is captured by the materiality of paper, which is something that can age and deteriorate 
(Ballatore & Natale, 2016; see also Schrey, 2014 regarding other analogue media). Here, it is the 
importance of the material aspect of books that forms the participants’ media ideologies.  
 In the next extract regarding the relationship between books and digital media, Cindy (24, 




FG 1 (24-25 year-old women) 
Trigger question: What do you think about these images that accompany two news stories? What do you think these kids are doing? 
 
 
1 Cindy (24) c’est intéressant ce que tu dis parce que c’est vrai j’pensais pas (.) dans les  
2   technologies y’a un truc en plus que dans la lecture y’a pas (.) dans la lecture  




4   tu dois investir l’activité pour comprendre autrement c’est pas intéressant si tu   
5   comprends pas un livre tu pètes un plomb (.) tandis c’est devenu facile d’etre là sans  
6   être là (.) devant un film devant euh (.) euh Instagram t’as pas besoin de fournir de 




1 Cindy (24) it’s interesting what you’re saying because it’s true I didn’t think with  
2   technology there’s something that doesn’t appear in reading, in reading you 




4   you need to be involved in the activity to understand otherwise it’s not interesting if    
5   you don’t understand a book you go off the rails whereas it’s become easy to be there  
6   without being there, in front of a movie in front of uh uh Instagram you don’t need    




Noticeably, in this statement, Cindy assumes that reading is an activity one can only do with a 
physical book and does not think about the possibility of reading a book on a digital platform, 
which has become quite popular with the introduction of eReaders and tablets (Baron 2015; 
Ballatore & Natale, 2016) as well as smartphones. As in the previous extract, the participants seem 
to see something sacred about the physicality of books; one can touch, smell, and feel them. They 
are “praised as sacred repository of wisdom” (Ballatore & Natale, 2016, p.2384). Moreover, 
physical books have been around for centuries and are highly valued. Indeed, in the Middle Ages, 
books were seen as works of art – they were embellished, illustrated, and decorated – and as 
symbols of knowledge and literacy; moreover, the physical work that was needed for the 
realization of books was so intense that it required the participation of various people (Department 
of Medieval Art and The Cloisters, 2001). The old book-making tradition and the values attached 
to print books help to explain the participants’ naturalized assumption that books are necessarily 
physical objects. Books are still symbols of knowledge and education today, especially because 
their affordances are limited compared to what digital devices allow; for instance, one can read, 
communicate, and play on a digital device. Although one can read online, when Cindy thinks 
about new technologies, she associates them with watching movies and going on Instagram (line 
7). In this particular extract, I wish to focus on Cindy’s description of the mental and physical 
requirements of both activities. Reading a book requires a certain investment from the reader and 
concentration in order to comprehend the book (lines 3-5), whereas using Instagram apparently 
does not demand an effort on the part of the user (lines 6-7). As Cindy says, “you can be there 
without being there” (lines 5-6) which is to say that you can be physically present but mentally 
aloof while using social media. According to Baron (2015, p.xiii), digital media allows multitasking 
and can lead to more distraction. In contrast, reading a book requires one to be both physically 
and mentally present and distraction is less possible; it is often seen as a true “sensorial experience” 
(Ballatore & Natale, 2016; MacFadyen, 2011). Therefore, the dichotomy Cindy makes between 
books and digital media is transposed onto another dichotomy between being active (with books) 
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and passive (with digital media). Through such a dichotomy, Cindy presumes than reading a book 
is better than being on one’s phone. Cindy’s media ideologies are thus tightly connected to the 
affordances of each medium and her perception/misconception of them.  
 With the two following extracts, I want to highlight the participants’ media ideologies by 
focusing on remediation, a process emphasized by the fact that people’s ideologies regarding a 
particular medium can affect and transform their understanding of other media (Bolter and 





FG 1 (24-25 year-old women) 
Trigger question: What do you think about news articles which claim that people spend too much time on their phone and that this can have 
a negative impact on their health and social life? What’s your opinion on that in relation to your own practices? 
 
Melanie (24)  tu r’gardes tu prends [l’train y’a plus personne] qui s’parle 
 









FG 2 (28 year-old women) 
Trigger question: What do you think about news articles which claim that people spend too much time on their phone and that this can have 
a negative impact on their health and social life? What’s your opinion on that in relation to your own practices? 
 
1 Sophie (28) ouais, ah et pis ah genre euh (0.2) j’pense maintenant y’a ptêtre une ou deux semaines 
2    j’étais dans le euh train (0.3) j’avais mon ordi portable, en face y’avait mon cousin  
3   qui était sur son smartphone, et y’a un gars qui (0.1) j’sais pas d’une cinquantaine  
4   d’années qui est passé à côté de nous il nous a dit ah ben c’est beau d’voir la jeunesse  
5   qui communique 
6 Sandra (28) ((laughs)) 
7 Sophie   ouais ça m’a beaucoup énervé sur le coup 
8 Jennifer (28) avec Paul 
9 Sophie  ouais j’étais avec Paul, ça m’a hyper énervée parce que j'étais là ah rabat-joie euh et  
10   en plus j’étais en train de faire euh (0.1) j’crois que répondais à mes mails vraiment 
11   et du coup ‘fin bref, voilà mais euh (0.2) j’trouve aussi que c’est un ptit peu inquiétant  
12   quand on voit que les gens ne parlent ‘fin ptêtre parlent un ptit peu moins,  
13   mais après j’pense que ‘fin nous en tous cas (0.2) de notre generation, on sait  





1 Sophie (28) yeah ah and then like uh I just thought of it now maybe one or two weeks ago I was 
2   on the train I had my laptop and in front of me there was my cousin who was  on 
3   his smartphone and there was a guy who was I don’t know in his fifties who walked past 
4   us and told us ah it’s nice to see young people 
5   communicate 
6 Sandra (28) laughs 
7 Sophie  yeah it really pissed me off at that moment 
8 Jennifer (28) with Paul? 
9 Sophie  yeah I was with Paul, it really pissed me off because I was like ah killjoy uh and I was 
10   uh I think I was responding to my emails really and so 
11   well but uh I also think it’s a little worrying when you see that 
12   people don’t talk, well maybe they talk a little less, but then I think that  
13   well us in any case, of our generation, we know where to set the limit, there were three 
14   of us on the train maybe we only watched 
 
In extracts 6.8 and 6.9, we see how the participants’ ideologies regarding face-to-face 
communication and about digitally mediated communication compete and are intertwined. In 
extract 6.8, Melanie (24, insurance agent) complains about the fact that nobody talks to each other 
anymore on the train (line 1). In saying this, she implies that people should be talking to each other 
instead of being on their phones, and that face-to-face conversation is better than digitally 
mediated conversation, especially on public transportations such as trains, when people are in the 
(physical) presence of other people. In such situations, the people who are physically present are 
more important than people who might be online or than any other online activity one can be 
engrossed in. Similarly, in extract 6.9, Sophie’s (28 university assistant) personal anecdote (lines 1-
5) also involves the competition between two potential “media” found on public transportations 
(i.e. trains): face-to-face and digitally mediated communication. In this case, the fact that an older 
fifty year-old man sarcastically says “it’s nice to see young people communicate” (lines 4-5) after 
seeing Sophie and her cousin busy on their own digital devices annoys her (line 7: it really pissed 
me off), especially since she had a “good excuse”. Indeed, Sophie says, “I think I was responding to 
e-mails, really” (line 10). By saying this and emphasizing her point with “really”, she implies that 
what she was doing online was a good enough excuse to not be talking to her cousin who was 
sitting opposite her on the train. According to Sophie, not any kind of online activity is appropriate 
when one is in the presence of someone else; however, replying to work-related e-mails is 
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appropriate. Thus, Sophie also agrees with the fact that the “correct” and “better” behavior in a 
similar situation would be to talk to the person who is physically present. In both extracts, by 
treating face-to-face communication as a “better” channel in specific situations, the participants 
assume that face-to-face communication is indeed a medium of communication (see Gershon, 
2010 for a similar example). Just like Gershon’s (2010) young interviewees, my participants’ 
evaluate co-presence as mediated communication; thus, their “new media ideologies are affecting 
ideologies of older media, and even transforming what had not been widely defined as a medium 
into one” (Gershon, 2010, p. 402). The fact that people’s media ideologies affect and are affected 
by ideologies of older media is the very definition of remediation. Furthermore, we notice another 
media ideology concept in the extracts above: materiality. As Thurlow (2017, p.13) explains, 
materiality is “concerned with the degree to which the material (i.e. physical and technical) 
affordances of a particular medium are attended to vis-à-vis its social uses”. More precisely, here I 
would like to focus on one type of social use: where it is appropriate to use a specific medium of 
communication. As Gershon (2010, p.287) puts it, “technological designs presuppose social 
narratives, including locations of appropriate use” (see Akrich 1997 as well). There is a tendency 
across the focus groups to consider the use of digital media in a public space such as public 
transportation and restaurants as inappropriate in the presence of other people one knows. Just as 
Sophie’s media ideologies shape her understanding of where it is appropriate to use digital media, 
Melanie (24, insurance agent) and Anna (25, physical therapist) in FG 1 argue in favor of face-to-
face communication in restaurants and are critical of the fact that some people who are physically 
together may spend time on a digital device instead of talking to each other:  
 
Extract 6.10 
FG 1 (24-25 year-old women) 
Trigger question: What do you think about news articles which claim that people spend too much time on their phone and that this can have 
a negative impact on their health and social life? What’s your opinion on that in relation to your own practices? 
1 Melanie (24) t’es d’accord que souvent quand on a été au restaurant souvent s’est dit on met pas  
2   les natels sur la table 
3 Jane (24) ça j’déteste ça j’fais pas 
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1 Melanie (24) don’t you agree when we go to the restaurant we often tell each other  
2   not to put our phones on the table 






FG 1 (24-25 year-old women) 
Trigger question: What do you think about these images that accompany two news stories? What do you think these kids are doing? 
1 Anna (25) une fois au restaurant au Portugal j’étais avec une amie, et pis euh y’avait une  
2   famille (0.2) donc deux enfants les parents et pis euh (0.3) ils ont pas discuté un seul 
3   mot quoi, un seul truc parce que quoi? les deux enfants ils avaient les tablettes la  
4   femme elle était sur son téléphone elle discutait même pas avec son mari non plus,  
5   donc déjà déjà là, ben justement après c’est ça (0.2) c’est pas l’fait qu’ils aient les  
6   tablettes qui est choquant c’est l’usage [et QUAND] tu l’utilises 
 
1 Anna (25) once at a restaurant in Portugal I was with a friend and then uh there was a family 
2   two kieds the parents and uh they didn’t exchange one word, one thing because what 
3   both kids had a tablet the woman was on her 
4   phone she was not even talking to her husband so there you go well 
5   there it’s not the fact that they had a tablet that was shocking but  
6   the use [and WHEN] you use it 
 
In both extracts, the participants assume that in a restaurant, the priority should be on the people 
physically present around them, and also assume that face-to-face conversation should be 
prioritized. For instance, in Extract 6.10, Jane’s (24, marketing assistant) remark “I hate that I 
don’t do it” (line 3), exemplifies her strong involvement in disassociating with the practice of using 
one’s phone at the table. To emphasize her point further, Jane specifies that she does not do it (line 
3). In Extract 6.11, Anna (25, physical therapist) is also clearly annoyed by the fact that people 
would rather look at their phone than talk to each other at a restaurant. Sharing a meal with other 
people – a practice called “commensality” – has been a significant social experience for centuries, 
and is still important in today’s society, although some scholars (e.g. Mennell, Murcott & van 
Otterloo, 1992) have identified a possible decrease in the social aspect of meals as people become 
more individualistic. Nevertheless, the “moral panic” discourse related to a decline in family meals 
exists and highlights the importance of commensality, even if such a discourse may be exaggerated 
and unfounded (Murcott, 2012). Yet, the participants in the extracts above all emphasize the 
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importance of commensality to them; as a result, they see smartphones as “disrupters” of the social 
experience of eating together. According to Anna (lines 5-6) in extract 7.11, the problem is not the 
digital device in and of itself, but rather the use of it. Here, it is seen as a disturbance of a sacred 
event: meal time, which is supposed to be a social experience. Although social media platforms 
such as Instagram have allowed another form of sharing food experiences with people remotely 
located, the social experience that the participants indirectly allude to is one of co-presence and not 
an online one. Therefore, in Extract 6.11, line 6 is especially relevant because it underscores the 
importance of usage (i.e. when, where) in shaping people’s media ideologies. Although Jane and 
Anna argue in favor of face-to-face communication in specific situations such as the dinner table, 
they are both “heavy” digital media users and not ashamed of it. They do not argue in favor of 
face-to-face interactions because they are against digital media and/or do not use them, but rather 
because of their media ideologies and what they consider (in)appropriate digital media use.  
 In sum, this second section shed light on the participants’ media ideologies and what they 
consider (in)appropriate digital media practice(s). It is considered appropriate to be on one’s phone 
in public spaces when one is alone (e.g. using a digital device on the train, as a pastime or as 
entertainment). However, in the co-presence of other people one knows, it is seen as inappropriate. 
Thus, the participants’ media ideologies reveal the common assumption that there is a real 
“offline” world and a virtual “online” world; as such “it is against the ‘standards’ of authenticity 
presumed in face-to-face interaction that virtual worlds, identities and communities are compared 
and found to be falling short or exceeding expectations” (Spilioti, 2015, p.136). In this case, the 
participants’ media ideologies express an understanding of the real offline world as better and 
praise traditional media since they show high esteem for print books and (unmediated) face-to-face 
interaction. In this sense, the participants tend to align with the dystopian discourse found in the 
news media rather than challenging it. Although I did not refer to news media discourse in this 
second section, moral panic discourses about, for instance, the end of the book, have been “a 
common trope in journalist commentaries that reflected on the impact of new technologies on the 
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act of reading” (Ballatore & Natale, 2016, p. 2380). Through this analysis of people’s media 
ideologies, we thus see another example of the circulation of anxieties among the media and (lay 
and scholarly) audiences.  
 
Theme 3: Negotiating surveillance and privacy 
Finally, the participants discuss their concerns about privacy and surveillance. Such a concern was 
not prompted by any of my questions – none of my questions were about privacy or surveillance – 
but surfaced in the participants’ conversations. In their discourse, the participants demonstrated 
their understanding of what is (in)appropriate digital practice in relation to the “affordances” of 
digital media (cf. Hutchby, 2001; Gershon, 2010b), especially when it comes to the constant 
tracking and surveillance of users that digital media allow. My analysis shows that the participants’ 
media ideologies and practices do not always align when it comes to privacy issues, and that it is 
often difficult to manage “context collapse” (cf. Marwick & boyd, 2011) in relation to privacy 
concerns. Moreover, we find two types of surveillance discourse: the traditional “top-down” 
surveillance, where big corporations and governments spy on “regular” people, and a more recent 
type called “lateral surveillance” (Andrejevic, 2005) or “social surveillance” (Marwick, 2012), 
which describes what social media users do when they monitor and track other users’ digital 
content and practices. The following extracts exemplify both kinds of discourses.  
 
Extract 6.12 
FG 3 (18-23 year-old women) 
Trigger question: We’re done with questions. Would you like to add anything else about new communication technologies and people’s 
practices? 
 
1 Charlotte (19)  sur l’iPhone 10 t’as pas de touches, et en fait t’as euh l’empreinte faciale (0.2) du coup  
2   tu regardes ton iPhone devant toi, et ça fait clic 
3 Julie (22) Florie elle a ça et ben désolée ça me fait trop flipper, ça veut dire que déjà ils ont ton  
4   empreinte, ils ont ton visage, tu peux aller partout hein tu seras de toutes   





6 Julie  mais à vie  
7 Charlotte ouais ouais 
8 Julie  ça reste à vie, ça me fait trop peur 
9 Charlotte  mais c’est comme, tout est lié là, Cecilia on on va à Rome à 
10    la fin du mois elle a réservé sur booking le vol, et ça s’est 
11    rajouté tout seul dans son calendrier et son calendrier lui dit he c’est bientôt votre 
12    voyage à Rome (0.2) mais elle elle était là comment il sait 
13 Everyone  ((laugh)) 
14 Julie  mais c’est comme quand tu parles d’un truc la journée ça m’est  
15   arrivé tellement de fois (0.3) ou tu regardes un truc pis une   
16   seconde tu parles et pis tu sais même pas si le téléphone  
17   t’entend, j’arrivais le soir pis j’regardais les trucs sur   
18   Instagram j’vois les même plublicités [que de ce que j’ai voulu   
19   ptêtre regarder pour acheter] 
20 Charlotte [que c’que t’as parlé ouais] 
21 Samantha (18) ah ouais moi j’ai eu pareil ouais 
22 Julie  mais ça fait peur 
23 Samantha ouais ouais ouais 
24 Julie  c’est comme en fait si on te suit 
 
 
1 Charlotte (19)  on the iPhone 10 there’s no button and actually there is facial recognition 
2   so you look at the phone and it clicks 
3 Julie (22) Florie uses that and I’m sorry but it’s so scary, it means that they have your prints 
4   they have your face you can go anywhere you’ll be well  




6 Julie  but for life 
7 Charlotte  yeah yeah 
8 Julie  it stays for life its scares me a lot 
9 Charlotte  but it’s like everything is interconnected, with Carole we’re going to Rome at the end of   
10   the month and she booked her flight on Booking  
11   it added itself on her calendar on its own and her calendar told her  
12   your trip to Rome is coming up and she was like how does it know 
13 Everyone   ((laugh)) 
14 Julie  but it’s like when you talk about something during the day 
15   it happened to me so many times or you look at something 
16   and you talk for one second and you don’t even know if the phone 
17   can hear you, I was coming home at night and looking at stuff on 
18   Instagram I saw the same ads [what I wanted to  
19   look for to buy 
20 Charlotte  what you talked about yeah 
21 Samantha (18) yeah the same thing happened to me 
22 Julie  but it’s scary 
23 Samantha  yeah yeah yeah 




In Extract 6.12, the participants demonstrate their awareness of the fact that powerful people and 
entities “above” are watching regular people. This kind of surveillance implies a hierarchy and 
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power differences (boyd, 2011). On lines 3-5, one notices that Julie (22, commercial employee) 
does not quite know who these people are, which is why she refers to them as “they”. Is it the 
government? Or big corporations? This goes to show the lack of transparency when it comes to 
surveillance practices and the secrecy surrounding them, which helps to explain Julie’s skepticism. 
Moreover, one understands that these “people” are powerful due to the ubiquitous nature of what 
they do: they are going to find you wherever you go (line 5), and also through the permanent nature 
of their action: they can keep your traces “for life” (line 6). There is also the omniscient nature and 
humanization of technology: “you don’t even know if the phone can hear you” (line 18); “her 
calendar tells her that her trip is coming up” (line 11); “how does it know?” (line 12); and “it’s as if 
you’re being followed” (line 24). All of these quotes exemplify the Panoptic metaphor (first 
referenced by Bentham, 1995 and Foucault, 1975) which can be found in various research and 
work regarding surveillance (see Manokha, 2018, for an overview of research). The central point 
of the metaphor concerns the social awareness of being watched. As Manokha (2018, p.228) 
explains, “individuals become conscious that they are under surveillance, that data about their 
online (and also offline) activities are being collected and stored by various entities, that the digital 
traces they leave may be gathered and analyzed in ways and for purposes that they do not know of 
and at points in time that are not known to them either”, which is exactly what we see in Extract 
6.12. As a consequence of such awareness and because of the “chilling effect”, people may start to 
change their behavior and practices. The “chilling effect” is related to “the idea that laws, 
regulations, or state surveillance can deter people from exercising their freedoms or engaging in 
legal activities on the internet” (Penney, 2017, p.2). The “chilling effect” can also happen with 
lateral or social surveillance. For example, if people know that their posts will be read by a lot of 
people, they might censor specific information. In FG 3, Adelina (23, teacher) talks about her use 
of WhatsApp and the fact that she has different WhatsApp groups: family, friends, students, and 
students’ parents. This is a typical example of “context collapse” (Marwick and boyd, 2011), where 





FG 3 (18-23 year-old women) 
Trigger question: What do you think about these images that accompany two news stories? What do you think these kids are doing? 
 
1 Adelina (23) voilà ouais ouais (.) du coup ils viennent t’écrire à n’importe quel moment même la 
2    photo de profil j’me disais mince mais qu’est ce que je vais mettre et tout [un moment 
3    j’la changeais 
4 Charlotte (19)  [ah t’oses pas 
5 Adelina  ouais j’sais pas j’me disais ptêtre que selon ce que j’mets euh ça peut être un ptit peu  
6   mal perçu ou bien, je sais pas, j’ai des parents qui ont dit à leurs enfants ah elle est 
7    plutôt jolie ta maitresse pis les enfants ils viennent me dire (0.2) ouais sans  
8   déconner c’est vraiment en fait on rentre dans une espèce de proximité dans une  
9   intimité j’trouve ça va trop loin, pis j’trouve que nous en tous cas, dans   
10   l’enseignement on sait plus comment gérer 
 
 
1 Adelina (23) there you go yeah yeah, okay so they text you whenever even  
2   the profile picture I thought darn what am I going to choose [there was a time 
3   I would change it] 
4 Charlotte (19) [ah you don’t dare] 
5 Adelina  yeah I don’t know I was thinking depending on what I choose it might not be  
6   well perceived or, I don’t know, there are parents who told their kids ah she’s 
7   beautiful your teacher and then kids come and tell me that, yeah 
8   for real it’s really, well we start getting close in an 
9   intimacy I think it’s going too far, and I think we in any case, as a 
10   teacher, we don’t know how to handle that 
 
 
In this example, Adelina explains how she has to think about her audience (composed of people 
from different social contexts) when choosing her profile picture (line 2) and admits that she would 
change her picture at times (line 3), which is a direct consequence of the “chilling effect”. In other 
words, she self-restrains or self-censors because she wants “to avoid argument or discussion” 
(Manokha, 2018, p.230). Adelina also admits that she does not always know how to handle the fact 
that her audience is composed of people from various contexts (line 10). As Marwick (2012) notes, 
context collapse leads to a blurring of social roles; as such, everyone seems to be on the same level 
(i.e. her as a teacher, her students, and the students’ parents). However, the fact that Adelina finds 
it difficult to manage the different groups of people shows that they are not on the same level, and 
that there are indeed different power relationships between them. In other words, “[m]oments of 
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rupture when social roles collide demonstrate that power flows not only top-down from 
authoritarian entities, but between individuals” (Marwick, 2012, p.387). Although Adelina admits 
that context collapse can be hard to manage, she later claims that she does not see it as a problem 
for her personal and professional life. In response, Veronica (19, student) reminds Adelina that her 
pupils keep texting her (which she views as inappropriate), to which Adelina replies:  
 
Extract 6.14 
FG 3 (18-23 year-old women) 
Trigger question: We’re done with questions. Would you like to add anything else about new communication technologies and people’s 
practices? 
 
1 Adelina (23) tout à fait, mais ça veut dire quoi que je supprime WhatsApp que je supprime  
2   Snapchat que je supprime Instagram pour éviter que les élèves ils m’écrivent ou alors  
3   je  
 
1 Adelina (23) exactly, but what does that mean, that I should delete WhatsApp, delete  
2   Snapchat, delete Instagram in order to avoid that pupils text me or 
3   I 
 
 
Thus, according to Adelina, self-censoring (a consequence of the chilling effect) is not a solution. 
Although Adelina has to think about the ways in which she presents herself online – because of her 
heterogeneous audience – she refuses to go so far as to delete her apps and social media platforms 
just because of the consequences of social surveillance. In fact, Adelina likes all of the surveillance 
affordances that her digital media allow. In the following extract 6.15, she gives the example of Life 
360, a tracking app that helps her localize friends and family at all times. Extract 6.15 comes right 
after the discussion of top-down surveillance and the negative aspect of technology. It reveals the 
tension between participants’ media ideologies since some are concerned about privacy and 





FG 3 (18-23 year-old women) 
Trigger question: We’re done with questions. Would you like to add anything else about new communication technologies and people’s 
practices? 
1 Adelina (23) mais après moi personnellement ça me rassure par exemple vous savez mon copain 
2    il habite à Fribourg, pis nous on a une application en fait ça nous permet de savoir  
3   ou on est  
4 Julie (22) ah mon dieu arrête 
5 Charlotte (19) moi ça m’fait peur 
6 Julie  mais c’est la pire vous êtes malade 
7 Charlotte ah non mais c’est find your friends 
8 Adelina  c’est Life 360 (0.3) pis moi en fait, lui lui il vient tous les  
9   samedis et ça me permet de savoir ou il est pour me préparer pour sortir ou pas quoi 
10 Charlotte mais tu peux lui écrire un message aussi 
11 Adelina  oui mais y’a pas que ça mais c’est pas grave 
12 Veronica ((laughs)) 
13 Julie  mais tu t’fais tout le temps contrôler c’est un truc de malade ça veut dire tu sors il sait  
14   ou t’es 
15 Adelina  ouais 
16 Julie  ah non mais moi j’trouve que c’est trop là 
 
 
1 Adelina (23) but then personally I find it reassuring for example you know my boyfriend 
2   lives in Fribourg, and we have an app it allows us to know 
3   where we are 
4 Julie (22) oh my God stop 
5 Charlotte (19) I find it scary 
6 Julie  but she’s out of her mind you’re crazy 
7 Charlotte  oh no but it’s Find your Friends 
8 Adelina  it’s Life 360 and so I, he comes over 
9   every Saturday and it allows me to know where he is so I can get ready to go out or not  
10 Charlotte  but you can text him too 
11 Adelina  but there’s more to it but that’s okay 
12 Veronica  ((laughs)) 
13 Julie  but you’re always monitored it’s crazy it means you  
14   go out he knows where you are 
15 Adelina  yeah 




In this case, there is no “chilling effect” for Adelina whereas Julie is totally opposed to such 
tracking apps. Both friends argue in favor or against one of the affordances of digital media: 
locatability (cf. Schrock, 2015) and explain their divergent perspectives on how digital media (i.e. 
social media apps such as Life 360) alters social relationships. Adelina finds such apps “reassuring” 
(line 1); she feels safe and reassured that she can have such a close bond with the people she loves. 
Similary, Ma & Chan (2014, p.52) refer to Reis & Patrick (1996) and claim that they “suggest that 
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people feel safe among others, which is why they actively seek support from social networks”. 
Here, it is important to ask what motivates Adelina to share such personal information and why 
her motivations are different from Julie’s. Ma & Chan (2014, p.51) suggest a link between the 
extent to which users share information online and “theory of belonging and the intrinsic 
motivation of altruism”; they demonstrate how users’ sharing behavior is influenced by 
interpersonal relationships. In Adelina’s case, her relationship with her boyfriend is crucial in 
determining what she is going to share online. As such, since her relationship with her boyfriend 
online through ‘Life 360’ is based on her relationship with him offline, her “perceived online 
attachment motivation and perceived online relationship commitment are found to be key 
determinants of online knowledge sharing” (Ma & Chan, 2014, p.55). Moreover, sharing private 
information online through the “locatability” affordance of mobile technology enables new ways of 
forming relationships and new practices (Schrock, 2015); for Adelina, it allows her to know when 
she can get ready to go out (line 9), for instance, and as such to extend online the relationship she 
has with her boyfriend offline. However, other participants do not approve of such apps. Charlotte 
(19, student) finds such apps “scary” (line 5), and Julie emphasizes the exaggeration and insanity of 
those apps with statements such as: “oh my God stop” (line 4); “but she’s out of her mind, you’re 
crazy” (line 6); “it’s unbelievable” (line 13); and “but I think it’s going too far” (line 16). Therefore, 
Charlotte and especially Julie have different opinions regarding the “location” affordance; in this 
case, they are not thinking about sociability. For them, it goes too far. Another example in FG 1 
illustrates the same perspective on online tracking features: 
 
Extract 6.16 
FG 1 (24-25 year-old women) 
Trigger question: What do you think about news articles such as the one below which claim that people spend too much time on their phone 
and that this can have a negative impact on their health and social life? What’s your opinion on that in relation to your own practices? 
 
1 Melanie (24) mais t’vois après ça nous coupe aussi notre liberté 
2 Tania (24) de quoi comment 
3 Melanie  par’ce que tout le temps surveillé, t’vois moi j’veux dire les gens i savent exactement  
4   ou je suis tout le temps 
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5 Jane (24) mais ça c’est par’ce que t’as autorisé moi j’ai pas autorisé 
 
 
1 Melanie (24) but you see then it interferes with our freedom 
2 Tania (24) how so 
3 Melanie  because you’re always monitored, you see I mean people know exactly  
4   where I am all the time 
5 Jane (24)  but it’s because you authorized it, I didn’t authorize it 
 
 
Here, Melanie (24, insurance agent) discusses the effects of certain social media features on her 
“freedom” (line 1) while using social media. In response, Jane (24, marketing assistant) says that 
she has not authorized the “tracking” feature (line 5), which is an example of a “chilling effect”; 
she decided to self-restrain by not turning on specific localization features that her smartphone 
allows.  
 In sum, my focus group participants demonstrate a variety of practices and media 
ideologies in response to privacy and surveillance concerns, with no single, uniform approach to 
the issue. The participants’ media ideologies regarding what is (in)appropriate use of digital media 
are based on the affordances of digital media, particularly the “locatability” affordance, and 
emphasize users’ concerns, fears, and anxieties about the loss of control and freedom.  
 
Discussion: Making sense of digital media 
 
In this chapter, I have attempted to provide an understanding of a group of young users’ media 
ideologies, and to show what current social issues surface among them. Their media ideologies 
might not be representative of the larger population; however, what they define as (in)appropriate 
digital media use and practices matters. Although concerns, anxieties and “moral panic” 
discourses regarding digital media are constantly changing due to the fast rate at which 
technologies evolve and change, it is still important to investigate which cultural meanings are 
circulating at a given time and place, and among a certain demographics. This chapter sheds light 
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on three major concerns that young Swiss-French digital media users between 18 and 30 
emphasize, and provides an analysis of whether those concerns and anxieties are “shared 
assumptions”. As Gershon (2010a, p.199) stated nearly ten years ago, “people now expect to have 
standard practices established” concerning digital media, but this is not always the case.  
 The first “concern” that the participants discussed was prompted by questions that were 
specifically about children’s digital media use, since I was interested in the relationship between 
the news media’s cultural discourses about children’s practices (cf. Chapter 3) and people’s 
ideologies. I found that the young participants accept much of what the news media transmits 
without questioning it. In this case, my focus group participants share many of the same 
expectations when it comes to young children’s digital media use; their discourse is centered on 
moral panic and fear. Therefore, one sees that meanings circulate across media and people in 
much the same way as Hall (1997) describes with his “circuit of culture”. Next, I showed that there 
is general agreement on the social practices surrounding digital media when compared with books 
and face-to-face encounters. The ways in which the participants understand the appropriate social 
use of digital media cannot be properly understood without taking into account their ideologies 
about older media (cf. remediation), which is where we find shared assumptions between the 
participants. They believe that face-to-face interaction should be privileged when people are in the 
co-presence of other people they know, and that physical books are of higher value than digital 
devices. As such, digital media are seen as “intruders” or “disrupters” of activities people have 
engaged in for a long time: talking to people face-to-face and reading books. Such ideologies are 
sometimes associated with “older” people and often found in the news media; however, the 
participants I interviewed are all young “millennials” who frequently use digital media and who 
even claim to be addicted to their devices at times. Yet, they seem to be affected by news media 
discourse and still consider “traditional” media to be important. Finally, I showed that when it 
comes to privacy and surveillance, participants do not always agree on the ways in which they can 
resolve social issues using digital media. As a matter of fact, people do not always have the same 
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“idioms of practice”, which is a term that Gershon (2010a, p.6) uses to explain how “people figure 
out together how to use different media and often agree on the appropriate social uses of 
technology by asking advice and sharing stories with each other”. The fact that people do not have 
the same “idioms of practice” explains why they do not always share the same meanings when it 
comes to digital media use and practices. The case of the “locatability” affordance of digital media 
shows how different idioms of practice compete, for example between Adelina (23, teacher) and 
Julie (22, commercial employee), who clearly have different media ideologies and idioms of 
practice. In sum, this example shows that there is not always a uniform etiquette regarding the use 
of digital media. Yet, many participants expressed fear and anxiety when confronted with 
surveillance and privacy issues.  
 In each of the three sections, the participants make dramatic and sometimes dystopian 
comments regarding digital media, even though they are all “heavy” users. As I mentioned in the 
introduction to this chapter, there is a mutual shaping between people’s communicative practices 
and larger systems of beliefs (cf. Thurlow, 2018). The ways in which people talk about digital 
media and the ways in which they use it shape their larger system of beliefs. In turn, these 
ideologies structure their digital discourse and practices by imbuing them with specific values. This 
mutual relationship is never-ending; both people’s digital media practices and their ideological 
system shape each other in a circular process that repeats itself. As a result, their beliefs and 
attitudes become naturalized. The circular relationship between micro-level practices and macro-
level ideologies can explain why the audience can both be influenced by and influence the media. 
Since discourses are produced in relations of power, equity, and social justice (Gee, 2011, p.30), 
exploring media discourse is particularly important. The media is a powerful organization that is 
responsible for the (re)production of these ideologies; in the act of choosing one form of language 
(verbal, visual, etc.) over another, they “have the potential to re-scale social, cultural, and symbolic 
capital, and thereby ‘re-shuffle’ authority and expertise on particular issues” (Milani and Johnson, 
2010, p. 6). Through the way they frame particular issues, they have the power to shape and 
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change dominant ideologies, which in turn influence people’ social practices. Dominant social 
groups such as the media use ideology to establish their power; they use certain discourses “in the 
service of the struggle to maintain or acquire power” (Woolard, 1998, p.6). They do so by trying to 
“fix” certain ideologies and make them seem natural and common sense through their 
metalinguistic representations. They do not mirror reality but attempt to circulate a naturalized 
distorted version of reality in which certain voices are privileged over others. As a result, the 
medias’ choices, values, and definitions serve to create social boundaries and inequalities in 
relations of power in society at large. As I demonstrated in this chapter, there are direct 
consequences to circulating distorted versions of reality since the audience can take these idologies 
up and spread them. I have also shown how people genuinely struggle to make sense of digital 
media, especially under the influence of what they hear and see in the news. In particular, we see 
how news media discourses are often (but not always) taken up and adopted when regular people 
talk about digital media. The circulation of the particular “regimes of truth” that I have analyzed 
in this chapter ultimately reminds us that technological change is both perceived in terms of 
progress as well as in terms of regression and anxiety. It is this “nuance” in people’s media 
ideologies that I wish to explore further in the next and final concluding chapter of this thesis, as I 

























Throughout this thesis, I have investigated the complex ways in which digital media discourse 
circulates across languages and nations, across linguistic and visual modes, across domains (e.g. the 
news media, stock photography, audiences), and across social groups (e.g. females users of digital 
media). More specifically, I have shown that the social meanings and cultural discourses of digital 
communication are varied and complex. I would now like to take a look at how each of the 
chapters of this thesis help to “make sense” of the various discourses that circulate between the 
news media and its audience, and understand how these chapters relate to one another. 
Ultimately, I argue that digital discourse (in the press and in everyday conversation) is imbued with 
an important affective undercurrent.  
 
Summary of the thesis 
 
Chapter 2 of this thesis concerned itself with language ideologies and related semiotic ideologies 
and served as a stepping-stone to the following chapters which focused more on media and gender 
ideologies. In Chapter 2, I examined the metadiscursive framing of digital discourse in 
international news stories about emojis. Specifically, I analyzed narratives about the perceived 
threat to language posed by digital visual communication. I showed how discourses concerned 
with language deterioration – discourses that frequently blame new technologies – are redirected 
to the deleterious impact of visuality, which is an example of a discourse of “language 
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endangerment” (cf. Duchêne & Heller, 2007). Ultimately, I demonstrated that the discourse of 
language endangerment is not only constitutive of language ideologies, but also of deep-seated 
“semiotic ideologies” (cf Keane, 2003) or beliefs about meaning-making. In other words, the 
discourse of language endangerment revealed how journalists value certain semiotic modes as 
being superior to others, (i.e. when they describe (written) language as superior to images and 
visual communication). My discourse analysis of international news reports not only showed how 
journalists “misrecognize” the nature of language, visual communication, and digital media, but 
also how they seek to scare their audience through diverse rhetorical tactics (i.e. the emoji as a new 
language; the rise and spread of emojis; and linguistic, cultural, and intellectual degradation), all of 
which serve to create a discourse of moral panic.   
 In the following chapter, I moved from language ideologies to media ideologies with a 
specific focus on news media discourse regarding children’s digital media practices. Using the 
framework of multimodal critical discourse analysis, I analyzed the news media’s ideologies 
concerning children’s relationship with digital media and revealed journalists’ and adults’ 
expectations of children and their digital media practices. These expectations and interpretations 
are often framed solely around a discourse of risk and are loaded with “harm-driven expectations” 
(cf. Vickery, 2017), which is problematic, misleading, and narrowing since this view justifies 
practices centered on surveillance and restriction, in the name of children’s safety. The news 
media discursively constructs an idea of childhood as “risk free” which, in turn, shapes an 
understanding of children as passive and vulnerable. I thus demonstrated how “childhood” is a 
concept that is socially and discursively produced (e.g. Holloway & Valentine, 2000; James & 
Prout, 1997; Stainton-Rogers & Stainton-Rogers, 1992). While there is a long precedent of moral 
panic discourses and mediatized “scare tactics” in the news, I argued that these cultural discourses 
are problematic since news media discourse not only has implications for children, but also for 
parents and caregivers who are frightened by the one-sided perspective that the news media offers. 
If parents are told that “screens are like crack to children”, it is understandable that parents would 
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not want their child to spend time on digital media. In this way, the media suggests a form of 
digital abstinence for children. However, this is an unrealistic expectation in a digital world where 
more and more children possess some form of digital technology. Consequently, the press scares its 
readers without offering them a realistic alternative for dealing with their children’s use of digital 
media. Furthermore, by focusing solely on the potential deleterious effects of digital media on 
children, the press does not take into account all of the valuable empirical work being done on 
children and their digital media use, much of which points to the positive opportunities offered by 
digital media (e.g. Livingstone et al., 2018).  
 In Chapter 4, the last chapter in which I focused on news media discourse (or the “cultural 
discourses” of digital communication), I introduced “gender” as a key analytic focus by examining  
the role of the media in constructing and fixing gendered visual ideologies related to digital 
communication. I showed how women and girls are limited by the news media’s visual 
representations of them, and how the digital practices that are encouraged visually are often 
confining and disempowering. Although research illustrates what women are capable of doing 
with digital media – through digital feminist activism for instance (cf. Keller et al., 2018; Mendes 
et al., 2018) –images found in the news media offer a very narrow vision of what women can do 
with technology by emphasizing an essentialist position on gender differences that positions 
women’s conversational, social and emotional skills, as well as their interest in beauty and 
appearance, as inherent and fixed. Although the news media does not employ the same “scare 
tactics” in relation to women that it uses with children and emojis, it relies on a different kind of 
“moral panic” when portraying women, one that presents women as vacuous, irresponsible, 
vulnerable and at risk (see Thurlow, 2017). The news media industry (in selecting the specific 
images that form my dataset) and the photo industry (in creating such images) construct gendered 
identities in relation to what they consider “normed” categories. Such constructions socialize men 
and women into certain kinds of behavior. For instance, the people represented as young, overly 
expressive and emotional when using digital media are mainly women because these kinds of 
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behaviors are associated with popular beliefs about womanhood (see Marwick, 2014). These 
images purport to tell us what being a woman using digital media is/looks like. However, they also 
go to show that even (overly) happy affective representations can be problematic. Even though the 
women depicted in the images are “happy”, the seemingly “positive” representation of these 
women actually serves to reinforce traditional gender stereotypes of women as unserious and 
emotional. In these images, the flow of emotions is less triggered by talk about digital media, but is 
rather seen in the visual representations of digital spaces. As such, the media’s construction of such 
spaces is out of touch with today’s society as it takes an essentialist position on gender differences.  
 The next two substantive chapters of my thesis examined the social meanings (or 
embedded practices) of digital communication. In Chapter 5, I offered a methodological 
contribution to the field of digital discourse studies by letting young women speak for themselves. I 
explored the discursive strategies that “wired women” utilize to negotiate the news media’s 
gendered representations of women and digital technologies, and how they (re)produce and/or 
challenge gender ideologies. Through my four focus groups, I examined the complex intersection 
of top-down cultural discourses and bottom-up social meanings and/or practices. Although the 
media (and its patriarchal ideology) subtly directs its audience towards a preferred meaning that 
aligns with its values and reflects dominant attitudes in society, it does not perfectly mirror society 
itself. As Lazar notes, discourse is a “socio-historically contingent ‘meaning-potential’” (2000, 
p.376). Thus, gender discourse is also a social construction and has the potential to be challenged. 
Furthermore, as the “circuit of culture” (cf. Hall, 1997) demonstrates, media texts can influence 
their audiences, but audiences also play a role in the interpretation of media messages. An 
audience is not a passive entity which blindly accepts any message from the media; rather, the 
audience plays an active role in the construction or challenging of ideologies, which is what I 
found in my focus group discussions as regards the patriarchal gender ideologies promoted by the 
news media. Ultimately, I demonstrated that my focus group participants discursively position 
themselves as powerful by challenging the news media’s representations of women and showing 
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awareness of patriarchal hegemony and gender stereotypes. They are able to negotiate and even 
reject the moral panic that the media prepetuates. However, they simultaneously position 
themselves as powerless by empowering men as being more competent digital media users and by 
identifying with the women depicted in the images (who are often portrayed as simple-minded). 
Following feminist post-structuralist discourse analysis (Baxter, 2003), I showed that the female 
participants exemplified two competing identities. They showed surprise, annoyance, frustration, 
and dissatisfaction with the news media’s images representing women as digital media users, 
images that they challenged and rejected because of their exaggeratedness. However, they did not 
show any surprise or shock when viewing the images representing men. I argued that they had 
evidently internalized and normalized gender ideologies that represent men as more professional 
and business-like. According to these gender ideologies, it is (working) men who “naturally” 
exemplify qualities such as seriousness and intelligence. Therefore, although women reproduce 
some of the news media’s gendered ideologies when discussing digital media use, they also 
challenge “normalized performances of emotions” (Döveling et al., 2018, p.2) when it comes to the 
portrayal of women’s digital media practices.   
 In my final substantive chapter, Chapter 6, I analyzed my focus group participants’ media 
ideologies in regards to digital communication as they spoke back to news media discourse. As in 
the press, the participants displayed a dystopian perspective with regards to digital media, and 
much of their media ideologies were imbued with fear. However, their discourse was more 
“nuanced” than the news media’s. I identified three major concerns that participants shared 
concerning digital media and digital communication. The first concern consisted of paricipants’ 
fears regarding children’s use of digital media and was prompted by questions that specifically 
addressed children’s digital media use (as a response to news media discourse about children’s 
digital media use). Here, I found that participants took up the same discourse of “moral panic” (see 
Buckingham & Jensen, 2012; Critcher, 2008) regarding children’s digital practices that I discussed 
in Chapter 3 of this thesis. Their second concern regarded the (in)appropriate use of digital media 
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and showed a certain nostalgia for old/traditional media, particularly for books and face-to-face 
communication, another discourse commonly found in the news media. Finally, the participants 
shared their concerns and worries regarding privacy and surveillance issues. I found that the 
participants did not always agree on the best way to resolve social issues concerning digital media, 
and that they did not always have the same “idioms of practice” Gershon (2010a, p.6).  Although 
all three of their concerns mirrored some of the concerns frequently discussed in the press and all 
three centered on moral panic and fear, I ultimately showed that young people have a hard time 
making sense of digital media, especially as a result of the influence of news media discourses and 
the “regimes of truth” that they perpetuate. Their struggle is evident through their understanding 
of media change as both a step forward and a step backward. Indeed, in contrast to the news 
media, which often focuses on dystopian discourses at the expense of all else, the participants’ 
discourse was much more nuanced.  
 
Moral panics and/as affective regimes 
 
In sum, all of my chapters revolve around the affective nature of digital media discourse, whether 
through the “affective” undercurrent of news media discourse or the audience’s “affective” 
response to such discourse. I argue that a perspective focusing on affect and the power of 
emotional appeals can help us understand how certain language ideologies, media ideologies and 
gender ideologies circulate among journalists and their audience and how they become 
naturalized through this interaction (cf. Pribram & Harding, 2002). As Grossberg (1992, p.82-83) 
argues, “affect is the missing term in an adequate understanding of ideology”; “[i]t is the affective 
investment which enables ideological relations to be internalized and, consequently, naturalized”. 
In other words, the media ideologies found in the press are not simply intellectual arguments 
appealing to the audience’s reason; they are arguments which use logic to make a strong emotional 
appeal. Therefore, not only do ideas and beliefs become naturalized through media discourse, the 
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emotions that the press elicits while espousing these ideas and beliefs become naturalized as well. 
 The “affective turn” marked a turning point in the field of social sciences and humanities, 
when scholars started to take into greater consideration bodily experiences and emotions, and our 
capacity to affect and be affected (e.g. Ahmed, 2004; Massumi, 2002; Clough & Halley, 2007; 
Wetherell, 2012). As a result, “the turn to affect becomes a decisive shift away from the current 
conventions of critical theory, away from research based on discourse and disembodied talk and 
texts” (Wetherell, 2012, p. 3). As mentioned above, Grossberg (1992) discussed “affect” as the 
“missing term” (p.82) in the understanding of ideology, and critiqued the dominant focus on 
“representation” and cognition in cultural studies. Following Grossberg and other scholars of 
“affect”, I take into account the importance of “affect” in the construction of ideologies. More 
specifically, I look at the mediated representations of digital media and how these have the power 
to “affect” their audiences. Some of the traditional discourses one finds in the press (and 
sometimes among users) are imbued with the feeling of fear; these discourses seek to scare their 
audiences into action. The media’s “affective practices” (which are not all dystopian) are 
“continually dynamic with the potential to move in multiple and divergent directions” (Wetherell, 
2012, p.13). I showed throughout this thesis how affective states and practices travel and circulate 
across different domains, how the press can influence its audience’s affective states, and how the 
audience can challenge, resist and/or take up the press’s emotionally-charged ideologies.   
 The role of the news media in the circulation and transformation of emotions and affective 
practices is better understood through the concept of “mediatization”. Indeed, the term “is used in 
communication studies for the critical analysis of interrelations between socio-cultural and media-
communicative change” (Androutsopoulos, 2014, p.10). Döveling et al. (2018) bring together 
research on mediatization and affect as an additional step in the understanding of online communities 
of practices. They coined the term “digital affect cultures” to explain how digital technologies 
“foster a globally mediatized emotional exchange” (Döveling et al, 2018, p.1). I am especially 
interested in their argument that digital affect cultures are “inherently normative and infused with 
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relations of power where, depending on the context, some emotional scenarios are normalized at 
the expense of others” (Döveling et al., 2018, p.2). Although their research focuses on investigating 
the circulation of emotions in digital spaces (i.e. social media), my thesis rather explored the flow 
and circulation of emotions outside of/around digital spaces. I argue that digital affect cultures 
may also emerge from and be triggered by talk about digital spaces, in metadiscursive practices. As 
such, hegemonic affective practices and emotions circulate through different spaces and become 
normalized. The news media’s discourse with its distorted representations of digital media 
practices (e.g. emojis) and of different groups of users (e.g. children and women) not only circulates 
negative kinds of “affect” (e.g. fear and anxieties), but also other happier affective states (e.g. the 
overly excited women using their phone/eating a salad), which shows the nuance in the discourses 
that are circulating. Those different kinds of affect trigger similar or different emotional responses 
in their audiences. Emotions are “discursively constructed cultural practice[s]” and are “governed 
by implicit norms of what and how we should feel” (Döveling et al., 2018, p.2). When news media 
discourse visually and linguistically portrays digital media as dangerous and frightening, or 
celebrates young women’s use of digital media, it essentially tells audiences that they should feel the 
same way about digital media. And, as I discovered in my focus groups, much of their audience 
does feel the same way.  
 Ultimately, I argue that there is an “affective regime” which circulates between the news 
media and its audience. An “affective regime” describes “the set of conditions that govern with 
varying degrees of hegemonic status the ways in which particular kinds of affect can be 
appropriately materialized’ (Wee, 2016, p.109). Thus, as an “affective regime”, the news media 
not only tells its audiences what to think about a particular issue, it also implicitly tells them how to 
feel. While Hall’s (1997) “circuit of culture” takes into account the ways in which meanings are 
constantly exchanged and (re)negotiated through different entities, his framework does not 
consider the important “affective” dimension that also circulates. In my focus groups, I found that 
not only do certain ideas circulate between the news media and its audience, certain emotions do 
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as well (moral panic and nostalgia). In order to understand the effect that news media discourse 
has on regular people, I explored how these different “affects” develop, circulate, resonate, and 
change. I found that the “affective regime” surrounding digital media is not necessarily uniform, 
and that it mirrors to some extent what Kuntsman (2012, p.2) calls “reverberation” with regards to 
the circulation of emotions and affective states. “Reverberation” refers to “distortions and 
resonance, intensification and dissolution in the process of moving”. While some affects such as 
fear are intensified in their movement and circulation (e.g. the news media’s dystopian discourses 
about the risks and harm of digital media and the audience’s similar response), others can be 
“muffled” (cf. Kuntsman, 2012, p,2), as I showed with the supposed “celebration” of young 
women’s use of digital media in Chapter 4. Indeed, even positive affective representations can be 
problematic since they can “muffle” a wider “moral panic” discourse.  
 It is with this in mind that I turn to two final examples of mediatized discourse. Figures 7.1 
and 7.2 show recent headlines and their accompanying images from the English-speaking press, 










Figure 7.1 comes from The Atlantic and focuses on an exaggeratedly negative framing, depicting a 
dystopian reality where social media has become so uncontrollable that it is leading to the collapse 
of our worlds. The accompanying image (with its disconcerting affect) reflects the frenzied nature 
of the headline “Social-media outrage is collapsing our worlds” as it portrays the repeated 
reflection of a young girl smiling, as if the viewer were looking at her through a kaleidoscope. 
Figure 7.2 comes from the BBC News website and exemplifies the mental health affects around 
digital media, as more and more young people are “sadfishing” (i.e. sharing their emotional 
problems online in order to get compassion from other people). What both examples demonstrate 
is that the movement and circulation of words and images can intensify feelings of fear and 
anxiety. Therefore, “the power of emotions accumulates through circulation of texts” (Kuntsman, 
2012, p.2, see also Ahmed, 2004).  
 In sum, through the explicit and implicit discourse about affect and emotions in the news 
media as well as in the audience’s response, we see how “moral panic” discourses are constructed. 
These moral panic discourses are themselves manifestations of wider “affective regimes”. 
Figure 7.2: BBC News, 1 October 2019. No image caption. (Image source: Getty Image) 
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Throughout this thesis, I have attempted to make sense of the “affective regimes” concerning 
digital media as they circulate in and out of digital spaces. I have looked at “the movement of 
emotions and feelings in and out of cyberspace, through bodies, psyches, texts and machines, but 
also [at] the multiplicity of effects such movement might entail” (Kuntsman, 2012, p.2). I have 
shown that these effects are nuanced. Discourses of fear are still prevalent in the news; however, 
the audience does not simply blindly take them up. When users themselves were given the 
opportunity to “speak back”, they displayed a wide range of responses to the news media’s 
discourse of moral panic and were not always dystopian in outlook. In addition, there is another 
dimension to the news media’s moral panic discourse that must not be ignored: the “disguised” 
depiction of female users of digital media as happy and positive, which is problematic since it 
reveals an underlying discursive construction of women and girls as vacuous and vulnerable. While 
this thesis highlights a certain “agreement” between the news media and the audience, it also 
demonstrates how people can challenge the status quo and the news media’s reductionist 
representations, something that current research seeks to do by demonstrating the power of the 
audience in shaping new meanings through the creation of new cultural texts. Although the news 
media continues to portray digital media and digital media users in unfavorable terms, it is 
nonetheless crucial to remember that it is through these same digital technologies that change can 
occur and that another picture can be painted, one which is ideally more forward-looking and 








[1] For more information about the Sinergia project, see the project website https://whatsup-
switzerland.ch/index.php/en/ 
 
[2] For more information about Sub-project D, see https://www.crispinthurlow.net/digital-discourse-database.php 
 




[4] The BBC example was retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/education-49883030 





[5] I present critical discourse studies in more detail later when I outline my methodological framework: Multimodal 
critical discourse analysis  
 
[6] I present multimodality in more detail later when I outline my methodological framework: Multimodal critical 
discourse analysis 
 
[7] I will discuss the concept of “media ideologies” and its core features in more detail later in my analyses  
 
[8] The concept of feminism will be defined and developed in Chapter 5 
 
[9] In the modern era, the concept of risk has become synonymous with ‘danger’ (Fox, 1999) 
 
[10] When I refer to a “text”, I refer to a manifestation of a communicative event that can be expressed through 
words, sounds, visual cues etc. (Bell and Garrett, 1998, p.3) 
 
[11] Although the DDD now includes a total of 1403 articles, at the time of my news media analyses, the DDD 
included fewer articles (see Chapters 2, 3, and 4).  
 
[12] In my thesis overview (end of Chapter 1), I explain why there is a special focus on ‘children’ in my thesis.  
 
[13] Find more details about the data collection process in Chapters 5 and 6, which both deal with focus group data 
 
[14] All of the names are pseudonyms  
 
[15] Chapter 2 is closely based on a co-authored publication: Thurlow, C. & Jaroski, V. (2020). 'Emoji invasion': The 
semiotic ideology of language endangerment in multilingual news discourse. In C. Thurlow, C. Dürscheid & F. 




[16] Since this chapter is closely based on a co-authored publication, I mostly use the pronoun “we”, but I sometimes 




[17] We treat newspaper headlines as a distinctive sub-genre of news stories (cf. Bell 1991) but also as an especially 





[18] Although a gender perspective is beyond the scope of the present chapter (see Chapter 5 for an analysis of the 
relationship between gender and digital media use), the reference to gender differences in Extract 3.3 represents an 
essentialist view on gender and technology (see Marwick, 2014, and also Thurlow et al., 2019). 
 





[20] In Table 4.1, I added an extra column on the far right which displays further statistics about the gendered 
distribution of specific types of clothing, facial expressions, and age which are relevant for my analysis. In this column, 
I only mention relevant statistics for female-only and male-only images, and not for images with both genders. 
 
[21] The images on the left-hand side (i.e. women laughing with salads) were taken for illustrative purposes from the 
website The Hairpin available here: 
- https://www.thehairpin.com/2011/01/women-laughing-alone-with-salad/ 









[22] In my analysis, I display the participants’ biographical details (i.e. age and profession) in parenthesis. 
 
[23] “Patois” refers to the Franco-provençal language and should not be confused with the English connotations of  
the word “patois”. It is the word that people in the canton of Valais use to refer to the “Franco-Provençal” language 
and carries no negative connotation. In the canton of Valais, different patois dialects are still spoken in some mountain 
towns, but since most patois speakers also speak French, the use of patois is becoming more and more marginalized. 
However, there are attempts to keep patois alive. The town of Evolène is currently the last Swiss town where Franco-
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Sources of quoted newspapers  
 
1. Linguistic extracts 
 








Extract 2.2: The Mirror, UK  
https://www.mirror.co.uk/tech/redhead-emoji-finally-getting-ginger-9661961 
 


































Extract 2.11: Tagblatt, Switzerland  
https://www.tagblatt.ch/panorama/viele-viele-bunte-symbole-ld.936621 
 








Extract 2.14: Le Matin, Switzerland  
https://www.lematin.ch/societe/retour-hieroglyphes/story/15235954 
 
Extract 2.15: Tages-Anzeiger, Switzerland  
https://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/digital/Eine-literarische-Revolution-/story/18666187 
 








Extract 2.18: CNBC, US  
https://www.cnbc.com/2015/06/24/emojis-the-death-of-the-written-language.html 
 
Extract 2.19: The Telegraph, UK  
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2016/08/08/emoji-are-they-a-force-for-good/ 
 
Extract 2.20: The Daily Mail, UK  
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5628765/Emoji-ruining-English-language.html 
 





Extract 3.1: The Mirror, UK  
https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/real-life-stories/mum-home-schools-children-letting-9741165 
 
















Extract 3.6: La Tribune de Genève, Switzerland 
https://www.tdg.ch/savoirs/sante/ecrans-abiment-enfants/story/10899157 
 




Extract 3.8: AAP Council on Communications and Media  
https://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/pediatrics/138/5/e20162591.full.pdf 
 
Extract 3.9 : Le Temps, Switzerland  
https://www.letemps.ch/societe/abus-decrans-responsabilite-parents 
 





2. Visual extracts 
 


















 Figure 3.4: Le Matin, Switzerland, 3 July 2017 
https://www.lematin.ch/suisse/alerte-ecrans-enfants-bas-ge/story/25027106?track 
 




Figure 3.6: The Mirror, UK, 6 October 2016 
https://www.mirror.co.uk/tech/secret-cyber-life-10-year-8993074 
 












Figure 4.3: The Telegraph, UK 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/life/i-cant-be-trusted-with-googles-texting-app/ 
 
Figure 4.4: The Mirror, UK 
https://www.mirror.co.uk/tech/you-unfriend-people-facebook-new-7861180 
 









Figure 4.7: The Washington Post, US 
https://www.pressreader.com/usa/the-washington-post/20160326/281784218222693 
 
Figure 4.8: The Mirror, UK 
https://www.mirror.co.uk/lifestyle/family/dad-confiscates-iphone-savage-joke-10763694 
 








Figure 4.11: The Telegraph, UK 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/family/parenting/should-befriend-children-pals-online/ 
 
Figure 4.12: El Pais, Spain 
https://elpais.com/tecnologia/2017/05/19/actualidad/1495189858_566160.html 
 
Figure 4.13: Beobachter, Switzerland 
https://www.beobachter.ch/digital/multimedia/digitalisierung-sind-wir-allesamt-handy-sklaven 
 
Figure 4.14: Die Zeit, Germany 
https://www.zeit.de/zeit-magazin/leben/2016-07/internet-technik-eltern-generation-hilfe 
 




Figure 4.16: Die Welt, Germany 
https://www.welt.de/kmpkt/article162224543/Dein-iPhone-kann-etwas-das-du-nichtkennst.html 
 
Figure 4.17: The Mirror 
https://www.mirror.co.uk/tech/viva-instagram-photo-sharing-app-8264454 
 



























Figure 7.1: The Atlantic, US 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/01/outrage/579553/ 
 








The Digital Discourse Database 
 
 












Left-hand side of the SEARCH section: Newspaper name, language, country, year, topic tags, 
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Focus group questionnaire (see Chapters 5 and 6) 
 
Introduction 
Tout d’abord, je voudrais vous remercier d’avoir accepté de faire partie de ce groupe de 
discussion. Comme vous le savez, dans ma thèse j’analyse les discours des médias sur les 
nouvelles technologies et la communication numérique. Je m’intéresse particulièrement aux 
images qui accompagnent les articles de journaux et qui représentent des personnes avec des 
appareils numériques, mais aussi aux commentaires écrits sur les pratiques des gens. Ce 
groupe de discussion est donc pour moi une manière de découvrir ce que les utilisateurs de 
nouvelles technologies (vous) pensez à propos de ces représentations dans les medias.  
 
First, I would like to thank you for agreeing to be part of this focus group. As you know, for my PhD project, 
I’m analyzing news media discourse about digital communication and practices. I’m especially interested in how 
the press visually portrays people and digital devices, and also how the press writes about people’s new media 
practices. This focus group is a way for me to find out what actual users (you) think about those media 
representations.  
Avant de commencer, je voudrais juste vous dire qu’il n’y a pas de réponse juste ou fausse. Je 
vais vous guider avec des questions, mais c’est vous qui allez parler. Je vais enregistrer la 
conversation, mais nous resterez anonymes. Je ne vais identifier personne dans mon rapport. 
Avez-vous des questions?  
Before I start, let me tell you that there is no right or wrong answer. I will be guiding you with questions but you 
will do the talking. I will be tape recording the conversation but I won’t identify anyone by name in my report, 
so you will remain anonymous. Do you have any questions? 
Question 1 
Pour commencer sur le thème des nouvelles technologies, pourriez-vous tout d’abord me dire 
quels appareils vous possédez (par exemple smartphone, tablette) et pour quoi vous les utilisez 
de manière générale?  
 
As a way of introducing the topic of new technologies and digital communication, can you tell me what digital 




Qu’est-ce que vous pensez des journaux comme l’article ci-dessous qui disent que les gens 
passent trop de temps sur leur téléphone et que ça peut avoir un impact négatif sur leur santé 
et leur vie sociale? Quelle est votre opinion par rapport à vos pratiques?  
 
What do you think about news articles such as the one below which claim that people spend too much time on 
their phone and that this can have a negative impact on their health and social life? What’s your opinion on that 
in relation to your own practices? 
 
    
Article Source: Les Echose, France, 8 February 2017 
 
Question 3a 
Qu’est ce que vous pensez de ces deux images qui accompagnent deux articles de journaux? 
Que font ces enfants? Que pensez-vous de ces situations? (E.g. quels effets cela peut avoir sur 
les enfants? Comment vous savez ça?)  
 




                
Article source: Le Temps, Switzerland, 2 Feb. 2018 
Image source: Getty Image 
 
              
Article source: The Telegraph, UK, 10 June 2017 
Image source: Per Breiehagen 
 
Question 3b 
La première image vient d’un article récent du journal Le Temps (2 février 2018) dont le 
titre est: La cyberdépendance abrutit les enfants, et qui parle de l’addiction aux 
écrans des petits enfants, ce qui inquiète L’OMS. L’article dit par exemple: «L’utilisation 
excessive des tablettes, smartphones ou jeux vidéo entraîne des pathologies comme 
l’obésité, un retard du langage, des troubles du sommeil, des diabètes de type II, une 
élévation du stress, de l’hyperactivité mais aussi une augmentation des cas de myopie.». 
Que feriez-vous en tant que parent?  
 
The first image comes from a recent article from Le Temps (2 February 2018). The title is: 
Cyberdependence is making children stupid. The article talks about children’s addiction to 
screens, which is worrying the WHO. The article states for instance: “The excessive use of tablets, 
smartphones or video games is leading to pathologies such as obesity, language delay, sleeping problems, type 





Est-ce que vous pensez que les hommes et les femmes utilisent les smartphones et autres 
appareils numériques de la même manière et de la même quantité?  
 




Laissez-moi vous donner quelques statistiques que j’ai trouvé dans mon travail: sur 214 
images de personnes avec des smartphones et autres appareils numériques comme tablette 
ou ordinateur, 53% ne montrent que des femmes et des filles, et 29% que des hommes ou 
des garçons. Il y a donc beaucoup plus d’images de femmes et filles avec smartphones et 
autres appareils numériques. Qu’est-ce que vous pensez de cette sur-représentation 
féminine?  
 
Let me give you some statistics from the work I have done so far: out of 214 images of people and 
smartphones, tablets, and laptops, 53% portray women/girls only, and 29% depict men/boys only. There 
are thus more images of women and girls with digital devices than men and boys with digital devices. What 
do you think about this female overrepresentation? 
 
Question 6 
Maintenant je vais vous montrer des exemples de ces images que l’on trouve dans les 
journaux. Regardez de plus près ces images. Que font ces femmes? Comment sont-elles 
représentées?  
 
Now I will show you some examples of news media images. Look closely at these images. What are these 
women doing? How are they represented? 
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Article source: The Daily Mail, UK, 25 February 2016 
Image source: Corbis 
 
 
                  
Article source: Die Welt, Germany, 30 September 2017 
Image source: Getty Image 
 
 
          
Article source: Die Welt, Germany, 23 February 2017 
Image source: Getty Image 
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Article source: The Guardian, UK, 29 May 2016 




Et ces hommes, que font-ils? Comment sont-ils représentés?  
 
And these men, what are they doing? How are they represented? 
 
 
                
Article source: The Telegraph, UK, 2 March 2017 




                  
Article source: Die Zeit, Germany, 21 July 2016 
Image source: N/A 
 
 
        
Article source: LA Times, US, 21 June 2017 
Image source: Associated Press 
 
 
            
Article source: The New York Times, US 6 July 2017 
Image source: European Press Photo Agency 
 
Question 8 
Qu’est-ce que vous pensez de la place des femmes dans le monde des nouvelles technologies?  
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What do think about the place of women in the field/world of new technologies? 
 
Question 9 
On a terminé les questions. Voulez-vous rajouter quelque chose par rapport aux nouvelles 
technologies et les pratiques des femmes, des hommes, des jeunes, des enfants?  
 
We’re done with questions. Would you like to add anything else about new communication technologies and 






Sources of the news articles that specifically discuss the relationship between 
language and emojis (see Chapter 2) 
 
The Guardian (UK), The Mirror (UK), BBC (UK), Daily Mail (UK), The Telegraph (UK), 
The Independent (UK) 
The New York Times (US), The Los Angeles Times (US), The Washington Post (US), USA 
Today (US), CNBC (US), The Huffington Post (US) 
 




Le Figaro (France), Le Monde (France), Courrier International (France) 
 







Antconc concordance of French words ‘langage’ and ‘langue’, and English word 
‘language (see Chapter 2) 
 
 


















The most common nouns in the French-language and English-language datasets 
through Antconc (see Chapter 3) 
 
French nouns 
1. monde (world) 11. téléphone (telephone) 21. entreprise (company) 
2. enfants (children) 12. jour (day) 22. communication 
3. intelligence (intelligence) 13. internet  23. application (app) 
4. temps (time) 14. vie (life) 24. compte (account) 
5. google 15. mots (words) 25. données (data) 
6. écrans (screens) 16. fois (times) 26. ligne (line) 
7. réseaux 
(networks/media) 
17. années (years) 27. messages  
8. parents (parents) 18. écran (screen) 28. twitter 
9. exemple (example) 19. utilisateurs (users) 29. réseau (network) 
10. enfant (child) 20. point (point) 30. étude (study) 
 
English nouns 
1. people 11. company 21. friends 
2. time 12. technology 22. face 
3. media 13. children 23. parents 
4. year 14. apple 24. life 
5. users 15. phone 25. school 
6. app 16. internet 26. content 
7. twitter 17. day 27. messages 
8. way 18. news 28. things 
9. world 19. work 29. women 















Sources of the news articles that specifically discuss children’s digital media 
practices (see Chapter 3) 
 
The Guardian (UK), The Daily Mail (UK), The Telegraph (UK), The Sun (UK), The Mirror 
(UK), The Independent (UK), The Argus (UK), The Irish Examiner (Ireland) 
The Huffington Post (US), The New York Times (US) 
The Scotsman (Scotland) 
Essential Kids (Australia) 
Le Monde (France), Le Figaro (France), Les Echos (France) 
 
La Tribune de Genève (Switzerland), Le Matin (Switzerland), Le Temps (Switzerland), 24 
heures (Switzerland) 
Der Bund (Switzerland), 20 Minuten (Switzerland), Beobachter (Switzerland), Tages Anzeiger 
(Switzerland), Appenzeller Zeitung (Switzerland), Handelszeitung (Switzerland), St. Galler 
Tagblatt (Switzerland), Die Weltwoche (Switzerland), Die Wochenzeitung (Switzerland) 
 
Die Welt (Germany), Die Zeit (Germany), Kontakter (Germany), Süddeutsche Zeitung 
(Germany), Norddeutscher Rundfunk (Germany), Berliner Zeitung (Germany), Die Hessische 















Montage of news media images portraying young children with digital media 

















These news media images come from 24 different news stories from: The Telegraph (UK), 
The Mirror (UK), The Guardian (UK), Daily Mail (UK), The New York Times (US), Die 
Zeit (Germany), Tages Anzeiger (Switzerland), Beobachter (Switzerland), NZZ (Switzerland), 




Transcription conventions based on the Jefferson transcription system (see 
Chapters 5 and 6) 
 
[word]  overlapping talk 
[word  simultaneous talk 
=  end of a sequence of line and beginning of another sequence of line without 
any   pause 
(.)  very brief pause 
(0.5)  time between words in seconds 
(      )  uncertain or inaudible word 
↑   rise in intonation 
↓  drop in intonation 
((        ))        analyst’s comments in the parentheses  
CAPITAL louder words 
° word  indicates that a specific word is softer than the rest of the talk 
?  indicates a rising tone which may indicate a question 
 
 
   
 
  
